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PREFACE
 
The Orbiter subsystem hardware/software interaction analysis examines software
 
interaction with hardware failure modes. Each failure mode identified in
 
subsystem FMEA (failure mode and effects analysis) is examined for interaction
 
with software. The analysis is based upon key questions which identify-potential
 
issues. These potential issues are to be resolved by providing rationale for
 
retention or identifying and. implementing changes to eliminate the issue.
 
The figure on the following page illustrates the relationship, of the
 
hardware/software interaction analysis to the verification process which leads to
 
the statement of flight readiness. As shown, the analysis is a supporting. item
 
which is a portion of the data base utilized by the FRAT's (flight readiness
 
assessment teams) and the associated SEAM (Systems Eng-ineering Assessment
 
Meeting) teams in planning and controlling,the verification process. The overall
 
issue of hardware/software interface compatibility is addressed by the verifica­
tion process itself. The analysis scope is limited to examination of single

failure modes, as identified in the FMEA, and the interaction of these failure
 
modes with the software as reflected by the software requirements.
 
The hardware/software interaction analysis is performed on a preliminary basis by
 
the JSC Reliability Division. Results, are then coordinated with JSC engineering
 
and Rockwell/Space Systems Group engineering and reliability to obtain inputs and
 
approval signatures. The approval sheet for the AFT Reaction. Control System are
 
presented below. The Rockwell signatures represent their review, of the open
 
issues and risks, if any, performed against the summarization of the analysis.
 
Section 5.0 presents. the analysis summary which- groups the failure modes by
 
similar retention rationale and is a convenience in identifying groups of failure
 
modes in which the analysis is similar. The reviews with Rockwell did not cover
 
each checklist. The minutes presented in the appendix document the nature and
 
depth of the Rockwell analysis review.
 
This analysis verified that no open issues remain. /jS
 
Approved: 4 
"Joseph H. Levine
 
?fChief, Reliability Division
 
it, 
VERIFICATION 
ANALYSIS 
VERIFICATIONPLAN IMPLEMENTINGDOCUMENTATION , 
CN,VNFLIGHT 
READINESS 
* VERIFICATIONROADMApPLANAA 
*REQUIREMENTS 
I'-
- TRb 
. TRSD 
DOUETTO 
TCP I 
STATEMENT 
RED NS 
VERIFICATION 
"K? 
0 
TEST 
THE HARDWARE/SOFTWARE INTERACTION 
ANALYSIS IS PREPARED BY RELIABILITY. 
IT IS ONE OF MNY ANALYSES AND 
DOCUMENTS USED BY THE SEAM TEAMS 
FRAT'S AND FRAT'S IN THE PLANNING AND 
- SYSTEM ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT OF THE VERIFICATION. 
VERIFICATION PLANNING - RELIABILITY PROCESS. THE OVERALL VERIFICATION 
AND MANAGEMENT DESIGN PROCESS LEADS UP TO THE FINALFLIGHT READINESS STATEMENT FOR EACH 
~A 
SUBSYSTEM AND THE VEHICLE AS 
WHOLE. 
SEAM TEAMS 
SYSTEM ENGINEERIN 
SRELIABILITY 
DESIGN 
OTHER ACTIVITIES DESIGN RELIABILITY SYSTEM ENGINEERING 
MML FMEA/CIL FSSR 
SDM HARDWARE/SOFTWARE CPDS 
ICD'S INTERACTION ANALYSIS INT. SCHEMATIC 
PRACA OMRSD/TRSD 
CERTIFICATION 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE INTERACTION ANALYSIS
 
AFT - RCS
 
SUBSYSTEM
 
FMEA # SD72-SH-0103-2
 
ANALYSIS DATE November 5,1979
 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYST 
APPROVED:
 
USC Reliability JSC Engineering FRAT Sponsor /
 
lockweil Reliability Rockwell Engineerin - FRAT Sponsor 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
 
Page
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION ............ ................1
 
2.0 SCOPE ..................... .............. 1
 
3.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS .......... ............... 1
 
4.0 DESCRIPTION .................... ............ 2
 
5.0 ANALYSIS SUMMARY SHEETS ................. ...... 9
 
6.0 ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SHEETS ................ ...... 13
 
LIST OF FIGURES
 
4-1 HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST ....... .............. 3
 
4-2 CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE ......... .................. 6
 
4-3 HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS SUMMARY ....... ............... 7
 
Appendix ............. ............................. 129
 
v 
1.0- INTRODUCTION. This report documents the results of the analysis of the 
hardware/software interaction analysis for the AFT Reaction Control System. This 
analysis-examines the interaction between hardware failure modes and-software in 
order to identify associated issues/risks. These issues/risks -are resolved 
through changes to software requirements to remove them, or surfaced to 
project/program management with appropriate retention rationale. 
2.0 SCOPE., All Orbiter subsystems and interfacing program elements which
 
interact with the Orbiter computer flight software are analyzed. The analysis
 
for each subsystem or interfacing element is presented in a separate volume of
 
this report (see section 3.1).
 
The analysis examines failure modes identified' in the subsystem/element FMEA
 
(failure mode and effects analysis). Potential interaction with software is
 
examined through evaluation of the software requirements, not detailed
 
implementation. The analysis is restricted to flight software requirements only,
 
and excl'udes utility/checkout software. The, BFS (backup flight system) software
 
is considered only as necessary, and only as it differs from the primary; the
 
basic thrust of the analysis is keyed to the primary system.
 
The analysis is based upon the, hardware design and software requirements as they
 
existed as of the date of the analysis. Future updates will be published as
 
necessary to incorporate changes to either the hardware or software.
 
3.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS.
 
3.1 HARDWARE/SOFTWARE' LNTERACTION ANALYSIS REPORT VOLUMES. The hard­
ware/softwarc interaction analysis results are reported on a subsystem basis,
 
each in a separate volume. The separate volumes which make up this report are as
 
follows:
 
Volume Subsystem
 
I Purge, Vent, and Drain
 
II Payload Deployment and Retention
 
III Payload Bay Doors
 
IV Main Propulsion
 
V Data Processing Subsystem
 
VI Hydraulics
 
VII Auxiliary Power Unit
 
VIII Reaction Control
 
IX Electrical Power Generation 
X Orbital Maneuvering
 
XI Environmental Control and Life Support
 
XII Integrated Avionics
 
XIII Electrical Power Distribution & Control
 
XIV GNC (Guidance, Navigation & Control) Support
 
XV Displays & Controls
 
XVI Communications & Tracking
 
XVII Instrumentation
 
3.2 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS. The primary documents used inperforming the analysis
 
included the following:
 
a. SD75-SH-17A, "Failure Mode Effects Analysis, AFT Reaction Control
 
Subsystem," July 18, 1977.
 
b. JSC 11174, "OV-102 Space, Shuttle Systems Handbook," September 22,
 
1977.
 
c. SD76-SH-0026A, "Functional Subsystem. Software Requirements, Sequence
 
Requirements," March, 1978.
 
d. SD76-SH-0020, "Functional Subsystem Software Requirements, Displays
 
and Controls," February 1, 1978.
 
e. SD76-SH-0027D, "Functional Subsystem Software Requirements, Systems
 
Management," October 16, 1978.
 
f. MG038103, "Backup Flight System Management/Special Processes and
 
Sequencing Program Requirements Document," December 20, 1978.
 
g. SD76-SH-O10E "Functional Subsystem Software Requirements, Redundancy
 
Management," June 1,1979.
 
4.0 DESCRIPTION.
 
4.1 GROUND RULES. The hardware software analysis is performed according to the
 
following ground rules:
 
a. The hardware/software analysis will be limited to investigating the
 
software interaction with the failure modes of the hardware as delineated inthe
 
subsystem FMEA's.
 
b. Software interaction will be limited to involvement of software of the
 
onboard computers.
 
c. Only failure modes of hardware with 'software interfaces (software
 
monitoring and/or software control) are analyzed.
 
d. The software detection must be considered with respect to each phase
 
of the mission [prelaunch (OPS 1 only), ascent, onorbit, and entry].
 
4.2 ANALYSIS CHECKLIST. The basic tool for the analysis is the checklist
 
(figure 4-1). A separate checklist isused for each failure mode analyzed. Note
 
that the "FMEA Number" inthe heading refers to the FMEA document number, not the
 
page number on which the failure mode istreated.
 
The checklist consists of three sections: Body, change/retention rationale
 
summary, and explanation/conments. Each of these sections isdicussed below.
 
4.2.1 CHECKLIST BODY. The checklist body conzains the questions which drive the
 
analysis. Blocks representing the possible answers for each question are
 
provided. Those answers identified by asterisks entail potential issues and
 
require explanation.
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.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST
 
SUBSYSTEM FMEA NUMBER
 
,ITEM 	 FAILURE MODE
 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES fl NO 5 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES 5 NO 2 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES N0 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES E] NO 5 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES 5] NO 5 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMIMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiIENTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES 5 NO -
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW W0 [] *1 2O 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YES5]5ON ] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 ISYES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES EJ*NO E] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES Q*NO 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
.0- NO H/S ISSUES 3.C3 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5.O ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. Q HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK - 4. --DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
FZFIEA CHANGE RECOMNMEDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
Fiqure 4-1, Hardware/Software Analysis Checklist
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The questions in the checklist body are answered using the following guidelines:.
 
a. Question I. Will the information provided to the onboard software and
 
the processing of that information cause annunciation of the failure and/or
 
initiation of a corrective action in response to this failure mode?
 
b. Question la. Answer question la. if the answer to question 1 is "no." 
Information available to the software could be in the form of (1) sensor data 
used by onboard software but not for automatic fault detection (data used in
 
software routines or fault detection available through callup or, dedicated 
di-splays); (2) system and/or subsystem performance parameters; or (3) 
measurements which are downlisted. Answer "yes' if such information- could be 
used to annunciate the failure condition or initiate responsive action. In 
explanation comments, specifically identify the information available for 
software detection. 
c. Question 2. If all 'of the following questions are answered "no," 
check the "no" block and explain the difference in the explanation/conmients 
section: 
(1) Are the'master measurements listed under "Failure Detectability 
In-flight" on the FMEA (1) used by the onboard software in detecting time 
critical failures (if routed to GPC), or (2) used- by the onboard software in 
annunciating non-time critical failures via cal-lup displays,, or (3) downlisted 
for non-time critical failures?
 
(2) Are other measurements, dedicated displays, crew detection, and 
system/subsystem parameters available or able to-detect this failure mode?
 
(3) If "failure detectability in-flight" specifies only software 
action, does the software actually initiate the corrective action as called out
 
in the "corrective action" portion of the FMEA?
 
d. Question 3. The question considers only the cases wherein the 
software determines a failure. 
e. Question 3a. Answer question 3a if the answer to 3 is "no." If the
 
answer to 3a is "yes," call out the possible corrective action in the
 
explanation/comments section.
 
f. Question 4. The question is considered for both the detected and the
 
undetected failure. The overstress or inducement of another failure may be 
acceptable action. Overstress by software is improper commands, sequencing, or 
timing resulting in action exceeding hardware design requirements or exposing 
hardware to excessive environments.
 
g. Question 5. The question is considered for both the, detected and the 
undetected failure. Limit adverse effects to effects directly resulting from 
software commands or subsequent actions resulting from erroneous inputs as a
 
result of the failure.
 
h. Question 6. The hardware/software may change the method of detection
 
and/or correction after the first or the second failure; consider this in
 
answering the question. Determine if the software will be able to use the
 
-4
 
redundance of the hardware. If the hardware/software interaction following the
 
particular failure mode changes the criticality, incomparison to the FMEA, check
 
the box provided in the summary section of the checklist.
 
i. Question 7. If crew action is not required to respond to the failure,
 
check the "N/A" block. Cues,which provide inputs to the crew include but are not
 
limited to cathode-ray tube annunciation, caution and warning, visual- cues,,
 
audible cues, callup and dedicated displays, subsystem status data, panel meters,
 
etc.
 
j. Question 8.A and 8.B. Answer these questions only if either question
 
-1or 3.is"yes."
 
(1) Question 8.A. Consider that the failure occurs while the
 
vehicle is being flown using the primary system. What will happen if the BFS
 
must be engaged subsequent to the failure? Wil-l the fact that the failure has
 
occurred prevent the BFS from operating properly, under any conditions? A "no"
 
answer is a potential issue (requiring explanation) only ifthe BFS can normally
 
tolerate the failure (when itoccurs during BFS operation).
 
(2), Question 8.B. Consider that the failure occurs while the 
vehicle is under BFS control. A "no" answer is an issue (requiring explanation) 
only if the BFS response differs from that for the primary system. 
4.2.2 Change/Retention Rationale Summary. Each failure is assigned to one of
 
six possible groups, based upon the answers obtained in the checklist body.

Boxes are provided to indicate the category assigned. Figure 4-2 presents the
 
criteria for group assignment.
 
A box is also provided to indicate that changes are required to the FMEA. The
 
FMEA evaluation of in-fl'ight detectability is sometimes inaccurate and requires

change. In addition, other errors (e.g., incorrect criticality assignment or
 
incorrect evaluation of redundancy screens) are occasionally noted during the
 
analysis and are documented here.
 
A space is provided to detail acceptance rationale-, change recommendations, or
 
suggested FMEA changes.- This space may also be used to provide a short general
 
comment to expand the retention rationale grouping.
 
4.2.3 Explanation/Comments. Each question answered by checking a box identified
 
with an asterisk is discussed in this section. The circumstances for checking a 
box not identified with an asterisk are discussed, and the rationale for not 
making such a change is presented, if applicable. This section may also be used 
to explain, expand, or qualify answers.. Each discussion is identified with the, 
corresponding question number. 
4.3 ANALYSIS SUMMARY. The analysis results are summarized on the basis of
 
retention rationale grouping and recommended changes/retention rationale. Figure
 
4-3 depicts the form utilized for this purpose. A particular retention rationale
 
definition, acceptance rationale statement, or recommended change is listed in
 
the left column, with the applicable failure modes listed on the right. The
 
issue/risk is briefly described with acceptance rationale or software
 
requirements change recommendation. The-summary provides a basic overview of the
 
total analysis results.
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CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE
 
I. 	NO * CHECKED - NO HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ISSUES ARE APPARENT FROM THE ANALYSIS. 
SYSTEM IS FAIL OPERATIONAL/FAIL SAFE WITH RESPECT TO THIS FAILURE MODE UNDER
 
CURRENT DESIGN.
 
2. 	 ONLY * CHECKED ON QUESTION 6 - NO HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ISSUES ARE APPARENT FROM
 
THE ANALYSIS. RISK HAS BEEN ACCEPTED VIA HARDWARE CIL.
 
3. 	 ONLY * (YES) CHECKED ON QUESTION la - NO SOFTWARE DETECTION IS PROVIDED. 
FAILURE EFFECT IS NOT TIME CRITICAL. FAILURE MAY BE DETECTED BY OTHER MEANS 
OR FUNCTION IS NOT MISSION/SAFETY CRITICAL. 
4. 	* CHECKED ON QUESTION 3a - * ON la MAY OR MAY NOT BE CHECKED - SOFTWARE DOES
 
NOT TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTION FOR FAILURE. FAILURE EFFECT IS NOT TIME
 
CRITICAL. CORRECTIVE ACTION MAY BE INITIATED BY CREW. PLANNED CHECKOUT
 
ACTIVITIES WILL DETECT FAILURE. SYSTEM IS FAIL OPERATIONAL/FAIL SAFE
 
WITHOUT SOFTWARE DETECTION AND CORRECTION.
 
5. 	STANDARD RETENTION RATIONALE DOES NOT APPLY. SPECIFIC RETENTION RATIONALE
 
IS SUMMARIZED FOR THIS FAILURE.
 
6. 	 ISSUES IDENTIFIED AND CHANGES ARE DESIRABLE. SPECIFIC CHANGES ARE
 
SUMMARIZED.
 
NOTE: DO NOT CONSIDER ANSWER TO QUESTION 2 IN DETERMINATION OF
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY CODE. CONSIDER RESPONSES TO BOTH
 
QUESTION 2 AND 6 IN DETERMINING WHETHER AN FMEA CHANGE IS REQUIRED.
 
6.0 	ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SHEETS
 
Following are the analysis checklist sheets for each failure mode evaluated.
 
Fi'gure 4-2. Change/Retention Rationale 
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS SUMMARY
 
SUBSYSTEM 
ANALYSIS RESULT ITEM/FAILURE MODE 
FMEA 
-nI 
CD 
CL 
(D0 
"-h 
'U 
The subsystem failure modes not analyzed are also identified. These failure
 
modes were evaluated as having hardware/software interfaces. Figure 4-4 depicts

the form utilized for this purpose..
 
5.0 ANALYSIS SUMMARY SHEETS. The analysis results are summarized on, the
 
following sheets. The failure modes have been grouped by issue/retention
 
rationale (or change), affording an overview of the results for the entire
 
subsystem.
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FAILURE MODES NOT INCLUDED INHARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS
 
EVALUATED AS INVOLVING NO HARDWARE/SOFTWARE INTERFACE
 
SUBSYSTEM FMEA
 
ITEM FAILURE MODE
 
Failure modes analyzed included only those items currently on the critical items
 
list. All other failure modes will be an lyzed at a future date.
 
Figure 4-4, Failure Modes Not Included In
 
Hardware/Soft are Analysis
 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS SUMMARY
 
FMEA SD72-SH-0103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS 

ANALYSIS RESULT 

HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 

ITEM/FAILURE MODE
 
Helium Tank U External Leak (03-2A-201010-1)
 
Helium Feed Line - External Leakage (03-2A-201013-l)
 
D. C. Solenoid Valve, Helium - Fails Closed (03-2A-201020-l)
 
Line, Low Pressure Helium - External Leak (03-2A-201035-l)
 
Helium Fill Quick Disconnect - Fails Open (03-2A-201070-1)
 
Purge Quick Disconnect, Propellant - External Leakage (03-2A-201080-l)
 
'Test Quick Disconnect - External Leakage (03-2A-201090-1)
 
Feedline and Fittings, Fuel - External Leakage (03-2A-202108-1)
 
Propellant Fill and Bleed Disconnect - Fails Open (03-2A-202150-l)
 
Propellant Tank Assembly - External Leak (03-2A-211110-1)
 
Propellant Tank Assembly - Bubbles in Propellant (03-2A-211110-2)
 
Injection Plate - Restricted Flow (03-2A-221311-1)
 
Thrust Chamber - Burn-Thru (03-2A-221312-1)
 
Nozzle Extension - Burn-Thru (03-2A-221?13-l)
 
Vernier Thruster - Loss of Output (03-2A-231310-1)
 
Vernier Thruster - Fails to Stop Firing (03-2A-231310-2)
 
Vernier Thruster - Burn-Thru (03-2A-231310-3)
 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS SUMMARY
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS 
ANALYSIS RESULT 
DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 
FMEA SD72-SH-0103-2
 
ITEM/FAILURE MODE
 
Helium Pressure Regulator - Restricted Flow - Fails Closed (03-2A-201030-2)
 
Helium Quad Check Valve - Fails Closed (03-2A-201095-2)
 
Feedline and Fittings, OX - External Leakage (03-2A-202109-l)
 
Tank Isolation Valve, A. C. - Fails Closed (03-2A-202110-1)
 
Tank Isolation Valve, A. C. - Fails Closed (03-2A-202110-3)
 
Interconnect Valve, A. C. - Fails Closed (03-2A-202111-2)
 
Manifold Isolation Valve, A. C. - Fails Closed (03-2A-202120-3)
 
Manifold Isolation Valve, D. C. - Fails Closed (OA-2A-202140-l)
 
Gimbal Joint - External Leakage (03-2A-211120-1)
 
Bellows Assembly - External Leakage (03-2A-221308-).
 
Engine Inlet Valve - Fails Closed (03-2A-221310-4)
 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
SUBSYSTEM AET - RcS FMEA SD72-SH-0103-2 
ANALYSIS RESULT ITEM/FAILURE MODE 
NO SOFTWARE DETECTION Relief Valve - External Leak - Fails Open (03-2A-201060-4) 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST 
FMEA NUMBER 
SD72-SH-O103-2 
03-2A-201010-1 
ITEM He Tank FAILURE MODE External Leak 
1. 
la. 
DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE NODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD 
YES 
*YES 
[ 
Q 
NO 
NO 
Q 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO 2 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES [ NO 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMEiTING ALTERU;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES fl NO In 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMNNDING HARDWARE ACTIOU OR IMPLEIIE;ITING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAJI LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES 1O r 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES [] NO
 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 *10 20 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A C YES[i.OE] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER-OCCURRENCE? 	 YES Q*N'0 ] 
B.. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES Q*NO [ 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.- NO H/S ISSUES 3.El NO SOFTWARE DETECTION S. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. r- DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. - RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
JFMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS:
 
1. 	V42P3110, 3113 (Right AFT) or V42P2110, 2113 (left AFT) He tank transducers will issue
 
a class 3 alarm, RM GAX blue light on the crew-cockpit glare shield, upon sensing low
 
pressure < 500 psi. Gross leak detection C&W is first indication.
 
5. 	A He tank leak will adversely affect the RCS quantity monitor principal function by
 
"RMS/OMS propellant quantity" to indicate an erroneously
causing meter M4 (panel 03) 

low percent quantity remaining. This is because He tank pressure is used in the software
 
6alculation. See FSSR 26 "sequencing", principal function 4.102.
 
6. 	No redundant tanks - loss of RCS function. Crossfeed is available. 
8B. 	 Same as primary.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - fRRITER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTPCL FMEA N4O 03-2A -ZO1010-L - REV:tI/{)8/75 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSUR tZ4T'ID'i ABORT: CR IT. FUNC: I 
.P/N PE r"C282-0C02-003./-.O32 CRIT. HDs: I 
.P/N VENOGR:ULO-9q9.f40-./-2 MISSIONlS: H4F VF X FF 2F SM 
.OUANTITY :4' PHASE)(S: PL X LO X C3 X 00 X LS 
:T.O BOTTLES RECK' PER 
:MODULE:OKE PER P'ZuPo TK. 
REDUNOANCY SCa.EN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A 
.PREPAREO BY: P 	 APPPOV-O,P By4AS h:
 
~OES J TAGGART - Sr 
.REL C AKERS 'EL R YX(~csL 
APPROVED WITH CHANGES 
.ITE.M: TANK See Section 13.0 
- HELIUt. STORAGE, FILAMENT 'ATJUNO 
.FUNCT ION: 
TO STORE HELIU;I AT A MAX !'rlPKI'G PRESSURG rF 4fl00 PSI F{Tl 
PRESSURIZATION OF THE AFT RCS .CULEIS Pt;OPELLANT SU0 PLY SYS7iz9. TANK 
CONSISTS OF '%UBLE iE!T Tt LINER ,ITH CUPC!4T K VLAP 4-a FISER A.N EPOXY 
RESIN BONDING OVEPAKP. 1.,. IS 18.71 IN. VOLU;"E IS 3008 CU. IN. 
.FAILURE MODE: STRUCTUAAL FAILURE (S) 
* 	 EXTERNAL LEAK 
;CAUSE(Sl:
 
* 	 MAT'L DEF, LINER OEF, FAULTY FAB, EPOXY-CUPE ItAEO,- TFST/HANCL 0AM,
 
,SHOCK, VI2, IADVCE LVERPESS (CG'C), I&4.,OEQ %:*.UNTIrG 
.EFFECT(S): f1N ( )SUPSYSTM (5)I14TEPFACES (C)MI$Slm4 (CS)CSS,/VEH!CLR: 
* 	 (A) LOSS OF FU:;CTICN/SUySYSTEA (3) LCSS CF I.*'TE-FCE FUN.CTI.' -

INABILITY TO DE0LET/JTI ' IZE ' ROP, Pr.SSIBLE r4'IA(E Tn POD STFTUCTUPE r
 
TPS 0 (C) MISSTON 'OJIFLC'TI.N - X-FEE FF"M '-S5 0P PCS. (0) POSSIBLE 
LOSS.OF CREW VEHICLE EXCE-'S RATE CF LEAK t;-Y yl-ErO Pn V;T.r.APt 
CAUSINC OAAGE TO P') ST:,UCT & DEGRAO CF THER"AL P'-"T SYS. EXCELS 
RETENTION CF PRUP 'M!AY A.\)vRSELY AFFECr VEH OYr. OURING g;NT!Y C LNCG.. 
.DISPOSITION & RATICNALE (Al)17SIG' (BITEST (C)tSDECT!ON (O)FAILU;E HISTClY: 
(A) FILAMENT .CU3 T '.KS o;E DESIGNE' TO LEAK RFC.RE PUPTURE .HICH" 
LIMITS FAILURE PRPPAG.'TC' DUE TO SHRAP'EL. KEVLA. 49 FT3ER 14AS A 
TENSILE STFE,GTH OF 50{KSI ALLOWING LIUHT 'AEbI-HT WITH GREAT STZENGTH. 
INCREASED STRAIN CAPABILITY IS P?fVI.ED %Y THE CC CN AE 'PRESSIVE LG±UD 
UNPRESSURIZEC LItN,". VENT OOC;RS ARE 'IPEN ON r187IT ANr WILL PELIVE ANY 
PRESSURE BUILDUP OUE TO L=;44AGE.. THE F.S. (LUrST) IS 1.5 X 4CPKING 
PRESS. (3) 1000 D.ESSURE CYCLES %RkE ECR.FCRmED OUPING OUAL WHICH IS tMORF 
THAN 4 X ANrICIPATED O.PERATING LIFE. 90-DY CRFEP TFST UNOER PRESSUPE 
IS ALSO P$ERFO MED AFTER WHICH THE TANK IS 7XA?INE: TO VEFEcY N.G 
PERMANENT OEFOPMAT-IOr: OR rLAW GRCWTH. PDODIF PPES.SURE (..L) X ' CRKING 
PRESSURE) ANO LEAKAGE TE-.TS ARE PERFCWlED OUQEIG ATP. (C) AN 
IDENTIFICATIT' IS PERF.JREf) AND THE UNIT TAGr-ED. RA MATIL ANC 
PURCHASED COMPONENT '.E.JnTS ARE VERIFILD BY -ECEIVING INSP. mEASUPEMENT 
STANDARDS AND TEST EOUID. STA.ARD)S 2E E;PLEENTED PER REOMTS OF MIL 
SPECS. THE FCLLO4,ING ITE-'S ARE VERIFIED CY SHOP TaAVELER MANOATORY 
INSPECTION PCINTS - PARTS "C),TECTICN, NFG. P-OCESSES, FINISHES, ASSY A%4O 
INSTALLATION. THE FULLUW(NG ITEMS WERE VERIFIFO SY UOrT CONDUCTED 
5-23-T7 - CORWSICN PROTECT IGN 0 ROVISI"NS, TUST HANDLLN., AND STCRA GE 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS S77OF 	 POOR QUALITY 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - Gw3ETER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CCNTRCL FMEA NO 03-2A -20Oi0-L REV:11/0/7? 
ENVIRCNMENTS. TENSILE, H2:4T TREAT AN-,) MELD S-MAPLE=S %RE TESTDO CURING 
Tr
IN-PR,3CESS FABRICATION IN ADDITION X-RAY & OYE PENETRANT F-A TUE 
LINES. hIND PATTERN & WI'JGING CCNTRCL 4?E USEJ] FOC THE KEVLA2 FIrE? 
OURING IN-PROCESS MANJPCTURE. WEIGHT CCNTRCL IS USED FC , THE EPOXY 
RESIN. TURN RCUNO - MONT'29 LEAKAGE TESTS PEFOR,4EO 4FTER INS 7 ALLATICA; 
INTO THE SYSTEM AND AS PA&T CF THE CHECKOUT PROCEDJRE PRIOR T FLIGHT. 
PRESSURE CYCLES ACCUMULATE.O ASE ALSO ,ECCSOEO. (0) NGCE AVAILABLE NE.
 
DESIGN.
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.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-201013-1 
ITEM He Feed Line FAILURE MODE External Leakage 
N 	 E1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES O 

ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION I;1RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES 5 NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES M *NO X
 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES 5 NO W]
(EITHER BY COMHANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IM;PLEMENTING ALTER";ATE PROGRAMl LOGIC)? 
3a. IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPEISATE FOR THIS *YES 5 NO 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR I.PLEiIE;iTInG ALTERnATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
-4. AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE NODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES' El NO Ex 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, INCOMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO M 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 *E1E 205 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IFCREW ACTION ISREQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A F'DYESFX NO-1
 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 ISYES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES (3*-NO ]
 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES -*O [
 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY
 
l.F NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.[ NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. C ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. [ HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. - DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECO1M1ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
E-FMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- --- ------------------- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---
EXPLANATION/COMIMENTS: 
1. 	V42P3110, 3113 (Right AFT) or V42P2110, 2113 (leftAFT) He.Tank transducers will issue
 
a class 3 alarm, RM GAX blue light on the.crew-cockpit glare shield, upon sensinq low
 
pressure < 500 psi. Gross leak detection C&W is first indication.
 
2., FMEA Change - For "failure detectable in flight" V42P-2110C through 2114C and 3110C
 
through 3114C should be V42P2110C, 2112C, 2112C, 2113C, 2114C and 3110C, 3112C, 3113C
 
3114C dropping out 2111C and 3111C which do not exist.
 
6. Feedlinesare criticality 1 with no remaining success paths. Crossfeed is available.
 
8b. Same as primary.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CROITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NC 02-2A -201013-1- REV 12/13/78 
.ASSEMBLY :PFESSURIZATIONi HcLIUM ABORT: CRIT. FUNC± I 
.P/N RI :MC6Z1-OO59 CRIT. HOw: I 
.P/N VENDR:73A630000 MISSIONS: Hp VF X Pr OF SM 
.QUaITITY :4 PHASE(S): PL X LO X 00 X 00 X LS X 
1/2 X .042 304L 
"ONE SET PER PROPELLANT 
:PER MODULE 
.~*IEDUNO'%NCY SCREEN: "A-W/A 2-N/A C-N/A 
:PREPARED BY: ZPPROVEO BY' APPROVE BY NA: / 
.O
.REL 
NCGLAVINICHC M AKERS C5E S ;EL YtS4 S-,.'smI 
APPROVED WITH CHANGES 
:ITEM: HELIUM FEED LINE See Section 13.0 
:FUNCTION: 
" S.S LI IES TC PROVIDE HELIJM FEFO FPCM HELIUM TANKS To
 
HELIUM PEGULlTTC;4/PRZ3SUP!ZATIC.4 SYSTEMl PA;4EL 
.FAILURE ?CE: STRUCTUR-L A'ILURE (S) 
. RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
.CAUSECS): 
NAT'L DEF (SULPHI:D STRI:'GER), VtB+ SHCCK, ST;IJCT PAIL. FA-IGJE, ASLD 
OEF, STRESS CCRPCS. Ic It.,TALL. 
'
 
.EFFECT[S): CN (A)SUBSYSTE2 (R}I*NTEP.FAC:S (CV'AISS!T : (L)C,/V_.,.= L 
- (.) LOSS OF SUBSYSTE4 PRcSSUPIZATION CAPdILL{,Y IF ,.3T IS"L (C AL 
UPSTREAM OF ISOL VLV-I'IAAILITY TO DEPLETE!UTILZEa POCP). (-) LOSS CF 
INTERFACE FUNCTION (CI4AerL T fEPRESS PPCP 7rA' - OCT 00 STg9.UCT & TPS 
DAM. (C) ABORT DECISION (LOSS OF PRFSS) " (-) DCSSILE LOSS OF 
CRE'/VSHICLE - IF LEAK EXCESS GR POD/T/S O-3!P CrcuqS 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGN ( )TEST (C)[NSOECTIQN (D)FAILURE HISTORY:
 
(A) F.S. IS 4
1.5 TO .0 <IMU4,OPERA T ING PRESSURE (SYSTEM RELIEF). 
THE WELDED CONSTRUCTIN SLIAINAT!S JOI4TS AND 2:OSSIBLE LEAK PATHS. 
THE ANNEALED AREA (DUE TO WELDING) IS SACKED JP BY. ASLEEVE. 
FASTENING CLAMPS ALLO6 FRE-DOCM CF MOVEMENT. TUBING BENDS ARE 
CONTROLLED BETWEEN FIXED POINTS TO FACILITATE INSTALL-ArION A Nr
 
ACCOMMODATE VEHICLE GPOWTH AN MOVEMENT. (3) PCCKwELL PERZFORMED
 
TUBING CERTIFICATION TESTS PER NCRBITFR TUBING VERIFICATICN 
PLAN" (SO 75-SH-0205). THIS TESTING INCLUDED PPESSURE CYCLINTG'ANO FOR 
TYPICAL SHUTTLE LINES & JOINTS. SYSTEM .EVALUATIS3N TESTS AT WSTF WILL 
ALSO ALLOW EVALUATION IN THE INSTALLED SYSTEM CCNDITION. LEAKAGE TESTS 
ARE PERFORMED IN-PROCES FOR TU31NG SECTIONS. OPTIGAL INSPECTIlNS ARE
 
ALSO PERFORMED AT THIS TIME IN ADDITION TO X-RaY AND DYE PENETPANT. 
LEAKAGE TESTS ARE ALSO PEPFORHED AFTER INSTALLTIION INTO THE SYSTEM 01NO 
ADDITIONAL WELDS ARE ALSO SUBJECTED TO NOE. (C) AN IDENTIFICATION IS 
PERFORMED AND THE UNIT TAGGED. CONTAM. CONTPGL P0 OCESSES, COrROS. 
PROTECTION PROVISIONS. NOE EXAM OF WELDS AND IISP. FOP SURFACE AND 
SUB-SURFACE DEFECTS 13 VERIFIED BY INSPETION.- THE F7LLC ,ING ITEMS ARE 
VERIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELEER MANDATORY INSP. PCI4TS. RAW VAT'L (LOT 
CERTIFICATION), PARTS PROTECTION, MANUF., COA'ING, PLATING, INSTLLATION 
* AND ASSEMBLE OPERATIONS. HARDWARE IS INSP. IN ACCOROANCE tTH QUALITY 
PLANNING REQMTS DOCUMENT (QPRO) WHICH HAS BECN-AP0 ROVEZ BY NASA. 
S79 19 SD75-SH-OO0S 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITE=MS LIST - CRSETEP 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CCtnTRGL FMEA NO 03-ZA -201013-t REV:12113/7STURNAROUND - LINES IN ACCESSI9LE AREAS ARE VESUALLY INSPECTED FOR 
EVIDENCE CF DAMAGE AND FLCOi AND PRESSURE FU"ICTIONAL TESTS ARE MONXTOREO 
FOR EVIDeICE OF O.STRUCTIO, OR LEAKGE,. (G) MEINC7 HISTORY 
-
.CCRROSION/FAG PRGBLEM4S DEJTCTEO DURING APr2LLG CHECKOUT ANC CORRECTED­
cJ1UGINAL PAGE ES 
OF PONR (QRwr 
lq~soSD75-SH-0003 
20 
-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2 
SUBSYSTEM _AEL RCS FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-201020-1 
ITEM D.C. Solenoid Valve, He 	 FAILURE MODE Fails Closed
 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY- YES NO [ 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?. 
Ta. 	 IFNOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la-CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES 5*% 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	-DOES THE FLIGHT SOFT1UARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS. OF THE FAILURE YES D NO Ox 
(EITHER BY COMMANDINIG HARDWARE ACT:ION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IFNOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR ThE SOFITWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES 5 NO [ 
FAILURE 1ODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEflEINTING ALTERNATE
 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE QVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES 5 No E 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, INCOMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES LA NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 ] *I 25I 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A E YESUnXIoC
 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES Q*N0
 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES IX1*NO 1 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
I.-1 NO H/S ISSUES 3.E3 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 5 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.M HARDWARE ACCEPTS-RISK 4'.= DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. F0 RECOMMENDED' CHANGES BELOW 
See Note 2. FFNEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. 	Ullage transducer will give C&W alert < 200 psi.
 
2. 	Measurement numbers V42X2124X, 2126X, 3124X, and 3126X (Eu He isolation,valves) needs to
 
be added for detectability since only the measurement stimulus identification numbers for 
the 	oxidizer valves are listed now.
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LOZ
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - 10BITER 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FE4 NO 03-2"%-4'01020-L RE:1:2I2/7 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: LR 
.P/N RI :MC284-04t9-0111-01Z CRIT. HOW: 2 
.P/N VENDOR:73835 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF CF SM 
.QUANTITY :3 PHASE(S): PL X LO X CO X 00 X LS 
:ThO 	VALVES REQ1' FOR EAC
 
* flIH ELIUM SUPPLY
 
* 	 REOUNCONCY SCREENI: -PtSS E-PASS C-F". 
.DES R BURKHART OaS %A' - S.SM -
SREL C.M- AKERS RFt ki R2a ' 
AWED WITH CHANGES 
* 	 ee Section 13.0 
SOLENOID
.ITEM: VALVE. D.C. 
. OPERATED. HIGH PRESSURE. HELIUM (1/21 1 -STA 'LE. (LTCHI'G ­
,MAGNETIC & SPRING FORCE) LV 2'JL/202/203/2 4/3M1/30Z/303/34. 
.FUNCTION: 
.. .UILIZED TO CONTROL 4ELIUJ;I PFESSUR!Z-ION SYST_', IN1 PE - FT tICOtJLES. 
IN THE OPEN POSITION A FLO't PATH IS PROVIDED FPr2, ThE HiLIUM SUP 0 LY 
TANK(S) TO THE REGULATORS. T'%O PARALLEL P4THS APE 'qCVIOEZ FCP- aACH 
PROPELLANT TANK. ONE PATH IS NqRMALLY 0 0 E"4 PE TANK. 7rpc 0PEN VALVE 
MAY BE CLOSED AND TH; PARALLEL VALVE CP.:I,- SU3SEQ1ENT TC .4 O0",NIsTRr!A4 
FAILURE.
 
.FAILURE MODE: PAILS CLOS-O
 
:CAUSE(S):
 
tVICONTINUOUS [NAOVeR CLOSING SIGNAL DUE TO SH.RT CtRCUIT, SH&CX.
 
CONNECTOR PIN OP. OIOCE OAMACE, JAMMING OF POPPET, 0 L'JGG-D CRIPICE.
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUSSYSTEM (R)INTERFAC-S (C)MISSICt (CZ)COE/VEHICLE:
 
r .
( 	 PARALLEL PATH 4VAILgLE. EFFEC
A) LOSS OF REDUNDANCY -	 (3) N 

(C) ABORT DECISION - DUE TO ONLY ONE PATH PEFA\INNG POICR TO CRITICAL 
EFFECT. (0) NO'EFFECT. (E) .FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EF=ECT - OGSSIBLE 
CREW VEHICLE LOSS - FAILURE OF REDUNOANT PARALLEL FLOW PATH WCULD 
RESULT IN INABILITY TO BURN OR DEPLETE RCS PROPELLANT. THIS WOULD 
RESULT IN POSSIBLE INABILITY TO CONTROL VEHICLE CURING ENTRY 7,U= TO 
INABILITY TO USE RESERVED ENTRY PROPELLANT OR C.G. PROBLEMS RESULTING 
FROM PROPELLANT WEIGHT.
 
.OISPOSITION & RATIONALE {A)OESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HISTOPY:
 
(CA) PARALLEL VALVES AND REDUNDANT POWER SOURCES ARE PROVIDED., ULLAGE 
PRESS IS ACEQ FOR PROP FEED WITH* LESS THAN 35 PERCENT PROP REMAINING. 
ONE VALVE IS MAINTAINED IN THE LATCHED OPEN POSITION WITH NO POWER 
APPLIED & THE OTHER IS LATCHED CLOSED., AN INDUCTIVE VCLTAGE SUPPRESSION 
CIRCUIT 'IS PROV IN THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM TO PREVENT DAMAGE TO OTHER 
ON-LINE COMP. REDUN DIODES LIMIT THE POSS OF 'DIODE FAILURE ALLOWING 
CURRENT.SHUNT'FROM THE COIL. A 1OO--ICRON FILTER IS PROV TO LIMIT THE 
POSS OF CONTAM CAUSING LEAKAGE, JAMMING MOVING 0 RTS - OR PLUGGING PILOT 
CONTROL ORIFICES. TO LIMIT THE ELECT SHORT POTENTIAL, THE LEAO AND 
MAGNET WIRES ARE ESICAP BY POTTING AND A FIXTURE IS USED CURING ASSEMBLY 
TO ENSURE THAT INSUL IS NOT DAMAGED BY THE EXIT NOTCH -WHEN THE COIL 
SLEEVE IS PRESSED ONTO THE COIL. (B) 4000 OPER CYCLES (ON-OFF--FLOW) AND 
RANDOM VIB AT ANTIC MISSION LEVELS ARE PERF OURENG QUAL. ITEM IS. USED 
24 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - OREiTER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CCNTROL FMEA NO 03-24 -201021-1 REV:12/12/73 
DURING SYS EVAL TESTS AT wSTF ALLOhING EV'AL UNDER SIYUL PISSIODN USAGE 
COND. PROOF PRESSURE, LEAKAGE, OPER AND INSUL TESTS AE PERF DURING 
t4TP. APROP L0CATEO TEST POINTS ALLOt PRE/ nST FLIGHT LE'AKAGE TESTS AND 
OPER TESTS ARE ALSO CONDUCTED AT THIS TIME. (C) Ati IDENT IS PERF AND
 
THE UNIT TAGGED. CONTAM CONT PROCESS, C R0OS. PROT PROV, NOrE EXAM. OF 
WELDS AND BRAZES, INSP. FOR SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE DEFECTS ANP PROPER
 
ELECT TERMINATIONS ARE VERIF BY INSP. THE PCLLOhING ITE'S ARE VERIF 5Y 
SHOP TRAVELER MANDATORY INSP. POINTS - RAn, ".'4T'L CLOT CERT), 0ARTS PROT. 
MANUF., COATING, PLATING INSTALL AND ASSEMBLY CPE-. THE ABOVE ITEMS AND 
AUIT
THE FOLL ITEMS mEP.E VERIF BY CONO 8-31-77. CrY'TAM CONT
 
PROCESSES. CORROS. PROT OROV. TURNAROUND - FUNCT FLOW TESTS ARF 
MONITORED TO VERIFY THAT VALVES COEN AN. CLOSE PQOPErLY UPON CcAA?\D. 
(03 APOLLO F.ILURES WERE MLINLY ASSOC 'ITH REVERSE OtJLARITY ViO) 
DEGAUSSING OF MAGNETS. THE SHUTTLE VALVE UTILIZES 4 CONNECTOR (RATHER 
THAN LEAD WIRES) AN BLOCKING OIODE WHICH OREVENTS THIS TYPE CF EZ-OR 
CURING CC.N. A POTENT ELECT SHORTING PROF :-,;O SIrtLSR VALVE CU'= TOt 
IN"SUL DAMAGE P.AS DISCOV 0UrT' G QUAL ANO C' 0 R S DESCRIEr IN ITEM (A) 
ABOVE.
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS FMEA UUMBER O3-2A-2010l-2 
ITEM He Pressure Regulator FAILURE MODE Restricted Flow - Fails Closed 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES- NO E 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IR RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORwATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES No 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES [ *NO0 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO 
(EITHER BY CONIIANDIIG HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;ATE PROGRAM' LOGIC)? 
Sa. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPAEILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFT'ARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES ®R NO E 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY CONMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR INPLEEIE;JTING ALTERATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES [] NO 0 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
S. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES n NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [ *ICA 201 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FNEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YES0i-O[5
 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIOU AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	 IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES (D*NO ] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES QD*NO 5 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) "
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1. M NO H/S ISSUES 3.Q NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5.CACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2'.-- HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.- DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 2RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
MIFMEA CHANGE RECOMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Ullage transducer will give C&W alert < 200 psi.
 
3A. Software could provide automatic switch over to parallel leg.,
 
6. 	1 success path remaining after first fail re.
 
7. 	Cathode-ray-tube and downlist is available.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - C78fTEq 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-ZA -201030-2 REV:I/-Cz 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATICN ABGRT: CRIT. FU'iC: IQ 
.P/N "RI : MC284-0418O1/-0002 GRIT. H0w: 
.P/N VENDOR:7433qOL MISSIO'%S: HF VF X FF "F SM 
.QUANTITY 	:8 PHASE(S): PL LO X CC X DO X LS 
:TWO PARALLEL* DUAL 
-STAGE UNITS PER TANK 
S REDUNDAN C CP EE: A-PASS ?-P'SS C-l'z7 
.DES 	 J.- TAGGART E . f" J _4 -. ..
.PREPAREO BY: RT APP~flVJY 	 APPRCVq0 .2'N1M.L: 
*REL 	 C M AK~ERS AEL _ -/-.. .. ',, 
ARVED WITH CHANGES 
See Sectioj1. 
.ITEM: REGULATOR PRESS, HE on 13.0 
SERIES REDUNDANT. SET AT UNEQUAL OUTLET PIESSU RES (PP 
3011302/303/304). 
.FUNCTION:
 
,* 	 TO REGULATE STORED HELIIJM PRESSURE FRO 0-'.C PSI,-, X TC ULLAGE 
PRESSURE OF 245 (+ OR - 3) PSEG F')R PUPPOSE F ? , ELLAN,,T FEED TO 
THRUSTERS. TW.O PARALLEL P.AThS WErH TWO7 SERIES RGS APE: PcCVIOEJ FOP
 
EACH PROPELLA)IT TANK. RIM.RY ELE-IEBT SET it 0.I L'..vER THAN 3ECCKIOARY.
 
.FAILURE ;.0DE: FAILS CLOSED (F)
 
* 	 RESTR ICTED FLOlW. 
.CAUSE(S):
 
CONTA.M (PILOT SCR:E}4). FkZ,-za yOvIST, S;','tG/STEl YR4:TURE, PS,7T,":
 
SINDS, EXCESS OCHE PRESS, C'CK=O SPRUNGS, 'AATIL OET. 
.EFFECT{S): ON (A)SUBSYST=.M {G)I TEPFACES (C) ;SSI; (U)C.E%/VE 4CLE: 
(4,8) LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (ONE OF 2 FLUO PATHS). (C) A ;rRT 0CEO SIC :.
 
-(0) NO EFFECT UNLESS SCONO PATH FAILS CLQSEO, REENTRY APAB IS LZST ti
 
" 
FAILURE OCCURS EARLY IM ENTRY SUCH THA4T ULLAGE P0 ESS !S NO SUFF. 
(E) FUNCTIGNAL CRITICALITY EFFECT - POSSI3L . CRE-/V-!HICLE LOSS. FALUR­
'iF REDUNDANT PARALLEL FLOW PATH WOULD RESULT IN I:!ASILITY TC SURN OR 
DEPLETE RCS PROPELLANT. THIS %OULD RESULT IN POSSIBLE INABILITY TO 
CONTROL VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY TO USE PESERVED ENTRY 
PROPELLANT OR C-G. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM PFOPELLAdT WEIGHT. 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGN (B)TEST (CINSOECTION (iOFAILUPE HESTO-v: 
(A) PARALLEL REGULATORS ARE PQOVIDED. ULLAGE PRESS IS ACEG FOP PGP FEZ. 
WITH LESS THAN 35 PERCENT PROP REMAINING. 25-MICRON ABS G8Q PLUS 
10-MICRON ABS GBR PILOT FILTER IS. PROV TO LIMIT THE POSSIBILITY OF 
CONTA4 CAUSING JAMMING OF MOVING PARTS OR- PLUGGITG PILOT CCNT'qOL 
ORIFICES. (81 501000 OPER FLOW CYCLES ANd PaNOCM VIB AT ANTIC MISSION 
LEVELS ARE PERFORMED 0URING CUAL. ITEM IS USED DURING SYS EVAL T=STS A7 
WSTF ALLOWING EVAL UNDER SISIUL MISSION USAGE CONO. PRCOF PRESS, LEAKa _ 
-AND FLOW TESTING IS PERFORMED DURING ATP. FUNCT AND LEAKAGE TESTS APE 
PERFORMED URING PRE/POST FLIGHT CHECKGUT. (C) AN :0 IS PERF AND THE 
UNIT TAGGED.~ MAT'L & EQUIP CONFORMANCE TO CONTRACT REQMTS IS VERIF BY 
INSP. THE FULL ITEMS ARE VERIF BY SHOP T48AVELER M.ANDATORY INSP POINTS -
RAW HAT'Lr PARTS PROTECTION, MANUF, COATING, PLATING, INSTALL AND ASSY 
OPERATIONS. THE ABOVE ITEMS NO THE FOLL ITEMS WERE VERIF BY AUDIT
 
.CONDUCTED 4-5-T7 - CONTAM CflNT PROCESSES AND CORROS P9OT oPOV, CONTA'l 
CaNT PLAN. PROPERLY. MONITORED HANDLING AND STORAGE ENVtR. THE FOLLOWIN'S 
1002 	 ­
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - R3BITER :c2
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO O!-ZA -231030-2 PEV:tU/O8/73 
ITEMS WERE VERIFIED By AUDIT CF MARCH 6, Lc78. INSECTI1C VEIFIES 
4SSEMBLY PER INSPECTION PcGNiS IN MASTER kECCRO. LOG CF CLEAt: ROOM ANO 
CALIBRATION OF TOOLS, VERIFIED. CRITICAL lIEASICN IO0 VE 0IFIED UY 
INSPECTION. PARTS CLENLINESS AND PASSIVTICN :Y ISPECTtCN. '4DE 
INSPECTION PERFOR'IE' AFTER ASSEMBLY. TURNACUND - tJNCT FLCW TESTS ARE 
MONITORED TO VERIFY THAT THERE IS NO RESTRICTED FLOI,. (Cl, NC FAILURE 
HISTORY OF THIS MODE FOR THIS R GULATOR.
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-OI03-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT -RCS 	 FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-201035-1 
ITEM Line, Low Pressure He 	 FAILURE MODE' Fxtprnpl I ok 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES NO f -
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION III RESPONSE)? 
Ia. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA.EVALUATION OF YES *NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES 0 NO [ 
(EITHER' BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;:ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFT.ARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El 90 E 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIENTING ALTERflATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES U NO- E 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY-.AFFECT *YES 0 NO E] 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY -OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 E *lrn 2E] 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FNEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A E]YESDNOO] 
TO-SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTICII AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	 IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES W*no El 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES IZ*N0 E] 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
i.D NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.CD NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. O ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.r- HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. = DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
[]FMEA, CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLAMATIOM/COMMENITS: 
1. Ullage transducer will give C&W alert < 200 psi. Gross leak detection will give
 
first indication..... .
 
3A. The helium insolation valves could be automatically closed by software upon
 
sensing a caution and warning low pressure of 200 psi.
 
6. Initiate cross-feed function.
 
7. Caution and warning low pressure light - "Right RCS" - cathode-ray tube and down:
 
link available.
 
8B. Same as primary.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CRR.TER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2A -201035-i REV:11/08/7O 
.ASSEMBLY :?RESSURIZATION ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: .
 
.PIN RI •MC621-0059 CPIT. HOw: 

.PIN VENDOR:73A630030 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF fF SM
 
.QUANTITY :4 PHaSE(S): PL X LO X CO X OC X LS X"
 
:0NE SET PER -PROPELLANT 
:PER MODULE 
iREDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-'I/A . 8-N/A C-N/A 
.PREPAREC 39: PPP RO VE 8OVE ASABY 

.DES N C GLAVINICH GES . .... SSM
 
.REL C M AKERS REL RE
 
4 APPROVED WITH CHANGES
 
:ITEM. LINE, LOW. PRESSURE HE. -See Section 13.0
 
FEED LINE (3/4")

.FUNCT IGN:
 
31-- X .020 3-04L S.S LINES T rOVDE nSLEU FEED FROM REGULATiRS T,
 
PROP TANK.
 
.FAILURE HOE: STRUCTURAL =A[LURE (5)
 
* RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAWAGE. 
.CAUSE(S):
 
.. MECHANICAL SHOCK, V13ATICN/FATIGUE, IMPR..PEP L;:S-ALL-rlnlN {'EL. 
-STRESS C.'lRkhiS, MAT'L DEFICEENCY (SULPHIO"E STPINGE )
 
.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (3)INTERFACES (C):AIcSC.% O)ICPE-/VEHCLE­
(A) LOSS OF SU8SYS Ei mELIUM SUPPLY. IN313ILITY Tr OEPLET/UTILEZE 
PROPELLANT. {3s LOSS OF IN T rjjl;?CTI0N INAIPLITY Tr' PP-5,ESSUP E'rERFACE 
PROP TANK-POTENT POO STRUCTURE & tPS DAMAGE. (C) POTENTIAL LOSS OF 
MISSION OR EARLY ILSSION TEPMINATION. (r))PCTENTIAL LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE IF GROSS LEA. OCCURS OR TPS DAMAGE rrCURS PRECLUDING SAFE 
ENTRY. 
.DISPOSITION C RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)FAILURE HLSTOPY: 
(C) F.S. IS 1.5 TO 4.0 MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE (SYSTEM RELIEF).
 
THE WELDED CONSTRUCTION ELIMINATES JOINTS AND POSSILE LEAK P'THS. 
THE ANNEALED AREA (DUE TO 4ELDING) IS BACKED UP BY A SLEEVE. FASTENING 
CLAMPS ALLOW FREEDOM OF ACVEMENT. TUBING SENDS ARE CONTROLLED 
BETWEEN FIXED POINTS TO FACILITATE INSTALLATION AND ACCOMMMIArE 
VEHICLE GROWTH AND MOVEMENT. (B) ROCKWELL PERFOMED TUBING 
CERTIFICATION TESTS PER "ORBITER TUBING VERIFICATION PLAN" 
(SD75-SH-O205). THIS TESTING INCLUDED PRESSURE CYCLING AND FATIGUE FOR 
TYPICAL SHUTTLE LINES & JOINTS.. SYSTEM EVALUATION TESTS AT WSTF WILL 
ALSO ALLOW EVALUATION IN THE INSTALLED SYSTEM CONDITION. LEAKAGE TESTS 
ARE PERFORMED IN-PROCESS FOR TUBING SECTIONS. OPTICAL INSPECTIONS ARE 
ALSO PERFORMED AT THIS TIME IN ADDITION TO X-RAY AND DYE PENETRANT. 
LEAKAGE TESTS AR-E ALSO PERFORMED AFTEv INSTALLATION INTO THE SYSTEM AND 
ADDITIONAL WELDS ARE ALSO SUBJECTED TO NDE. (C) AN IDENTIFICATION IS 
PERFORMED AND THE UNIT TAGGED. CONTAM. CONTROL PROCESSES, COr(ROS. 
PROTECTION PROVISIONS, NOE EXAM OF WELDS AND INSP. FOR SURFACE ANC 
SUB-SURFACE DEFECTS IS VERIFIED BY- INSPECTION. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS APE 
VERIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELER MANDATCRY INSP. POINTS, RAW MAT'L (LOT 
CERTIFICATION), PARTS PROTECTION, MANUF., COATING, PLATING, INSTALLATION 
AND ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS. HARDWARE IS INSP. IN ACCORDANCE WITH QUALITY 
3SDZ-SH-ooo332
 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - 0SITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CO;ITR0L FMEA MG 03-2A -201035-1 REV:I/Ci75 
PLANNING REQOITS CCUMENT (CPRO) WHICH HAS SEEN APPROVED 0Y NASA. 
TURNAROUND. LINES IN ACCESSIBLE AREAS &RE VISUALLY INSPECTED FOR 
EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE AND FLCW AND PPESSUqE -FUNCTIONAL TESTS ARE MONITORE: 
FOR EVIDENCE OF O8STRUCTIW4 OR LEAKAGE. (0) -4INrc HISTORY -
C3RRGSION/F&B PROSLEMS OETECTED DURING APOLLC CHECKOUT AND CCRRECTED. 
HISTORY - CORROSION/FAB PROSLEMS DETECTED 'URING APPOLL0 CHECKOUT AND 
CORRECTED. 
SD75-Sa-ooo3
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-201060-4 
ITEM Relief Valve FAILURE MODE Fxtprnal I eak --Failq Onn 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES MX NO E 
ANNUNCIATE OR.TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
Th. 	IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMTION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES [ NO 2 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2._ 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND Ia CONSISTENT WITH. THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES E *NO [ 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES [] NO 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IPPLEMERTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS. *YES l NO E]
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COVMANDING HARDWARE ACTION. OR IMPLEIENTING ALTERATE 
PROGRA ILOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVE RSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES NO0 [El 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES N1O
 
OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE.TOLERATE (CONSIDER-CREW *0ET *lf- 2E] 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY-. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A E]YESFIOQ 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTIOn? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO- EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. 	CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES. WJno F1 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES K]*NO F 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1. E] NO H/S ISSUES 	 3-' NO SOFTWARE DETECTION S. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. [] HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. " DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6..- RECOMVlENDED- CHANGES BELOW 
EFIEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS:
 
1. 	 Gross leak detection will give first indication.
 
la. MeasurementsV42P2115, 2116, 3115, and.3116 provide propellant tank ullage pressure
 
signals from transducers.
 
6. 	 Left and right AFT RCS pods provide redundancy.
 
2 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT -- REACTION CONTROL F-EA NO 03-2A -2O1060- REV: 12114/7,P 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION. ABCRT: RET. FUNC: IR 
.P/N RI :MC284-0421-0001l/-OOO2 CRIT. HD: 
.P/N VENDOR76D9D9-RiO_j/576-OOP9-IOZ MISSIONS: HF. VF X FF .qF SM 
.QUANTITY :4 	 PHASE(S): PL LO X CO X DO X LS 
o *-dNEPER PROPELLANT TANK 
* 	 REDUNDANCY SCREEN' A-PASS E'-FAIL C-PASS 
.GEBY::PREPARED BY: 	 'K/ APPROVgD BY (NA A) 
.DES - R,GONZALEZ OES 	 S 
- 'v e i7. -f REIJ­
.REL C M AKERS REL 	 RpDWIHCAG
A13V WITH CHANGES
 
See, Section 13.0:ITEM-, VALVE 
.	 RELIEF, PRESSURE. BURST DISC C POPPET­
.FUNCTION:
 
* 	 PROVIDES PRESSURE RELIEF IN EVENT REGULATOR FAILS OPEN OR PRcPELLAT 
PRESSURE RISES DUE TO THERMAL INCREASE. THE S.S. BURST DISC RELIEF 
PRESSURE IS 324-340 PSIG. THE MAIN POPPET CRACK AND QELIEF' PFESSURE IS 
315 PSIG AND THE MINIMUM RESEAT PRESSURE IS 3tO PSI.. AMBIENT PRESSURE 
SENSING INTERN.AL IS PROVIDED SINCE THE VALVE OUTLET IS SUBJECTED TO 
SACK-PRESSURE. 
.FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LE4K . "F) 
FAILS OPEN, MAIN- POPPET OR OIAPHRAG4 LEAKS OR MAIN POPPET OOES NOT
 
RESEAT AS REQ'Q AFTER BURST DISC RUPTURE.
 
.CAUSE(S,): 
CORROSION. CONTAMINATION, POPPET BINDS IN GUIDE, SPRING BPEAKS OR COCKSt
 
SEAT CRACKS,. MOISTURE FREEZES, VIBRATION, SHOCK. 
.EFFECT(S2: ON (A}SUBSYSTEM (B)-INTERFACES (C)MISSICN (D)CREW/VEHICLE: 
(A) LOSS OF SUBSYTEM PRESSURIZATION., (-B) LOSS OF INTERFACE FUNCTION 
(INABIL ITY TO RE-PRESSURIZE PROPELLANT TANKS CUE TO HELIUM LOSS). 
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO USE/DEPLETE PROPELLANT.- (C) LOSS CF ENTRY 
CAPABILITY - ASSUMES ULLAGE PRESSURE IS ALSO VENTED OVERBOARD & PROP 
CANNOT BE DEPLETED. (2 FAILURES - FIRST IS RELIEF'REQ'MTrl. ABORT 
DECISION IF LEAK RATE IS SMALL. (0) NO EFFECT (FIRST FAILURE. (E)
 
FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECT - POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE - SEE
 
ITEM (C) ABOVE. PROP IN ONE POD MAY NOT BE ADEQUATE FOR ENTRY. POSS 
ENTRY CONTROL & LANDING HAZARD,LC.G.) IF PROP CANNOT BE DEPLETED 0RIOR 
TO LANDING.­
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (AIDESIGN (BITEST (C)INSPECTION {D)FAILURE HISTCRY:
 
CAI THE BURST DISC IS REDUNDANT TO' THE MAIN POPPET FOR THE EXTERNAL 
LEAKAGE MODE. (MAIN POPPET LEAKAGE 'WOULD NOT BE SENSED UNTIL AFTER 
BURST DISC ACTUATION OR FAILURE). A Z5-MICRCN FILTER O0VNSTREAM OF THE 
BURST DISC WILL REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR CONTAMINATION CAUSED LEAKAGE 
FAILURE. THE HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE COULD BE CLOSED DURING STATIC 
PERIODS. THIS WOULD PREVENT CONTINUING LOSS OF SOURCE PRESSURE. THE-
MAIN POPPET STEM IS N SE0ARATE PIECE FROM 'THE MAIN SENSING SPRING 
ACTUATION MECHANISM. THIS PROVIDES CLOSE TOLERANCE CONTROL OF OPENImG 
PRESSURE F ALLOWS THE POPPET TO SEAT INOEPENOENTLY OF THE LARGE SENSOR 
SPRING FORCE.. (B) 36,000 PRESSURE EXCURSION CYCLES AT SYSTEM OPERATING
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-z4 -201060-4 REV:LZ/14/72
 
PRESSURE AND 400 PRESSURE RELIEF CYCLES ARE CONDUCTED DURING QUAL.
 
CC) AN IDENTIFICATION IS PERFORMED CONTAMINATION CONTROL PROCESS,
 
CONTAMINATION CONTROL PLANv CORROS. PROTECTICN PROVISION1 NOE EXAM OF
 
hELDS. INSP FOR SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE DEFECTS, PROPERLY MONIORED 
HANDLING AND STORAGE ENVIRONMENT, AND MAT'L AND EQUIP, CONFORMANCE TO 
CONTRACT RE.TS. ARE VERIFIED 81 INSP. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE VERIFIED 
BY SHOP TRAVELER MANDATORY INSP POINTS-RAW MAT', (LOT CEPTIFICATION), 
PARTS PROTECTIONS MANUF., COATING, PLATING, INSTALLATION AND 4SSY 
OPERATIONS. TURNAROUND - LEAKAGE TESTS ARE MONITORED TO VERIF. THAT THE 
BURST DISC IS STILL INTACT AND THAT THE MAIN POPPET LEA RATE IS WITHIN 
SPECIFICATION REQMTS. VISUAL INSP FOR EVIDENCE OF DETERICPATION IS ALSO 
PERFORMED. (D) APOLLO FAILURES WERE DO LARGELY TO GALVANIC CORROS. C 
CONTAMINATION CORRECTED BY CESIGN r TEST PROCESSING CHANGES. (THE 
SHUTTLE RELIEF VALVE IS A NEW DESIGN WHICH CONTAINS A FILTER & DOES NOT
 
USE DISSIMILAR- METALS).
 
36 
t.5 SD75-SH-0003 
iL I !Lt, f 	 A'C E f',Ci& , IJL St ­
* ": L :,..-	 , . ' I - - . - r:C 
.,j 
­
- -:L 	 I /." , L I , A t A",I[. ''.,I *, r i.: ­' 

SAiT::: 	 ;:!,.s- FbI LU : 
-..-
MPLA UNK 'can UFss- 1 
L A t i ,:a' ---- -- Aj L L­
'-,L" 10 L I A!-FLII 14 y L L vA 	 ,:i'I, 10 .	 i: Ii;.r:u
 
F'Pt" U" i ; 	 T ULLA t b Fr--:S -t "ZL:\I' S. 
• 't I 'J'r"{ U 'D?...............YLS 
.1U- A"LVH 
-CH TL-1 
- ­
£A.I-,'ALtZ 	 1:L
 
M:L C ; AKL'RS 	 I:LL 
I f ? : VizLV[: 
,*L . I;,, EVt. Al L .	 L , irLI
....tv',-f: ;'--.'&s,.L -i.LLUF P.' , . 1 R:'hC.L/-<I2 FAI]Lt.. 'F , tl I'<t,>ZLL, \t 
T I :-I 
-- :":-AL 	 .S .. t. ,- T .-	 -,YP. ThL S -:;--I L I.- ,.*.­
-- i-";2 c f-. YN.-i;NtUM0 t.i '- PI -'RLS$U<Z t: SIX Lj A kn f .I31, S.",
 
5 ,! iN1L VKL i I'11'SliL $l':NC "lo V Vh UUI L,! iS S'"J-LLI . it., 
n!,LI. cVY ,' L i ha L L tAK 	 (i-) 
"

* ,L . \, A x vIR P-.pLf &A LI, -,t:,i LE MxS CAI KAI% P',49.I L'L S iul 
Z-$_4. ,n.' ' -.1 M AF r : LB'-T AI $ IA i-I.c. 
*'.'f,I,-i±~ .I,,\ P bI-Ll r,I:\['S IN to4.L-, S I' (, i, LA ,t,, ..5 t I (NC.'-i,, 4.15 	EU ,r.1f-t L ES, V 1Li 1 12].'ri UMCK. 
('. LSS> Sa $'<I"I(U) ii. . IZ 'TI~ri. L.tS ofi ,f.k-l .	 Fc.NL'IL',
*C L i -A t. " [i,. P?, , LLrLflI ]AKS DO. 1 i1 LI, 0 .4o
 
Pt 'I.L" IV W L_/L xiLLI .-rh5LLAN .I L)L SSS t-t -I,-
IN -tAL i/Y a 
Cjj'p jj. i ( - S SLIM:Sb LL~t;h PJE$SU;:t 1$ ALSV VEMI E-L' UIS.LP's ", 
,.,'T ?. -bLLIcL. It FAILU-$ 
-FIRST IS RiLtIF "LOI). ,AV' Ai 
IjCJtI I1 LrVK h I, IS SY'IlLL. (D) NO SPc.CT (1- t AI-,LC:- -. (_­
-:5U".x-L OrI"1iCZ.L1TY LFHui- - VU'.I1LLL LL LAL- LtFt V-rCL.: -

I (C) .-,iVh.t" r!10 i'1 0L f iU ;,AY N, f 6 L AuVj L I 
 F l ;>, Y. hWPt 
rV Ii Y r-'L 'MN . HMi;,xI) L 
 NU (Co. o) I I- "t-" C.vN:,T c L.. LL .T..u I'"ii. 
I' LAo% [ : I' 
.,CI.:- -CT I "'t,k C 1 L"t' 
.\Ii.I qLL K. -cSCUi f ,Y'. RL ISF ,.:PL.''S VN/L+ LPcr.'; Jr L s LLI. L 
8I T ;I '\ WA'r FLw LN.II.y Di:I'LL IL ISuAL.Lc PUD I r I :'.PKbi' F I ,,, II :.' 
37 	 ORIGINAL PAGE is 
OF POOR QUAL y 
:'-i ILL i-,riLL .LL AcL -t l(:T. /..t.L'<,.J" - ".':I . 
K. 'Li. - :-'LL VIAt C >.' i.rm".( :.} '.\ 

", ' ­
* 2 ' .. C . ,. , , oL - ,] ,I . f ".J " ,. . ~ - - -
I. 38 I-m 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSTS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-0103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS FMEA NUMBER f3-2A-201070-1 
ITEM He Fill Quick Disconnect FAILURE MODE Fails Open 
I. DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
AUTOMATICALLY YES NO El 
Ta. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
*YES NO­
2. 
3. 
ARE THE AISWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FNEA EVALUATION OF 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
DOES,THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAkE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE 
(EITHER BY COMIANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
YES 
YES 
E]*NO 
D NO F0 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE 
FAILURE CODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION 
PROGRAfI LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION' WITH SOFTWARE 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE 
TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO F1 
OR IMPLEiIE:TING ALTERNATE 
! 
OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES fl NO E] 
LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES oI NO 
TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 D *l- 2F-
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTIONI IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES' PROVIDED N/A -]YES-RO[] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES *NO 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES I]*NO Q 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARf 
1.0-] NO H/S ISSUES 3.(D NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. M 	HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. - DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. D RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
In-Flight detectability 
rn FMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Gross leak detection will give first indication. 
6. Capped quick disconnect provides one redundant success path.
 
Pod 	Redundancy
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CR31TER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTICN CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2A -Z3107O-1 REV: 12/12/78 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: 1 
.P/N RI :MC276-0 CIT-0402/-0403 CF.IT. HOW: I 
.PIN VENCOR:753720ZC-O401/-0403 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM 
.QUANTITY :4 PHASE(S): PL X LO X CC X DO X LS X 
:ONE PER HELIUM TANK PER 
.	 REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-.N/A C-N/X 
SPREPARED BY: APPROVED9. APPROVE 0Y A 
DES5 SCARLETT D hS 5S 
.REL C M AKERS ... ......
 
WOAROVED WITH CHANGES
 
* 	 See Section 13.0
 
.ITEM: DISCONNECT,QUICKFILL,HES ci .
 
. (114") WITH SPRINi LOADED PGPPET AND STRUCTURAL END CAP. 'D 2L9/220
 
.FUNCT I.. 
PRVIDE HELIUM TAN K FILL -40 VENT PGI:NT FOR GRCU4:J SERVICING ,PE;±TICNS 
AND LOADING. COUPLING IS ACCESSIBLE 4T THE HELIUM SERVICI'"G PANEL. 
SFAILURE MODE: FAILS OPE" 	 (S) 
* EXrCS OF ACCEPTABLE RATE, SEALS DAMAGED.
 
*CAUSE(S) 	 A 
* 	COTAMINATIO , VIRATIN, 'iECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART SWUCTU'AL
 
" 
FAILURE, EXCESS 0; IMPQOPE- USE, IU:ADhC MI-NT C * E FALF, NC L R; 
SUPDCRT - SHAFT OR 500E EE4T. RETAININ;G CAP LOCSqNS NEGAT[-IG CA0 SEAL 
!EOUNOANCY.
 
--
.EFFeCT(SI: ON (A SURSYSTEM T R (FAES ()CPC? ;/VEwCLE:(")INTRPAC ISSEON 
( SUB-SYSTE' PkESSU:IZ±TIC;N t-3 OF INrEPF6CE FUN:CTIChA) LOSS 3F LOSS 

(INABILITY TO QEPRESSUPIZE PROPELLANT TAN'(S 011 TO HELIU! LOSS). (C)
 
LAUNCH DELAY OR ABORT. ({) POTENTIAL CPE'w LOSS -URING HISICI IF
 
0ROPELLANT CANNOT BE UTILIZED OR DEPLETED.
 
.DISPOSITICN a RATIONALE (A)CESIGN (SBTEST (C)I;S'ECTtON (D)FAILU!E HISTORY: 
(4) F.S. IS 2.0 X-WCRKING PRESS. ULLAGE 0 ;ESS IS _ADEO TC EXP.L PROP 
WITH 35 PERCENT OR LESS RE4 AINING. GROUND HAL= CCUPLINGS AND LINES ,RE 
SUPPORTED TO LIMIT ANY UNDJE STRESS ON THE CCUOLING DURING SEPVICE AND 
PREV DAMAGE TO SEALS. A SAFETY FEATURE OU;ING SERVICING AND 0RIC" To 
REMOVAL OF THE END CAP IS A PROV WHEREBY ANY LEAKAGE PAST -HE AIRBORNE 
.POPPET SEAL CAN BE VENTED OVERBOARD BY ROTATING A 3LEED SCPE6. CC4PLETE 
STRESS ANAL HAS BEEN CONDUCTED. UTIL OF STRUCTCAP MINIfIZES LEAKAGE 
POTENTIAL AND PROVIDES A R-DUN SEAL EXCEPT FOR STRUCT FAILURE. (B) THE 
COUPLING IS SUB TO 600 OPERATIONAL CYCLES (CCUPLING AND UNCOUPLING) 
DURING QUAL. RANDOM VIB TESTING IS ALSO CONDUCTED AT ANTIC VEH LEVELS 
FOR 48 MINUTES IN TWO AXES. USAGE DURING SYS EV&L TESTS AT WSTF ALLOWS 
EVAL UNDER ACTUAL USAGE CON. PROOF PRESS TESTS ARE CONDUCTED DURING ATP 
AND LEAKAGE TESTS ARE PERF BEFORE AND AFT ER OPER CYC LES. (C) AN ICENT 
IS PERF. RAW MAT'L, NOE EXAM, VISUAL INSP FCR CRITICAL SURFACE DEFECTS,
 
°
 AND EQUIP CONFORMANCE TO CONTRACT REQ.TS tQE VERIF BY RECEIVIh:G INSP. 
MEASURMENT STANDARDS AND TEST EQUIP. STANDARDS ARE IePLEmENTED PE-
REQMTS OF MIL SPEC. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE VERIF BY SHCP TR4VELER 
MANDATORY INSP POINTS. -PARTS MPG. PROCESSES, COATING. ASSY AND
 
INSTALLATION. THE ABOVE ITEMS AND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE VERIFIED BY
 
AUDIT CONDUCTED 5-23-77. CORROS PROT PROV, CONTAM CONT PRCCESSES, TEST
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - C13ITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CCNTROL FMEA NO 03-ZA -20Z1070-I REV:12/12/7S
HANDLING, ANC STORAGE ENVER- THE FOLLQW!NG [TEMS .ERE VERIFUiO BY AUDIT
 
OF MARCH 6, 19T8. INSPECTIGN VERIFIES ASSEMBLY PER INS 0 ECTION POINTS IN
 
MASTER RECORD. LOG OF CLEAN ROO'ANO CALISPATINC OF- TOOLS VERIFIED. 
CRITICAL OIMENSION 100% VERIFIED BY ItSPECTCPI. PARTS CLEANLINESS AND
 
PASSIVATION VER-LISO 8Y INSPECTICN. NOE £NSPECTION PERF(P. EO AFTER 
ASSEMBLY. TURNAROUNOo CCUPLINGS ARE VISUALLY INSP FOR EVID CF DAMAGED 
SEALS ANO LEAK TESTS ARE PERFORMED. (C) APOLLO F&ELUP.- HISTO0 Y hAS IN
 
THE MAIN ASSOC WITH GROUNOIUSAGE, IMPRGPER H±'GLING. 
SD75 -S -o 3
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-0103-2 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS " FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-201080-1 
ITEM Purge Qljjr nlicnnec;t, propellan't FAILURE MODE External Leakage 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFT11ARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES a NOO 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION INRESPONSE)?­
la. 	 IFNOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION -THATTHE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES ] NO-

USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO DUESTIONS 1 AND la 'CONSISTENTWITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES C]*NO []
 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO ID­
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIEITING ALTER;;ATE PROGPAM"LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES 0l O [ 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COM,4NDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiIEITING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVE.RSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES '2 No 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTIARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO
 
OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 ] *iC] 2[D 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A Q]YES'NO[
 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. 	CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES E]*NO El 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES 5]*NO
 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY
 
T.0 NO H/S ISSUES .	 3. NO0, SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0-ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.CD HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. l DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6.El RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
rnFMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED
 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS:
 
1. Gross leak detection will give first indication.
 
2. The above statement indicates in-flight detection.
 
6. Need minimum of 2 yaw thrusters. Cross-feed is available. Pods are redundant.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CSITER LOZ 
SUBSYSTEM tAFT - REACTION CONTRCL FMEA -NO 03-ZA -201080-1 - REV:I/IJg/7 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION ABORT: CPIT. FUNC: IR 
.P/N RI :,MCZ7-0O01 CR TT. H1,.: 
.P/N.VENOOR:7636t0C0 F 76316000 :aISSIONS: HF VF X FF CF S:I 
.OUANTITY :Z8 PHASE(Sl: PL L0 X CC X 00 X LS 
Sf,.4. PER POO
 
-

-l2OFI/Z IN. REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS 
.2 OF 1/4 IN. 
.PREPARED BY: APPROVAPPRVD B',S 1:A 
.DSCSCARLETT D'ssS 1 
.REL C M AKERS REL V AS1 
ARbOVED WITH CHANGES
 
See Section 13.0 
.ITE4: OISCONNECTQUICK. PURGE.
 
VENT, PROPELLANT 'xITH STRUCTURAL END CAP AND SPRING LCAOE. POPPET
 
CI/ 2 & 1/4-IN.)-. 
.FUNCTION:
 
-TO ALLOW GROUND OURGE OF PRCPELLANT M NIFOLDS OURNG T;J,PNSAr-O!o 
GPER AT ICNS.
 
.FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK.\GE (S)
 
CAP LEAKS, SEALS DAMAGED RETAINING NUT LJGSENIS NEGAING CAP S=AL
 
REOUNOANCY.
 
.CAUSE(Si:

VtSRATION. PIErE PART STRU,Ttn&AL FTLDZ,.LCcvAMItrt--, ?ECH-4.L
 
SHOCK. SEAL IAMAGE, INAOEO tAIN7T OF'tSE H-ALF, NO L'E SLIPPC':r - S IAFT
 
OR BslqE BHET
 
.EF=ECT(S): ON (A)SUSYSTEM"(3)INTERFCES ("SStCN (01 CR"/VEH CLE:
 
(A,c) LOSS OF REDUk.0aNCY
 
(PROPELLUNT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE COULD ISOLATE LEAK). .(C) 'AISStz.!
 
mOOIFICATION OR ASORT DECISION. (0) NO ;FFECT UNLESS :iULTIPL'E FaILU-S
 
OCCUR OR EXCESS LOSS OF PROPELLANT OCCJRS. (E),JNCTIO;AL CVTICALETY 
EFFECT - POSSIBLE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS - LOSS OF RCS ENTRY PrCPELLX'T. 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL DURING ENTRY. 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGN (B)TEST (CIINSPECTION (O)FAILUPE HISTGRY: 
(A) F.S. IS 2.0 X WORKING RESS. REDUNDANCY PPCVtOED BY I'TEiRNAL SELL, 
CAP & MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE. GROUND HALF CUUPLEnGS ANO LIMES ARE 
ADEC SUPPORTED TO LIMIT ANY UNDUE STRESs oC! THE COUPLIIG DURING SERVICE 
AND PREV DAMAGE TO SEPLS. A SAFETY FEATURE OURING SERVICING AND PRI2R
 
TO REMOVAL OF THE END CAP IS A PROV WHEREBY ANY LEAKAGE PAST THE
 
AIRBORNE POPPET SEAL CAN 3E VENTED OVEFEGARD BY 7CTkTING A BLEED SCRE.
 
COMPLETE STRESS ANAL HAS BEEN CONDUCTED. UTIL CF STRUCT.CAP MIN\I.MIZES
 
LEAKAGE POTENTIAL AND 0ROVIDES A REDUM SEAL EXCEPT FOR STRUCT FAILURE.
 
FAILURE CAN BE ISOLATED AT MANIFOLD VALVE. (8) THE COUPLING "IS SUBJ TO
 
600 OPER CYCLES (COUPLING AND UNCOUPLING) DUPING CJAL IN ACOITICN TO
 
PRESS SURGE CYUCLING AND PROP EXPOSURE TESTS. 9ANCOM VIB TESTING IS
 
ALSO CONDUCTED AT ANTIC VEH LEVELS FOR 8 .4INUTES IN E4CH-AXIS. USAGE 
DURING SYS EVAL TESTS AT WSTF ALLOWS EVAL UNGER ACTUAL USAGE CoNDO 
PROOF PRESS TESTS ARE CONDUCTED OURING ATP AND LEAKAGE TESTS ARE PERF 
BEFORE AND AFTER OPER CYCLES. (C) AN [O.NT IS PERF. RAW AT'L, NDE 
EXAM. VISUAL INSP FOR CRITICAL SURFACE .DEFECTS. AND EcUIrP CONFORMANCE TO 
'CONTRACT REQOTS ARE VERIF BY RECEIVING INSP. MEASUREMENT STANOAROS AND 
. 5 -SD75 -S -0o003 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL I.TEMS LIST - ORBITER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION COpITROL FMEA NC 03-2A -20-OSO-1 REV:1l/O9/'8
 
TEST EQUIP. STNDARS -ARE IYPLEMENTED PER REQPTS CF '-IIL SPECS. ThE
 
FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE VERIF BY SHOP TRAVELER MAIJOATfPY INSP POINTS-?ARTS
 
PROT, MFG. PROCESSES, COATING, ASSY ANO !NST-ALLATICN. ThE A3V-E ITEMS
 
&ND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS 'Em.E VERIFIED BY AuJDIT COACUCrTED 5-23-77.
 
CORROS PROT, PROV CON.TAJM CO;T PROCESSES, TEST HANOLENG, AND STORAGE
 
ENVIR.. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS wRE VERIFIE.- BY AUDIT OF MARCH e, 1979.
 
INSPECTION VERIFIES AS&EMSLY PER-iINSPECTGN POINTS [N MAS-ER RECORD. 
LOG OF CLEAN RCOM AND CALIBRATION OF TCLS VERIFIED. CRITICAL DI;-ENSIGN 
100!9 VERIFIED By INSPECTICN. PARTS CLEANLINESS AND PASSIVATION V :RIFIEV 
9Y INSPECTION. NDE INSPECTION. PERFORMED AFTER ASSE-rBLY. 
TURNARCUND-COUPLINGS WILL BE VISUALLY INSPECTED FOP EVIDENCE OF CAP SEAL 
DAMAGE AND CAP LEAKAGE. (0) APOLLO FAILURE hISTC'Y '.AS IM THE MI.'N 
ASSOC hITH GROUNO USAGE, IM.PRSPER HANOLING. 
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S -S -OOOS 
•HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-201090-1
 
-ITEM Test Quick Disconnect FAILURE MODE External Leakage
 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY' YES j] NO [ 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION INIRESPONSE)? 
Th. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT COULD *YES N CSOFTWARE O 
-USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2.. ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES []*NO [ 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO 
(EITHER BY COMiANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOF-r..IARE'TO. COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES Q NO rn 
FAILURE CODE (EITHER BY COFR.IANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR INPLEiIE;iTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE hARDWARE OR *YES El NO Z 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES [ 0
 
OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [ *1E 2ED 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHAUGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A E]YES Ri'O-
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE AflSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES E]*NO I] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF-CREW/VEHICLE? YES *X]*NO
 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1. 0 	'NO H/S ISSUES 3. 0 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. D ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.77 HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. -IRECOr1ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
FxIFEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Gross leak detection gives first indication.
 
2. FMEA change - in flight detectability should include above measurement numbers.
 
6. Pod redundancy.
 
47
 
,i! I z ILU'... -j . ANDL, -LLOi 7'P Y . - Ls ,-
I, A L 
... 'Nt.it'1 ; - - i j .uI]c. Ct,' lI..L r LA C3-<, - ],; -i . l i 
0..1 L t.T:Zty.i '..Ii--. 
SSsw1. ... Lr 'I I-s. : 'Vit 
:I-.fY ,--,-S..i): i'L L" x .. y , ,. , 
kCL ., At,.Y S(AL_: ,--t[ '- L1_ LL -"I 
S - i,L ,­
- jA" r, . . . ...- _ , 
S1-, '----1:3-" 
ZpryZ bI'L V z'r 
WM:: C "" _,CALL.ST 
A'CL C M AKINS LL
 
A I- "
f I' : L'_.T, 1
' 
(1/"-'J ~. 1 .A'." C,.,-.* '. ,' T ,,''\t,, L_:A-LS .(-'-<V-1 L\N' S-iKIIC'iJF-4L -­
- . L s- i;r.c-. rtI*i 
,< ?Ltril L. (. .L ,YI%Tc'.t -'u\''C -. v-J. -,. 1.L- ' v- Qr -F':t" _L VP-, V 
, , ,
 
... C/L[ 't" Ir!!S- .t sYv . ,w.,e.. C, iL ,NEW.i I I dVzl. ; .. ,r .,....- CL ; r z: 
'C T)(.vi2L. ,; , Sf-kV k'-iL. !I'-ci.. CAr" i'riGg~t;-S R.,:U'.uA .UY rU..,'AT
II vS,* m..A2'-. V L ,% SLll AL ,I &I-AILASi\f h U :WAL 
A!-h-I]SEAV!~ zIKUC1UD4,AL LAr kt'K'AC .LZJL,.*.LL1 ' 1)L.r.r, r L k2S1q -X.;E. $u"ftiFAIL ttiU. (p..,PPE .aLCz : \~Y ,, 
0L A"LL.
:.--;b-'A L'T ;.Y--l.
 
. F 1-IS '): W L. & )IN AEFIRW US (LI)MY (L),.:t L - -U--a , ',6zf\ L rtS SI al ­
*N & 31-K sF 1'ILAI-I4LI LKDY ( FJL j L I& W<L(j4V1 "1I- 5u L IT PAR!LFUS. *SL riLIst t c LAN1YCI CAL-(CAI~.'" 
W"gLi,.> ,- to) -' i AC-- I & ,LtI LLL AL I -. L
 
l.t j,rl ; , N "-Cl -WL,L,&. 1 ,P r LI. : ,O 1) f>r, : - : , 
if'"S LL(.S)L 1-1 LZ.-AL L. T !CL 1 Y* K I " u- ULL "E r, -'. L.... 
nh, r'-COOK b;'L':lR QIL Fst 1 NA;-F\lILlI"Y IU B-V' Uk G'aPtLaf tAnn- e jtL-LA.7 
I "1'Sf NE10LL IN LLS I LL NAFILNY F3 CAL\iuu:tt.L V(-! iLL t.IU*A 0, 
-.
K,U I AE/L 1TAY 1 US. ,ESZLm,& P LTSY I 5K C. k. Ll-,n 
, 'Y&l-W
,CIP.- A i., r,-,'", F-R-UPELLAI,1 .
 
1 SCL I 1Z CL,,%S ILW. 'E F ULLA -E i';\t- !SJm,-,; ,LEAKr' IF 14_,511P- t." L.54'2" -jirj;, 
..r' j~ k m tL 1"ULLD1LNP, VALV," r,\I IC r m L,'_.2. ..... S~ ,[,'L
' 
.,.It t, i/ ,, -7, [-S . " ', L ; 
1, J'c Yd! I r, t5ARL" UkINv !.,R,'LQ USA E. SE LIN: MUST uL 
SuIWF'"R1 . * P0,bl- ALVKSL EFrtLCl (iNVnmiCLE GYNA--',ICS It- rN (A 
48 
ORIGINAL PAGE S 
OF POOR QUALITY
 
49
 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CR,.TEP 102 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTICN CONTROL FmEA -No 03-ZA -291090-1 REV:12/t2/lc 
.ASSEMAiLY :PRESSURIZATTGN ABORT: C4IT. FUNC: !­
.P/N RI :MEZToG-0032-0005,7,19,21 CPIT. HOW: 3 
.P/N VENDOR:R.R4Z670-5,-TaG4Z-;J-&-3 MISSICNS: HF VF X FF OF S:4 
.QUANTITY :36 PHASE(S): PL L2 X CC X 00 X LS 
* 18 PER MOULE 
REDUNOANCY SCREE-': A-FALL B-FAIL C-PASS
 
.PREPARED BY: APPR a A--4 IA -
CDESCARLETT W..isi4J'YismDESr:" 	 r 
.REL C M AKERS REL . P.C" 
APPROVED WITH CHANGES 
ITEM- DISCONNECT, QUICK* TEST See Section 13.0 
Pr. (L/4") WITH SPRING LC4uE0 POPPET AND STR1CTURAL ENO CAP. '40 
20 L-204/ZO7-ZI6/3 1-304/:0T-316 
.FUNCTION: 
* 	TO PWJVIZE ACCESS TO THE HELIIJM SUPPLY SYSTEW ZT VIRICJS PCINTS E'N THE
 
SYSTEM (RELIEF VLVES/3URST DISCS REGULATPFS, CHECK VALVES). PCVE,-3S
 
FOR C/O OF PRESS SUI-SYS COMPONENTS. COPNEI,INOUTS &"CUTPU-S ARE
 
ACCESIBLE AT HE SEOV PANEL. THE END, CAP PPOVIOES EIt' sOANCY c!J
 
EXTERNAL LEAK.
 
.PAILURE MODE: EXT =',IAL LEAWAGE 	 (Si 
* 	CAP LEAKS, SEALS CAtAG,20,,
 
.CAUSE(S): 
VIBRATION. PIECE DART SrpuCTUPAL FAILURE (POPPET. ,L M CH1'![cL 
SHOCK. EXCESS TORCUE. SEAL OA'AAGE, IN4OE; MAINT OF .E HLF, '40 LINE 
SUPPORT - SHAFT CR 6OE ENFT. 
.EFFECT(S): ON (4)SUSYSTEM. (3)INTERFICES (C)vSSCN (O)CREN/VENIcLE: 
(4) 'LOSS 0 SUSSXST-z4 PRESSUEZATION CR aEDUNO-'NCY OEPENCIcNG rii 
LOCATION . (8) LCSS OF INTERFACE FUNCTION (LOSS OF PPOPELLANT FEED
 
CAPABILITY). LC,0-) NO EFFECT DUE TO REDUNOAT: aORET SEALS & E;4o CAP.
 
(S) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECT - POSSIBLE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS. LOSS
 
OF PRESSURANT RESULTS IN INABILITY TQ BURN OR 0EPLETE RCS PRCOELLANT.
 
THIS WOULD RESULT IN POSSIBLE INABILITY tc CCNTROL VEHICLE OUPING E\ITIY
 
DUE TO INABILITY TO USE RESERVED ENTRY P -PELLA C GL
 
ESULTING FROM PROPELLANT WEIGHT.,
 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGN (B)TEST (C)tNSPECTI2I ()FAILUE HISTnaY: 
* 	 (A) P.S IS 2.0 X WORKING PRESS. ULLAGE PRESS IS AGEC TC EXPEL PROP 
WITH 35 PERCENT OP. LESS REMAINING.. GROUN HALF COUPLINGS ANO LINES ARE 
AOEQ SUPPORTED TO LIMIT ANY UNDUE STRESS ON THE COUPLING DURING SERVICE 
AND PREV OEMAGE TO SEALS AND WELD JOINTS. A S FETY ,FE4UPS !J ING -
SERVICING AND PRIOR TO REMIOVAL OF THE END CAP- IS A PROV WHEREBY ANY 
LEAKAGE PAST THE AIRBORNE POPPET SEAL CAN BE VENTED OVER3t2APO SY 
ROTATING CAP. UTI. OF STRUCT CAP MINIMIZES LEAKAGE OOTENTIAL AND 
PROVIDES A REDUN SEAL EXCEPT FOR STRUCT OR WELD FAILURES. (9) THE 
COUPLING ES CESIGNED FOR 400 OPER CYCLES (COUPLING AND UNCCUPLING). 
USAGE DURING SYS EVAL TESTS AT WSTF ALLOWS EVAL UN ER ACTUAL USAGE CONO. 
PRCCF PRESS TESTS ARE CONDUCTED DURING ATp AND LE KAGE TESTS ARE PERF 
BEFORE AND AFTER OPER CYCLES. (C) AN IDENT IS PERF ANU THE UNIT TAGGED.
 
RAW MAT'L. NOE EXAM OF WELDS, VISUAL INSP. OF WELD IOINTS FOR
 
tOGS .Sf75-SH-ooo3 
sO 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - OB.5IrTER 132 
Z-.EV:12/12I76
SUBSYSTE " :AFT - REACTION CCN-ROL FMEA NO 03-24 -21090-1 

CONFORMANCE TO STANDARO 6ELO PRACTICE, SURFACE DEFECTS, 4'40 EQUIP 
CONFORMANCE TO CONTRACT FEOPTS ARE VERIF By RECEIVING INSP.. EASUREMENT 
STANDAROS AND TEST EQUIP. STANOARDS ARE IMPLE:'!ENTED c-P P=_:CMTS OF "IL 
S'ECSO THE FOLLOING ITEMS ARE VERIF BY SHOP-.R3VELER MANrTTCRY INSP 
POINTS- PARTS PROT, MFG. ?;;OCESSES, CtiATING. PLATTNG, ASSY Al-
INSTALLATION. THF ABOVE ITEmS ANO THE FILLOING ITEmS WERE VaRIFIEC EY 
AUDIT CONOUCTED 11-3-76. C.30 R2S'PROT PROV, CONTMi CCNT PPCCESS'hS, TEST 
HANDLING. AND STOR"GE ENVIR. TURNAROUND-- CCUPLI"IGS WILL LE VISUALLY 
INSPECTED FOR EVIDENCE OF SEAL DAMAGE ANO CAP LEAKAGE. (CflUPLINGS -
BlETWEEN. THE HELIUM ISOL VALVE C rEGULA'r . THCSE ASSOCIATED %.fTH PROP 
TANK C/O ARE NOT ACCESSIBLE AT SERVICI:.G PANELS) (C) a0CLLO FAILURE 
HISTORY IAS i THE MIM ASSCC wTH GRflUNJ IS;.GE.-, [.PrCPER rJAn.oLi:-NG. 
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S D75 -SEO- 003. 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS 	 FNEA NUMBER 03-2A-201095-2 
ITEM He Quad Check Valve 	 FAILURE NODE Fails Closed 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFT'WARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES J] NO C 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION UliRESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES [] NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES Q1*NO [] 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO El (EITHER BY CONIANDIIG HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFT14ARE TO COPENSATE FOR THIS *YES NO0 [ 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiIE;ITING ALTER:1ATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES' NO [
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO [
 
OTHER FUnCTIOnS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *'[1 2FX 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A ].YESSN{iO[] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES EJ*NO El 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES Ej*NQ ".
 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1. ED NO H/S ISSUES 3. E3 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 5 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.Q[] HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. E RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
EFMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1 & 2. Upon using the thrusters, propellant tank ullage pressure will decay until <200
 
psi which will give a class 2 alarm, caution and warning. (Red Light)
 
.52
 
" I, iL ...,. ' '."-L.*.' ,,\'i - I• I. , NCLY,'. .9-"1 ;, Lc:.	 rIL ; :tzh ­
" " "L : . "I .A I1hv -L ALL:Y 'I JI 
-, 11 :' . ,L -' :,i/- '- -; . If. -. ,- . 
:.- L 
- Li::- - PL Y S;ut-E - -fr.r 
S *,* , Y 	 H :" Ir-,S L..- ,, . L. 
,,  
rII
 
L1 I L ' F-LJ k--.s- . ''LL I '
 
•,.,tK'.6A,'NLY SL( c-i-ti. : , , '-L--."' L-, 
,. ... . , . -	 j lY I',t 
C 'YL - ".i-. P ! 
L• 	 V 
P ILLiLFt 	 -11 PLS I T .-SI L I I L.... " J" I-	 L "IC_IU* I 

IL t' C-'I S IL C'- L 
Th -' ?Y 	 .41C' VF I i C LV S 
1LS-4 ---L b.t K-,'' 	 ; 
- .' I Ar'- F I.,, KiS rL.,T.i:" , :- -.p ' r.VS 1 .: S - ',r LL i.L " " 	 Il. J ,A P J " " - ,, 
S. 	 - t - - - 55 5' 
- "" S 	 7 l- F . L -.-...L 	- .)lU- \ 
". Tt t I L .( -- I c FLL 	 , 
rZ.T;- " ,.:1 A -Z LVD L Y':P(F)k T "'IIL : . 
V * 1 t ) If k (-L -s_ c11-C; t ,L ijT t (Z 	 L 
I. I IL'' 	 LL .r 
-- )i I Y;I- - .;A r. (C)M1SSE ) I L I.1 L.: 
* * ,cL , 5LIL J-. ?PiILL'... CF,-.,, , ?L'LIS' ' L C~uS 
L$) 	 L -' L.I"I:C P.<.<(:-I (F) I;N . ! ILL L~ 10. 
rr>A$ ' LV . ' PM-L " 	 'IA 
" ' 
.4,].) S-i5 1 A'K.) F(iS ituLY P-sLV.AvT U!I]L/J:_-L:ThIi,. Wi- ALL. L':'-H (rjA",.'it
tS~fl'.SCuTct' V1)L IL L-r.' 
) L ... IL -L L'1lICA-LIS If tir LI- 1-/ - LL 
" I-ICL'.- Lt U... F'A] Lu-.? U.F' wAK,,LLLL i-Orr) L h :- :. }-z5$31 .LY ,. CL I ..
* I LQSS i,.) tL2L' F.c - k - L ,,,L Li-, -DfWC 10 , L) :L.- I-c :Lc -
J\,A' I L.IY I. - Ji- x.Jr,u,-- Lx ,i ALL i.C\ i',C:'_LL -C i-llv iiit-x,' I:-A, : . 
'P' :; III iLLT"L - I 7 U LNJ-.E P'AC'' '. LcP' l DI i--UIT,: S I 
Y C JLY ft. TF],-fL. LL Ju: ' LL: ii L. .I.., ;_n, CEL L.fT.Y U.1 INA: 

,; '.VNA l<'.rI"Lt.J\\ .a 'hL, tML:-. DU1 ?,'QVLLLA;'I
A ,;u..- lb ,-:l:1 
*% "t:'.Li1" ' AC.tilL-;: 
* 	 Ii P"'" [ r .I-".P:I NuI.L. , CLu, i HL£LI U,. ISuL VgLv,_ cl Ti I-A LLL',-.-L 
'-"-I U TLL I'ui-P 'i tiI',SE-H.... S. 
-' 

* '-4 ,A 1- rI4 ' l k it PU.;Ll c i-,] LI- 1U LNJU . frtJS S Lnf'hLL I'~ r'I-. , Lu t-. 
'1,Yr CAJ.,c I-jP[ ST[A'- . -F ]ltui:' NLT uLTE-,leUL- U'Lth5 PA,5 ,L 1'' ) t IS-
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
53 OF POOR QUALITY 
-f L. L,. FFr.L .'...LYS. -I 
S - t * - L L . " , ' '.' ,- S - 5 r..,-I i ,L ,'C:-,--d * I*. 
54
 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CR3ITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2A -23L095-2 .REV:12/12/79
 
.ASSEMBLY :PRESSURIZATION A3URT: CRET. FUNC: 17
 
./N RI :MC284-149 -001/-O002 CRIT. HOV: 3
 
.PIN VENDGR:RS01050-01-011 HISSIO'S: Hp VP X FF r-F Sm 
.QUANTLTY :4 PHASE(S) :. PL LO X CC X 00 X LS
 
- :ONE.PE HELIUM SUPPLY
 
C 
* REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-OASS S-FAIL C-PASS
 
SPREPARED BY: AiPPROVED 4Y APPROV OB A 
.DESR,. BURKHART ~jKtA**Z.-C/ S3M 
*REL .C N AK ERS R__L : Rr.*/ 
APPOVED WITH CHANGES 
.ITE4,: VALVE, QUAO, CHECK, HE. See Section 13.0
 
* CV Z0./202/30L1/302
 
.FUN.CT ION:
 
* EACH CHECK VALVE QUfl WITH 4 POPOETS IN .ERIE - PARVLLEL '"P \ :GE'-|EN7 
OPOVICES PARALLEL REDUNDANCY FOR HELIUM, .SESSU 'EZATIO4 ",. SERES
 
RECUNDANCY TO LIMIT SACK FLCW.' OF PROPELLIT V,C"RS F . ' THE :,a'PELL.'C
 
TANKS TO THE REGULATOR. A 304L 25 ,rR0"I :IL"ER IS U"IL[Z--O I- ThE
 
INLET. VALVE UTILIZES CUTT-R SEAL OESIG"; CONkCEPT (TWC SEZ4LING SUOFACES
 
PT;, POPPET)
 
.F&ILURE 4OE: X4ILS CL0SE (r)
 
* RESTRICTED FLOci.
 
aCuAUSE(S}:
 
STRUCT FAILUREr SHOCK, V!3 Ptj3PEp IMS 1P GID.OE. C.lr, tI R
 
FREEZES IN COLD VALV', CCPRGS. 
..EFFECT(S): ON CAISUBSYSTEM (b3)I'TERFACES (CI.MSSICN (V)CE'r/VEH(CLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF REOUNDANCY - PARAL FLOW PATH.., (E,CC) 'NO -FFEcT U:LSS 
PARAL POPPETS FAIL CLOSED. FAILUPE OF PAPkL DCPO0.TS WOrduLD CAUSE 41v 
RATIO SHIFT AND POSSISLY PREVENT UTILICEPLETIC:1 CF ALL 000P ,POPOETS 
EVENTUALLY UNSEAT). (E) FUNCTICNAL CRITICALEVY ECFECT - POSSIBLE CREr 
VEHICLE LOSS. F4ILURE OF PIRALLEL POPPETS WIOULO POSSIBLY '7ESULT Il 
INABILITY To BURN OR DEPLETE ALL RCS OROPELLANT IN AJDIT[CN T, MIXTURE 
RATIO PROBLEMS WITH 0 ESULTANT THRUSTER FIRING PROBLEMS. POSSIBLE 
INABILITY TO CONTROL VEHICLE DURING ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY To UTILIZE
 
RESERVED PROPELLANT AND C.G. PROELEMS DUE TO PROPELLANT 'EIGHT.
 
.DISPOSITION t RATIONALE (A)DESISN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION ({)F-iILJREHISTCRY:
 
(A) SERIES-PARALLEL REDUNDANT POPPETS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR THE CLOSED
 
FAILURE MODE. TO LIMIT 'rHE POTENTIAL FOR POPPET SHAFT SINOINGiOR 
GENERATION OF CONTAMINATION THE .GUIDE PINS UTILIZE SAPPHRE AS A WEAR 
RESISTANT SURFACE. A 25-MICRON INLET FILTER WILL ALSO REDUCE THE 
POTENTIAL FOR A CLOSED FAILURE BY LIMITING TFE POTENTIAL F R 
CONTAMINATION TO CAUSE BINDING OF MOVING PARTS. (6) 100,000 OPERATION 
CYCLES (FLOW) AND RANDOrM VIBRATION At ANTICIPaTED MISSION LEVELS APE 
PERFORMED OURING QUAL.. ITEM IS USED DURING SYSTE-1 EVALU'rION TESTS AT 
WSTF ALLOWING EVALUATION UNDER SIMULATED MISSION USAGE CCNCITIONS. 
PROOF PRESSURE, LEAKAGE, & OPERATION (CRACKING PRESSURE AND FLOW) TESTS 
ARE PEFORIED DURING ATP. APPROPRIATELY LOCATED TEST POINTS ALLOW 
PRE/POST FLIGHT LEAKAGE TESTS AND OPERATION TESTS WHICH ARE C.NOUCTEO AT 
THIS TIME.- CC) AN IDENTIFICATION IS PERFORMED AND THE UNIT TAGGED. 
1010 SDTS-S-0003 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CR5ITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM1 :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FIMEA NO 03-2A -231095-2 REV:12/12/7S 
CONTAMINATION CCNTROL PROCESS, CORROS. PROTECTION PROVISIONS, 0'DE EXA;.. 
OF WELDS 'AND BRAZES, INSP. FOR SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE DEFECTS AR=
 
VERIFIED BY INSPECTt-On,. " THE, FOLLOWING ITEMS ACE VERFIUD BY SHOO 
TRAVELER MANDATORY INSP. POINTS - RAW ,TA'L (LOT CERTIFICATIO,.), PARTS
 
' PROTECTION, MANUF., CGATING, PLATING 1NSTALLTIC A"llD ASSEMvBLY 
OPERATINS. THE ABOVE ITEMS &NO THE FOLLOhING ITEMS wERE VERIFIED 5Y
 
AUOIT CONDLETED 12-2-77. CONTA$INATIOI- CONTROL PROCESs5E, CO-ROS.
 
PROTECTION PROVISIONS. TURNARnUNO - FUNCTIONAL FLOW AND LEAKAGE
 
(SACK-FLOW) TESTS ARE PERFORMED. (0O' NO PRICR HISTORY FOR CLZ-SE FAILURE 
MODE FOR THIS.TYP- OF DESIGN.
 
1I-el 56 5f75 SR -0O00
 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS FMEA IUMBER 03-2A-202108-1
 
ITEM Feedline & Fittings. Fuel FAILURE MODE External Leakage
 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES [ NO [
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IL RESPONSE)?. 
la. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 0 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA.EVALUATIOI OF YES Q*NO [ 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE.ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES [ NO [ 
(EITHER BY COMnANDIIG HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR ThE SOFTW.4ARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO [
FAILURE 1'ODE (EITHER BY COP.ANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIE;ITING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES El NO 5 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES ] NO1 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTFLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *l[ 2[D 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTIOI IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND. TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A D]YESrANO] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE ANS'AER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER, OCCURRENCE? 	 YES (D*NO-
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES Z]*NO 5 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.- NO H/S ISSUES 3.0 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. M ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.[ HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. - DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECONNENDED CHANGES BELOW 
In-flight detectability
 
.XFMEA CHANGE RECOMNEM;DED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Gross leak detection gives first indication. 
2. V42P2115 and 3115 should be deleted from this FMEA page as they are in the oxidizer
 
system and not the fuel system.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CgS.ITER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO- OS-ZA -202108-1 REV:.11/08/7? 
.ASSEPBLY :PROPELLANT FEEa1 FUEL ABORT: CPIT. FUNC: 1
 
.P/N RE :MC621-0059 CRIT. HOW: I
 
.P/N VENEDOR:73A560001 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM
 
.QUANTITY :2 PHASE(S): PL L-3 X CQ X 0O X LS
 
-ONE SET PER PROPELLA-NT
 
:PER MODULE.
 
* REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/'A s-II/A C-N/A 
:PREPARED BY: APPROVED PY- A0 PROVE0 Y I-ASA 
.DES N G GLAVINICH DES -. 554
 
.REL C M AKERS REL _ _..' _L - R--.-
*"-SAtROVED WITH CHANGES
 
See Section 13.0

*ITEM: FEEDLINE AND FITTINGS 
FROM TANK TO 1I T4NK V-LVES, TO 2) M-MFIFCLJ V±LVES, TC 3) THRUSTERS. 
.FUNCT ION: 
(1) 1 112 X.023 304 L S.S. FPDM TANK '0 I[STP[HUTIO:N PANEL, (2) 1 1/4 
X.O2S FROM MANIFlID ISGLAT304 VALVE TO TH;,USTZF MA"IFOLD, (3) 51a 
XoO28 THRUSTER MANIFOLD rC DROVIDE FEE;) TO ArPOP IATE ORC 0ELLANT 
COMPONENTS FOR THRUSTER OPERATION-3 4TIS 'CCELERATION CCN "RCL ANC7 

ROTATIONAL CONTROL.
 
.FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILU.S (S)
 
R
UPTURE, EXTERNAL LEA4K-AGE.,
 
.CAUSE(.SI: 
VIB, FATIGUE, SH5CK,. ELO DEF, INSTALL 06.A, OY*ITUE-SEAL FAILURE, AT' 
OEF (SULPHIDE STIIGEq',).

.EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (3)I,TERFLCES (C) 1ISSIGTC (ODCRE /VEHECLE:
 
IA) SUBSYSTEM'DEGRADATION - LOSS OF PROP9 U3) DEGRADATION OF
 
INTERFACE FUNCTION - PUSS CORROS DAMAGE IN P0. (C) LAUNCH DELAY
 
OR ABORT DECISION. 1-D) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CRE /VEHICLE-IF LINE FQOI 
TANK ,OUTLET-RUPTURES RESULTING IN INAU'LITY TO UTILEZE/OEPLET5 PROP OR 
PROP REACTS WITH FUEL OR OX CAUSING FIRE OR EXPLOSION. 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (AIDESIGN (B)tEST (C)IN$PECTIGN (O)FAILUR'E HESTORY: 
SAI F.S. IS 1.5 TO 4.n MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE (SYSTEMW RELIEFI. 
GYNATUBES HAYE DUAL SEALING SURFACES.- THE WELDED CONSTRUCTION 
ELIMINATES JOINTS AND POSSIBLELEAK PATHS. THE ANNEALED AREA (DUE TO-
WELDING) IS BACKED UP BY A SLEEVE. FASTENING CLAMPS ALLOW FREEDOM OF 
MOVEMENT. TUBING BENDS ARE CONTROLLED BETWEEN FIXED POINTS TO 
FACILITATE INSTALLATION AND ACCOMMODATE VEHICLE GROWTH A-NC MOVEMENT. 
.(B ROCKWELL PERFORMED TUBING CERTIFICATION TESTS PER "ORBITEP TUBING 
VERIFICATION PLAN* (SO T5-SH-0205). THIS TESTING INCLUDED PRESSURE 
CYCLING'AND' FATIGUE FOR TYPICAL SHUTTLE LINES & JOINTS. SYSTEM 
:EVALUA-TION TESTS AT WSTP WILL ALSO ALLOW EVALUATION IN THE INSTALLED
 
SYSTEM- CONDITION. LEAXAGE TESTS ARE PERFORMED IN-PROCESS FOR -TUBING 
SECTIONS. OPTICAL INSPECTIONS ARE ALSO PERFOFIED AT THIS T IME IN 
ADDITION TO X-RAY AND DYE PENETRANT. LEAKAGE TESTS ARE ALSO PERFORMED 
AFTER INSTALLATION INTO THE SYSTEM AND ADDITICNAL WELDS A-kE ALSO 
SUBJECTED TO NOE. (C) AN IDENTIFICATION IS PERFCRMED AND THE UNIT 
TAGGED. CONTAM-. CONTROL PROCESSES, CORROS. PROTECTION PROVISIONS, NDE 
EXAM OF WELDS AND INSP. FOR SURFACE AND SUB-SU'FACE DEFECTS IS VERIFIED 
BY INSPECTION. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE VERIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELER 
598 D75-SH-0003 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CR9T1TER 1.02 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT -- REACTION CONTRCL FME.A NO 03-2A -202108-L PEV:tI/08/7 ? 
MANDATORY INSP. POINTS- RA& ,4AT'L (LOT CERTIFICATION), PAR'S PROTECTICN, 
MANUF., CQATING, PLATING* INSTALLATION AND 4,SSE;4'ILY OPER4TIONS.. 
HAROWARE IS INSP. Ip1 ACCOR3ANCE mETH 'HUALITY PL\,NING REQMTS OCCU'IET 
(OPRO) WHICH HAS S3EEN APPROVED BY NASA. TURNAROUN-- LINES IN ACCESSISLE
 
APEAS ARE VISUALLY INSPECTED FOq EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE AND FLcW ANO 
PRESSURE FUNCTIONAL TESTS MRE MONITORED POR EVIDENC.- OF CBSTRUCTEON OR 
LEAKAGE.- (I" MINOR HISTOCRtY - CORROSICPI/Aa PRO6L_'IS OETECTED DURING 
APPOLLO CHECKOUT AND COR.ECTEO.-
CORRECTED. 
60 S D75-SH-0 003
 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS 	 FNEA NUMBER 03-2A-202109-1 
ITEM Feedline & Fittings, OX 	 FAILURE NODE External Leakace
 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e.,, AUTOMATICALLY YES [ NO [
 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION It RESPONSE)?.
 
Ia. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INlFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 2 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE AUSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATIOn OF YES *NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES' THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES El NO (D (EITHER BY CONMIANDIRG HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMERTING ALTERN;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTNARE TO CONPENSATE FOR THIS *YES 5XI NO El 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY CONMAUDING HARDWARE ACTION, OR IMPLEIIEITING ALTERNIATE 
PROGRAN LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES E3 NO [ 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES 0 NO [] 
OTHER FUr:CTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [ *1[] 2E] 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE ,IODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A E]YESEUIoN ] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. 	 CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER_ OCCURRENCE? YES Q-*NO E] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES Q]*NO ] 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETERTION RATIONALE SUMiLARY 
T.0 NO H/S ISSUES. 	 3.El NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. QACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.C DETECTION-DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOIt4ENDED CHANGES BELOW, 
FMR4EA CHANGE RECO'?E:DED 
- - -- -- -- -- -- -- ---- - --- --- ----
--- - --- --- ---- --- --------
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Gross leak detection gives first indication. 
61
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - C?'TSR 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION COJNTROL FMEA NC 03-ZA -20210'-1 REV:I1/O0fl1
 
.ASSFMBLY :PROPELLANT' FEEDDXIDIZE,I-':ABORT: Cu. F 
.?/N RI :MC621-0059 - CP IT. HDI;: 
*P/N VENOGR:73A560002 "I.SSIOt:S: "IF VF X FF 'F SM 
.ITEM : FEEDLINE AND FITTINGS 

.QUANTITY :7 PHASE(S): PL X LO X CO X DO X LS X 
* :ONE SET PER PROPELLANT 
a­
* REDUNDANCY SCR-EEN: 4-N/A B-N/ C-N/A 
PREPARED BY- APPROVED BY:- APPROV BY NAS:) 
.DES N C GLAVINICH DES SSM-
OREPA Cy:,M AKS^R RE - jly~ 
P O WITH CHANGES 
See Section 13.0 
FROM TANK TO 1) TANK VALVES TO n- MANIFOLD VALVES TQ 3) THRUSTEPS. 
.FUNCTIO'N: 
S(-L I I//- X.3Z 304L S.S. FROM "r'*;K T fISTrI=UTIt.'l PAMEl, (2) 1 1/2 ­
x.oZs FROM MAUirFOLO ISZLATIG;4 VALVE TO T'AIZUSTE? AN1FCLD (3) 3/+ 
X.O23 THRJSTER MANIF-LD TO PROVIDE FE=- C AOPOPZRIATE P0 COELLANT 
COMPONENTS FOR THRUSTER OCEP4TION 3 AXIS AC rLSRA7ICX CCNTCL AI 
ROTATIONAL CCNTROLC
 
.FALLUPE MODE: STFUCTURAL FAILURE IS) 
RUPTUPE,. EXTERNAL L-AXXGE. 
.C-AUSE(S ): 
MECH-i.ICAL SHOCK, Vt 2 .S-'IG"/F7I3UE, IM!ofCOED i I5T.LLATIC% &WEL}). 
' _OYN TUBE SEAL FAILUERE MATrL )eTCIE iCv (SULDHIr ST Z!Vr=p). 
.EFFECT(SY: ON (A)SUSSYSTE (3)INTERFACES (C)'ISS.IC. (]CPEIVEHECLE 
(4) SUB-SYSTEA DEGCAOTION - 'LOSS OF PvnPELLat,T. (9) ')EGRACATIOh OF 
INTERFACE FUNCTION - PTEMTIAL CORRCSI NI FRpI2 FREE PPnPELLANTS IN 
MCODULE. (C) ABORT OECISION. (D) POSSIBLE Lrss OF COEW VEHICLE - IF 
LINE FROM TANK OUTLET :UPTJ'ES qESULTING It. INABILITY TO 
UTILIZE/DEPLETE PROSP bR PEnP- REACTS vITH FUEL OR 2XIZIZER CAUSING 
FIRE OR EXPLOSION. 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A).ESIGN (B)TEST (CIINSPECTICN (DI)FALLURE HISTOIY: 
(A) F.S. IS 1.5 TO 4.0 MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE (SYSTEM RELIEF).,
 
OYNATUBES HAVE DUAL SEALING SURF'ACES. THE hELOED CflN.;STRUrTIlN 
ELIMINATES JOINTS AND POSSIBLE "LEAK PATHS. THE ANNEALED AREA (DUE TO 
WELDING) IS BACKED UP BY A SLEEVE. FASTENING CLAMPS ALLC . FREEOOM OF 
MOVEMENT. TUBING BENDS ARE CONTROLLED BEThEE, FIXED PCINTS . 
FACILITATE INSTALLATION AND ACCOMMODA-T5 VEHICLE GDOWTH AD MOVEMENT. 
IB ROCKWELL PERFORMED TUBING CE.TIFICATION TESTS OEC "ORBITE0 TUBING, 
VERIFICATION PLAN'S (SD75-SH-0205). THIS TESTING INCLUDED PRESSURE 
CYCLING AND FATIGUE FOR TYPICAL SHUTTLE LINES C JOINTS. SYSTEM 
EVALUATION IN THE INSTALLED, SYSTEM CONOITION. LEAKAGE TESTS APE 
PERFORMED AT THIS TIME IN AOOITICN TO X-RAY AND DYE PENETRANT. LEAKAGE 
TESTS ARE ALSO PERFOR.MED AFTER INSTALLATION INTO THE SYSTEM AND 
ADDITIONAL WELDS ARE ALSO SUBJECTED TO NOE. (C] AN IDENTIFICATION IS 
PERFORMED AND THE UNIT TAGGED. CONTAF. CCNTRCL PROCESSES, CORROS. 
PROTECTION PROVISIONS. NDE EXAM CF WELDS AND INSP. FER SURFACE AND 
SUB-SURFACE DEFECTS IS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE 
-VERIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELER MANOATORY INSPO POI.NTS - RAW AT#L (LOT
 
9'7 SD75-Sa-0003 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CPEITER 102
 
SUESYSrEM :AFT - REACTION CCMTROL FMEA NO 03-2A -Z0O109-I REV:11/O/7S 
CERTIFICATION, PARTS PROTECTION, 4ANUF., CfATING, PLATING, VJSTALATICN 
AND ASSEMBLY OPERATIONS. HARDWARE IS INSP. IN ACCORDANCE WITH QUALITY 
PLANNING REC.MITS DOCUMENT (CPRD)'WHICH HAS SEEN APROVSO 2Y NASA. 
TURNAROUND- LimES IN CCESSIBLE AREAS ARE VISUALLY INSPECTED FOR 
EVIDENCE OF OAMAGE AND FLOA AND PRESSURE FUNCTIONAL TESTS ARE MCNETOREJ 
FOR EVIDENCE OF OBSTRUCTION OR LEAKAGE. (m) MINOR HISTORY -
CORROSIOJ/FAB PROBLEMS OE'r5SCTED DURING APPCLLC CHECKOUT AN'D CORRECTED.
 
ARE MONITORED FOR EVIOEMCE OF OBSTRUCTICN OR LEAKAGE. (D) MINOR
 
HISTORY - CORROSION/FAB PROBLEMS DETECTED OURING APPOLLO CHECXOUT AlD
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•HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AT - RCS 	 FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-202110-1 
ITEM Tank Isolation VIvA A r FAILURE MODE Fails Closed 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES NO f7 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
Ia. 	IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT, THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FIIEA EVALUATION OF YES *10 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES NO
 
(EITHER BY COMIMANDING HARDWARE ACTION-OR IMPLEiIENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES fl NO E 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY CO.MIANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IIIPLEHEITING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?. 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES NO
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES L] NO
 
OTHER'FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	HOW. MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 ] *1l 2E 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FNEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YESWN'OO 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED 'FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES E*NlO E 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES *nO "X 
*EXPLANATION -REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.-- NO H/S ISSUES 3.[] NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.0 HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. [ DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. -I-RECOITIENDED CHANGES BELOW 
]FMFEA CHANGE RECOIMEINDED 
EXPLANATION/COMNENTS: 
1. First indication "failed off" thruster C&W for 1/2 leg. Redundant paths on 3,4,5 leg.,
 
3A.' Software could be designed to automatically position the appropriate tank isolation
 
valve.
 
6. One success path remains after first failure.
 
8B. Same as primary.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEM S LIST - CP31-IR 102 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NC 03-ZA -201110-1 REV: I Z/ S.­
.ASSEMBLY :PROPELLANT FEED AaCRT; AdORT, CF.IT. FU.!C; I 
.P/N PI :HC284-043O-0OO7/-O03 RTLS CRIT. HOW: 
.P/N VENOCR:575CO25/5750026 MISS INS: HF VF X FF 'F S'4 
.QUANTITY :12 PHASE(S): PL LC-X CO X 00 X LS 
:THREE VALVES PER PROP 
: TANK 
* REDUNDANCY SCREE': A-PASS I-PASS C-'SS 
.PREPARED BY: APPROVED APPROV 8Yl ,'|ASA 
COES R GONZALEZI OE.D  
.REL C ?4 AKEPS REL 
" A POVED WITH CHANGES 
*IE:VAV.See Section 13.0

.ITEM: VALVE. 
TANK ISOLATION B PHASE 400 HZ AC MOTOR ACTUATED (115-230V) LVZ51-266, 
LV 36L-366. (l-l/ IN..) 
.FUNCT ION:
 
THREE REDUNDANT ISOLATIO(1 VALVES IRE USED PEP TANK T,3 ISCLATE G.r:ZUPS C:= 
MANIFOLDS (ONE -TANK ISOL VALVE CONTROLS 2 :ANLFLOS AN, Tc PARALLEL 
ISCL VALVES CONTROL THE Rc:AAINING 2 P0 IMARY P4NI1FOLOS ANC THE VEPNIE 
MANIFOLD) THAT MAY EXHIIT OPEN OR LE=IKA'GE FAILIRES' AND TC ISnLATE THE 
TANK OURING I:.TERCONNECT S RCS OR OMS CFOSSFEEO CPE.ATICNS. ALSO IJSEC 
TO PREVENT HELIUM U.:LESTIGN TC ENGINE AT )' GP ".-iT ('A"UAL %ITC-). 
FUEL & OXIC V'LVES C.VN 3E OPES-RTED UNOEPENOE"l-LY 70C2 Ci',. LI\E P'ESS 
PELIEF TO TA IK IS 0 QOVIDED. 
.FAILURE MODE: PaILS CLOSED (P) 
* FAILS TO OPEN,, FILS Tc i.mt'r4 OPEN.
 
.CAUSE{ S):
 
* LIMIT SWITCH MALFUNCTITON, PREMATURE P 2WER TO .T'IR, ELECTRIAL SHO]RT, 
RPC OPEN. JAMMING OS SALL ShAFT rR CAMS.
 
.EFFECTS): ON (A)SUSSYSTEN (B)INTERFACES (C)MISSICN (oDICRW/EHCLE:
 
LOSS OF REDUNOANCY PROPELLANT FLOW, TO TO ,AANIFOLOS (N ONE SiUE)
(A,,S) 

AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THRUSTER FUNCTION, POTENTIAL THRUSTER DAMAGE 
FROM INDUCED SURGE. (C) ABORT DECISION (DEFENOENT ON WHICH TA-K IS2L 
VALVE FAILS, ONE.TANK £SOL VL/ CLOSED MAY LOSE TIAO MANIFOLCS). (0) NZ 
EFFECT FOR SINGLE FA-ILURE FOR flFT MISSIONS (LOSS OF THRUSTER MAY BE 
CRITICAL FOR RTLS IN SUBSEQUENT' MISSIONS FOR OMS DEPLETI N eUIN). C'-I T 
I FOR P,TLS - LOSS OF TO MA.IqFOLDS (PER PGO AFT) IS CRITICAL FOR ET 
SEPARATION & MATED COAST flURING RTLS. (E) FU.'CTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECT 
- POSSIBLE CREWVEHICAL LOSS DUE-TO UTILIZE/CEPLETE !CS ?POPELLANT. 
POSSIBLE INABILITY TO CONTROL VEHICLE DURIG ENTRY DUE TO INABILITY T7 
UTILIZE RESERVED PROPELLANT & C.G. PROBLEMS DUE TO PROP WEIGHT. 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSECTION (D)FAILURE HLST-=:
 
(A) AC MOTOR VALVE IS 3-PHASE - 2 CF 3 WINDINGS ARE ADEQUATE FOR VALVE 
FUNCTION. SERIES (HYBRIDI RELAYS PROVIDE REGUNO&ACY FOR THE PRE'ATURE
 
CLOSE MODE. PARALLEL (HYBRID) RELAYS PROVICE REDUNDANCY FOR ELECTRICAL 
POWER SIGNAL. ADITIONALLYr REDUNDANT VALVES ARE PROVIDED.(ONE TANK 
ISOL VALVE CONTROLS 2 OF 4+MANIFOLDS. AND T'nfl P!ALLEL TANK ISOL VALVES 
CONTROL THE -REMAINING 2 PRIMARY MANIFOLDS AND THE VERNIER MANFL9). A 
.400-MICRON FILTER IS .UTILIZED'ON THE INLET AND OUTLET TO LIMIT THE 
POTENTIAL FOR CONTAMINATION CAUSED FAILURE CR JAMMLNG OF MOVING PART3., 
68ORIGINAL PAGE M 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - "rSETER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CCNTROL FMEA NG 03-2A -212110-1 RE/:12/I2/ldT
 
CLOSE--Pr) .-
ANTICIPATED tMISSION LEVELS ARE PERFORMED DURING QUAL. ITEM IS USED 
DURING SYSTEM. EVALUATION TESTS AT "STF ALL"hING EV4LUATICN UNCEP SIM-
ULATED MISSION USAGE COfROETION. PROOF PRESSUgE, LEAKAGE, CPEPATtON, 
CONUUC ED AS PART OF PRE/POST FLIGHT CHECKnlUT. (C) A VISUAL INSP AND 
IDENTIFICATION IS PEPFORRED. CpNTA?ANATICrN CONT 'OL DPOCESS, C3RaS. 
PROTECTION 6 ROVISIOCNS, NDE EXAM Or WELDS, INSP F-O SURFACE AND 
SUBSURFACE DEFECTS AND PROPER ELECTRICAL TERMINTIONS. RaW MAT'L (LOT) 
CERTIFICATION. PARTS PROTECTION, CCATING ANC PLATrN PROCESSES -ARE 
(A) 2500 OPERATION4 CYCLES (PEN 4NC RAD-TM VIS-RATIO' AT 
VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. MANUF, INSTALLATION, AND ASSY,OPERATIO;S ARE 
VERIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELER MANOATCRY IMSP POINTS. T ABCVE ITEMS AND 
r 
' THE FCLLOwING ITEMS WES;E VEEIFIEO BY AUDIT CONJDUCTE JULY '9761 
N':,C
CONTAMINATION CONTROL PLAI, PROPERLY -OGNITfl-EO HANDLING STOR-GE 
ENVIRONMENT, SPECIAL MEASUREI;ENT STANDARDS aW ECUIP AND MAT'L AND EQUIP 
CONFORMANCE TO CONTRACT r-=-'ITS. TUFNACU1'/rL'CTIC;4L FLfl6 & LE4KAGE 
TESTS ARE MONITORED TO VERIFY THAT VALVES PEN -NO CLCSE --Ov5.-LYUPOt 
COMM-AND. [D) NO PRIOR FAILUP.E HISTORY FCR :r,415 TYPE 3ESIGN. 
1011 5f69l75311inOQ
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SHARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-0103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT-,RCS FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-202110-3
 
ITEM Tank Isolation Valve, A. C. FAILURE MODE Fails Open
 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES ro N 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
Ia. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMIATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES 8 NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA, EVALUATION OF YES [];-N 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO E 
(EITHER BY COMMIDIHG HARDWARE -ACTION OR, IMPLEMEITING ALTER;,ATE PROG.RAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO CONPENSATE FOR THIS *YES [ NO E 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIE;ITING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAI' LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES- [] NO m 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, INCOMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO
 
OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDIARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 Z *In 2F'J 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A r]YES -N O-I
 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO' EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A., CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES *NCXINIO 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES Q*NO . 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY
 
1.0 NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.F- NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. - ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW
 
2.01 	HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. " DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6.0 RECOP,4ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
--]FIIEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED
 
EXPLANATION/COQIIENTS:
 
IA. Tank isolation valve discreets are available.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CREITER LZ
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTICON CONTROL FMEA '40 03-21 -202110-3 REV:t2/t2l73 
.ASSE,'BLY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: ABORT, CzIT. FU IC: 2 
.P/N RI :MC234-0430-OOO7/-OOG8 RTLS CRIT. HD': 2 
.P/N VENDOR:575COZ575-0026 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF CF SM 
.QUANTITY t1Z PIS-4CE(S1-: PL L7 X CC X DO X LS 
*
.THREE VALVES OER PROP
 
* . TANK 
• 	 REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PAS B-PAZS C-P.SS 
PREPARED BY: . PPROVES BY:APPq co (NA A) 
.0ES R .GONZALEZRL._ DES ... # _ SSM 
.REL C M AKERS REL ZY RE. 
SAPROVED 	 WITH CHANGES
 
.ITEM: VALVE. 	 See Section 13.0
 
T&,NK 	ISOLATION 3 PHASE 4,00 HZ AC MOTCR CTUJATEO t1.-ZOVl LV261-266, 
LV 	361-366.
 
.FUNCT ION. 
T 
 3?ruPS cc 
MANIFOLDS (ONE TANK tSOL VA'LVE CONTPCLS 2 AWIFCLZS A'O TwC PARALLEL 
ISOL VALVES CONTROL THE PEtAI;ING 2 PRIMA.Y M-aI:LJS C HE VER:.;IE 
MANIFOLD) THAT MAY EXHi3S r GPE-'t OR LEAKAGE F.ILU-PES ANO TO iSOLATE T-= 
1rANK DURING ITERCCNNiECT S 'S OR GMS C'CSSFEEC nOEOATICNS. -LSO USED 
"-0 PIEVENT HELIUM ItsSESTIL'i TC E.fGi." - AT -CUP' --1,,-iOUT ( 'a".JAL S.[Cjl)., 
FUEL & OXID '/ALVES- C M 5-% -'PEA T 3D INOQ-Pl'oE:lTLY F2F, C/O. LI'E -SS 
RELIEF TO TANK IS POV'EOEU. 
.FAILURE MODE: INTERMAL LE4)KAr(. 	 (P) 
THREE REOUN ANT IS.L-TIO; V,/LVES ARE UStl PE. rrINA 	 q., 
* FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAIL TO RE:.AIM CLOSSO1.
 
.CAUSE(S 3:
 
* 	 VIBRATION, LIMIT' SWITCH .ALFUNC'IOII STPUCTURAL FAILURE, SEAT C CKS
 
CONTAMINATION, CCRROS, LOSS OF SIGNAL (RPC SHORTS OR OPEN).
 
.EFFECT(S): 	 ON (A)SUBSYSTEM (B)INTERFACES (C) m ISSICN J)lCqEl.t/VEHICL-E:
 
,(A3LOSS REDOJN'DANCY - (M-,IFOLO- ISOLATICI). (C) APCRT CF [SION ­1 OF 
PROPELLANT MANAGEMENT PROBLEEMS DIJRING CROSSFEEC OPERATIONS. (D) NO 
EfFECT - CRIT 1 FOR RTLS. IF RCS TANK ISGLATICN VALVE W-ILL NCT CLOSE 
DURING OMS DEPLETION BURN THE RCS PROPELLANT "AY BE OEPLETFO IF ASSOC 
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVES ARE NOT CLOSED. 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (3)TEST (C)INSPECTION (O)FAILURE HISTORY: 
* 	 (A) AC MOTOR VALVE IS 3-PHASE - 2 OF 3 WII'GS ARE ADEQUATE FOR VALVE
 
FUNCTION.. PARALLEL (HYBRID) REL4YS PROVIDE PEDUW)±ICY FOR ELECTRICAL
 
POWER SIGNAL. A 400-MICRON FILTER IS UTILIZEC ON THE INLET AND OUTLET TO
 
LIMIT THE POTENTIAL FOR CONTAMINATION CAUSED FAILURE OR'JMMING OF
 
MOVING PARTS. (Bl 2500 OPERATION CYCLES (flPEN-CLOSE-OPEN) AND RANDOM
 
VIBRATION AT ANTICIPATED MISSION LEVELS ARE PERFORMEO DURING QUAL. ITEM
 
IS USED DURING SYSTEM EVALUATIGN TESTS'AT %STF 4LLCAING EVALUATION UNDER
 
SIMILATED MISSION USAGE CONOI'TION. PROQF PRESSURE,. LEAK-AGE, OPEPATIN,.
 
CONDUCTED AS PART OF PRE/POST FLIGHT CHECKOUT. (C) A VISUAL INSP AND
 
IDENTIFICAITGN IS DERFORmEb. CONTAMINATION CCNTqGL PqCCESS, COROS.
 
PROTECTION PROVISIONS, NOE EXAM OF-WELOS, INSP FOR SURFACE AND
 
SUBSURFACE DEFECTS AND PROPER ELECTRICAL TERMINATIONS, RAW MAT'L (LOT)
 
CERTIFICATION, PARTS PROTECTION, COATING 4ND PLATING PQOCESSES ARE
 
-VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. MANUF, INSTALLATIGIN AND ASSY OPERATIONS ARE 
Pooe 	Q is 
, o72
 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CRBITER L02
 
SUBSYSTEN :AFT - REACTION CONTiOL F4EA NO 03-2A -202110-3 REV-12/1Z/78 
VEPIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELER MANfiATORY INSP POINTS. THE ABOVE ITEMS AND 
THE FCLLOWING ITEMS WERE VERIFIED BY AUDIT CCNDUCTED JULY 1976/ 
CONTAMINATICN.CONTROL PLAN, PFOPERLY ?CNITCaED HANOLIi'G AND STORAGE 
ENVIRONMENT, SPECIAL MEASURSMENT STANCAROS M'S ECUIP AND M4TPL AND EQUIP 
CONFORMANCE TO CONTRACT PEQMTSO TURNAPOUNO - FUNCTICLNAL FLOW & LEAKAGE 
TESTS ARE MONITORED Tl VERIFY THAT VALVES OPEN AND CLOSE OROcERLY UPON 
COMMAND. (0 NO PRIOR FAILURE HISTORY FOP. THIS TYPE DESIGN. 
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.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-0103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM APT - RCS 	 FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-20211.1,-2 
ITEM Interconnect Valve. A. C. 	 FAILURE MODE Fails Closed­
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY- YES NO C 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
Ia. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION, THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTEIIT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO j] 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
ACTION NEGATE EFFECTS FAILURE Nl [ 
(EITHER, BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY' EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES' fl NO ]
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLENEflTING ALTERINATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE TO THE OF THE YES O 
4. 	 AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVER.STRESS THE HARDWARE OR. *YES* E NOO 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO l 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUT"LE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW"] 0 [ * 2f' 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO F4EA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED) N/A D]YES ]OE 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTIOn? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A; 	 CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES 12*10 F] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE, FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES Q-I*HO "ID­
-EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.1 71 NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.El NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. DACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.lj DETECTION 'DURING.CHECKOUT 6. 'IRECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
In Flight DetectabiTity
 
WFMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/CONMIENTS: 
1. "Failed off" thruster gives first indication.
 
6. One success path remains after first failure. 
8B. Same as primary. 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITE-iS LIST - CR3ITEZ t']Z 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - RE=ACTrEON CONTRUL FHEA NO 23-ZA -ZOZILLI-Z REV:12/12/7T_
 
* \SS5E-LY :PROPELLANT FEED 	 ABCrT: x.18iT, C2IT. FUNC: PR 
.P/N RI ::42 -O3O-3J7/'-000.3 RTLS .CRIT. HOW: 
.PIN VE;IOCR:5750025/5750O26 MAISSIOS: HF 'IF X FF !F Sl 
.QUANTCTY :3 PHASE(S): PL LO X tr X JO X LS 
,* : flO INTERCONNECT LINES 
* :PER PROPELLANT T&t:K 
* 	 REDUNDANCY SCPEEN " -1-PASS 13-PASS C-P ASS 
AP P911~ ­*PqSPAREO BY: 	 BY:qov yP,,A 
*REL 	 C M AKERS- REL ' ---
A'RIRVED WITH CHANGES
 
"ITS v LVE.• See Section 13.0
 
* INTERCONNECT, 3 PHASE 400 H7 Ar MOyTOR flPFRPATpn (lR.i9nnv) nMsfrl (I ./V'). 
.FUNCT ICN::
 
,C ?RO:VZOE CONTROL OF_ rNTERC-;;N1tEC. LE~iE FCR VSPTCU "WrES CF PRZPELL4NT
 
FEEO: 1) CPSN FOR DMS T RCS Z) OPE FZ; OCS T-- RCS 3) CL2SED FOP 'RCS
 
-TO SAME S CE RCS "0O04S TG CMS. O ,,-C;NECT VALVES PEPC?
N' 	 TAN( 
ARE USED. EACH GOES INOEEF-'OEhTLY TO SE3 \R\TE -4A;!FCLD eANKS. LIE
 
tZESSJ;.E RELIEF TC'ARCS P-('P T.ANK IS QOPVIrtEC.
F .LJut,,. .: 'AILS rA 't E I 	 F) 
* FAILS TO 4BEt-AN OP 'I.
 
."IUSB{S)"
 
VE3, LIUIT S - F&IL:'P.E, P1E- :±TRE oy;R T,- jTrO, T L Si-m!T
LcTlr_ RPC
 
.- FE'I.JA [NO OF C . 'A 

.-EFFECT(S): fU CASU3vST..'4 (2)IIT-RFACES (C)'tS5rcLi (')C=I/VERICLE:
 
(Al LOSS -F RDUNCA CY. (n) OEGRlOArIC'! CF [',T--SF&CE
 
FUNCTICN-CRCSSFED PqP CA. fE UTILIZED BY CONLY 2 2P 4 M'FCLD 34ANKS.
 
(C) 4ISSIflN MOIFICATICN-OPEFATION CHANGES FC' ITE=- B ABCVE. " (0) NC 
EFFECT FOR OFT MI.tSSICiS (L2SS ZF THRUSTER ;'AY ;E CSITICAL FOR RTLS IN: 
SUSSECUENT MISSIONS FCR C.4S DEPLETION BURN). CRIT L FOR RTLS - LCSS OF 
I MANIFOLD FGRWARO & L MANIFOLD AFT IS CRITIC-'L FC.R ET SEOARATION & 
MATED COAST DURING RTLS. SINGLE CCMPUTE? FAILUE CZULD PESULT IN THIS 
-
TYPE CONDITON. (E) FUNCTIOiAL CRITICALITY EFFEC - PCSSILS EARLY
 
MISSION TERMINATICN - INABILITY TO OEM-CNSTP TE C.S ?RC? FEED TC aCS.
 
.OISPOSITION & a ATIONALE (A)OESIGN (BITEST (C)INSPECTION (O)FAILURE HISTO:.Y:
 
* (A)AC MOTOR VALVE IS3-PHASE - 2 OF 3 WINDINGS ARE AbEQUATE FOR VALVE FUNCTION.
 
SERIES (HYBRID) RELAYS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR THE PREMATURE CLOSE MODE. PARALLEL
 (HYBRID) RELAYS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR ELECTRICAL POWER SIGNAL. ADDTFIONALLY, 
REDUNDANT VALVES ARE PROVIDED. A 400-MICRON FILTER ISUTILIZED ON THE INLET AND 
OUTLET TO LIMIT THE POTENTIAL FOR CONTAMINATION CAUSED FAILURE OR JAMMING OF MOVING 
PARTS'. (8)250.0 OPERATION CYCLES (OPEN-CLOSE-OPEN) AND RANDOM VIBRATION AT 
ANTICIPATED MISSION LEVELS ARE PERFORMED DURING QUAL. ITEM ISUSED DURING SYSTEM ,'
EVALUATION TESTS AT WSTF ALLOWING EVALUATION UNDER SIMULATED MISSION USAGE CONDITION. 
PROOF PRESSURE, LEAKAGE, OPERATION, CONDUCTED AS PART OF PRE/POST FLIGHT CHECKOUT. 
(C)A VISUAL INSP AND IDENTIFICATION ISPERFORMED. CONTAMINATION CONTROL PROCESS,
 
CORDS. PROTECTION PROVISIONS, NDE EXAM OF WELDS, INSP FOR SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE
 
DEFECTS AND PROPER ELECTRICAL TERMINATIONS, RAW MAT'L (LOT) CERTIFICATION, PARTS.
 
-PROTECTION, 	COATING AND PLATING PROCESSES-ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. MANUF,
 
INSTALLATION, AND ASSY OPERATIONS ARE VERIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELER MANDATORY INSP
 
POINTS. THE ABOVE ITEMS AND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE VERIFIED BY AUDIT CONDUCTED
 
77 	 SfE75-SE-000 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT ' REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO. 03-2A-202111-2 REV: 12/12/78 
JULY 1976/CONTAMINATION CONTROL PLAN, PROPERLY MONITORED HANDLING AND 
STORAGE ENVIRONMENT, SPECIAL MASUREMENT STANDARDS AND EQUIP IND MAT'L 
AND EQUIP CONFOFZANCa TO CONTRACT REQMTS. TU.NARoUND/FuNCTIONAL FLOW &
 
LEAKAGE TESTS ARE MONITORED TO VERIFY THAT VALVES OPEN AND CLOSE PROPERLY
 
UPON COMMAND. (D) NO PRIOR FAILURE HISTORY FOR THIS TYPE DESIGN.
 
0o-23 78 SDf7'5-SE-0003
 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS 	 FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-202120-3 
ITEM 	 Manifold Isolatinn Valv A C_ FAILURE MODE Fails Closed 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES E] No [ 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?. 
Ia. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES 5 NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO
 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES fl NO 5 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING, HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES 5] NO M 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COM11ANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIE;ITING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	 AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES nI DID n 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
S. 	CAN' THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES El NO El 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 E5 *15 2XT 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED NIA" 5]YES5NOE 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES *NO 5 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES 2D*NO 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
I. [ NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. [ NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. - DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0]RECOw4ENDED CHANGES BELOW 
[5 FMEA CHANGE RECOMMEZOED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
3. RCS RM automatically detects and prevents thrusting.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CRBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CChTROL FMEA MG 03-ZA -202120-3 - REV:L 2112/TZ
.ASSEtMBLY :PROPELLANT FEEO ABORT: AABCPT. crvT. FUNC: i 
.P/N RI :M4C 284-0430-0001/-0002 RTLS CRIT. HO'.: 3
.P/N VEINOOR:57503231575O0Z4 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF CF S.4 
.OU&NTITY :16 	 PHASE(S): PL LO X CC X DO X LS'
 
* :FOUR PRIMARY VALVE MANI­
:FOLCS 	PER PROP
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS 9-PASS CrP±SS
 
.PREPARED BY: APPRO X00a~RCVl;0 BY!/ s)
.oES R.GONZALEZ .0. 0__. . SESM 
-REL 	 C M AKERS PLE aT.a2I R 
_APPROVED
" 	 ; WITH CHANGES
 
.ITEM: VALVE See Section 13.0
 
-MANIFOLD ISOLATION. 3 PHASE. 400 HZ AC MOTOR OPERATED (I5-2(0O l I/211 TELE.,
 
114"OUTLET).

.FU i...
 
* 	 1) TO ISOLATE THRUSTERS ,-' PROPELLAViS PRECF TG SYSTC-4 ArT T A.NQO 
2) TO ISOLATE A FAILED OP'I T 4PUSTER OF QO3"NSTREA'M LEAK. EACr 
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE CCNTROLS 3 0 eImARY THOUSTP-S. LI"E 00 ESSURE 
RELIEF TCwAROS PROP T-.IK IS PROVIDED. 
.FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSEO-PN:EM.ATURE (F)
 
o 	 OPERATION, FtILS TO P.'jAINj rpN. 
.CAUSE(S: 
VIBRATION, LIMIT SWITrtH :ALFUNCTIOt;, PRE"-rUFE 00 ,,Ez TO ,CTCP. 
PPEMATURE MOTOR SIGNAL, o'C SHORT. 
.EFFSCT(S): ON (ASUSYSTEM4 (a1I'.TERFACES (C)MESEIC.f (O)CAE'./VEHICL=:
(A)LB) LOSS OF RED'JNO0ANCY-LcSS OF PRO? FLUV- f USE Cr 3 ?PIMkPY 
THRUSTERS (I OF 4 M4ANIFOLOS). (CI(D) .4-EFFECT FO. SINGLE FA!LUqE FC, 
OFT MISSIONS (LOSS OF THRUSTER0AY BE CRITICiL FOR RTLS TN* SUFSEJEM\T 
MISSIONS FOR 0.9S DEPLETION EURN). CRIr I FOP RTLS - LOSS CF 1 .AFCLC 
FORWARD & I MAIFCLDAFT IS CRITICAL FOR- ET SEPA: TICN & "AATEL COAST 
OURING-RTLS. SINGLE COMPUTER FAILURE COULD RESLL T N THIS TYOEr
 
CONDITION. (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECT - OCSSI2LE CREW/VEHICLE 
LOSS DUE TO INABILITY TO USE RCS IF ALL MiANIFCL0 VaLVES FAIL CLOSED. 
.OISPGSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSOECTI']N (3)F4ILURE HISTO=Y:. 
* 	 (A) AC MOTOR VALVE IS 3-PHASE - 2 OF 3 WINDINGS ARE ADEQUATE FOR VALVE FUNCTION. 
SERIES (HYBRID) RELAYS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR THE PREMATURE CLOSE MODE. PARALLEL 
(HYBRID) RELAYS PROVIDE REDUNDANCY FOR ELECTRICAL POWER SIGNAL. ADDITIONALLY, 
REDUNDANT VALVES ARE PROVIDED. A 400-MICRON FILTER ISUTILIZED ON THE INLET AND 
OUTLET TO LIMIT THE POTENTIAL FOR CONTAMINATION CAUSED FAILURE OR JAMMING OF MOVING 
PARTS. (B)2S00 OPERATION CYCLES (OPEN-CLOSE-OPEN) AND RANDOM VIBRATION AT 
ANTICIPATED MISSION LEVELS ARE PERFORMED DURING QUAL. ITEM IS USED DURING SYSTEMEVALUATION TESTS AT WST;: ALLOWING EVALUATION UNDER SIMULATED MISSION USAGE CONDITION. 
PROOF PRESSURE, LEAKAGE, OPERATION, CONDUCTED AS PART OF PRE/POST FLIGHT CHECKOUT. (C) 	A VISUAL INSP AND IDENTIFICATION IS PERFORMED. CONTAMINATION CONTROL PROCESS,
CORDS. PROTECTION PROVISIONS, NOE EXAM OF WELDS, ENSF FOR SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE
 
DEFECTS AND PROPER ELECTRICAL TERMINATIONS, RAW MAT'L (LOT) CERTIFICATION, PARTS
 
2ROTECTIDN,. COATIN& AND PLATING PROCESSES ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. MANUE,INSTALLATION, AND ASSY OPERATIONS ARE VERIFIED BT SHOP TRAVELER MANDATORY INSP 
POINTS. THE ABOVE -TEMS AND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE VERIFIED BY AUDIT CONDUCTED 
JULY 1976/CONTAMINATION CONTROL PLAN, PROPERLY MONITORED HANDLING AND STORAGE 
ENVIRONMENT, SPECIAL MEASUREMENT STANDARDS AND EQUIP AND MAT'L AND EQUIP CONFORMANCE 
82 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTE4 :AFT - REACTION ONTROL FMRA NO. 03-2A-202120-3 REV: 12/12/78 
TO CONTRACT REQMTS. TURNAOUND/FUNCTIONAL FLOW & LEAKAGE TESTS ARE MONITORED 
TO VERIFY THAT VALVES OPEN AND CLOSE PROPERLY UPON COMMAND. (D)NO PRIOR 
.FAILURE HISTORY FOR THIS TYPE DESIGN.
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iSD75-SH-0003
 
.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-0l03-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT -- RCS 	 FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-202140-1 
,ITEM Manifold Isolation Valve D.C_ FAILURE MODE Fails Closed 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES fn NO [] 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION II RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE F.LIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES 5 no 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FIEA EVALUATION OF YES M *l0 5 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFI4ARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES ] NO ]
 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERIATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES E NO 5 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIE;ITING ALTER.IATE 
PROGRAI LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE hARDWARE OR -YES E] NO [] 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES Ul 'O E-
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 U *1[ 2] 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A []YES-NO5J 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER-TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. 	CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES (f*J-O F1 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES *NO ._l 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.- NO H/S ISSUES 3.cJ NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.r-1 HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.[M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. -RECOtIENDED CHANGES BELOW 
GRFMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
3. The RCS Redundancy Management software will inhibit the firing of those jets associated
 
with the failed valve.
 
6. There are no success paths remaining after first failure.
 
8B. Same as primary.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITENS LIST - ORBITER LOZ
 
SUBSYSTEM 'AFT - REACTION CONTPOL FMEA NC 03-ZA -202140- REV: t2/tZ/t7'
 
ASSEMBLY :PPOPELLANT FEED ABORT: -.w;T. c I-

P/N RI :M4C234-0423-0D1/-OCl2 CRIT. HOW: 

A
P/N VENOOR:738q5 MISSIONS: H Vs X FF ?F S,"
QUANTITY :4. PHASEC(5: ?L Ln CC X DO LS 
:T , PER MO1DULE 
REDUNOANCY SCREEN: A-P"SS "B-PASS C-FAIL 
PREPARED BY: 	 APPROVED BY: A'PRV, YDES- R,. RURKHA, T 0E S _.. . . ..._ (", J 
REL 	 C .4AK2RS REL 
" -APRDEDWITH CHANGES 
-ITEM': VALVE. 	 See Section 13.0
 
,'±ANIFGLS ISCLATI~f;, VERNIER rH PUSTER, SCLENID (-SVCZI 3t-SA3LE 
(LATCittG) LV 258/157/357/353. 
FUNCT ION: 
TG PROVIDE VFN'4IER THRUSTER ISCLATECN: .1) PPIDR -0 SYSTS:-! "-CI''Ttt -
AND 21 IN THE EVENT iF 4 RU-, AY THRUS.ErP-R 1..IFZLU LEAK. 
FAILURE MOE: F-%ILS CLOSED. 	 (F) 
CAUSE(S ) :I.MPROPER ELSCrRIC. SGN!-L (CZNTIIUCUS SHQRT). -,R LCi "'A-ThIC F.',C
 
CqC'4' LATCHI; 4AGNMT, -.SC" Sh"CCK, VIB., CLNTA- (ALt, GAP).
 
- ,T {ASUB5ST-~~(S)INhTEPPACES CC)"1iNSiC", (lC -r/VEH CL5t
 
(4) 	 LOSS OF FUNCTIOU (VEPILER THRUSTER]. (A) OFGRAt)±TrCm OF r-iE.zF"CA 
' SUSSYSTEM-PAYLCAC M 	 . (C) IA!SSICr, AI'F-'ICATlC CP.'ANTULATICN	 A3CPT 
NO EFF=CT UNIL=SS ADDIT.IONAL
o0CIS ION. 0) 	 FAILIJ ES .OCZi.
 
DISPOSITION& R4 TrON4LE (A)CESIN ()TrEST (C)ISPEcrT(m (O)FAILIRE HESTC.Y: 
F 0
(4) SERIES SaITCHES (R'C'S) HIINIMIZE POTENT T'!AOVEP. CT.U'-I0.
 
PARAL SWITCHES (RPC'S) P7CVIDE ELECT PEDUN Fr? TW 0ENING SI.
 
AN INDUCT VOLTAGE. SUPqES CIVCUIT IS PRCV IN- THE ELECTRICL SYSTE',| TO 
tPREV DAMAGE TO OTHER ON-LINE CGMP REnOUNOA OI]WS LM4IT THE PoSS ;F 
DIODE FAILURE ALLCWIG CURENT SHUNT FCM THE CIL. 
100 MICRON FILrEP IS PRV TO LIVI* "HE PISS OF CfVT-AN C-USING 
JA.MMTNG MOVING PARTS FC Ll.hIT THE 
ELECT SHORT POTENT, THE -EAO AND MAGNET wIRES 4PE EPICA? SY 0C3TI= G 00D 
A FIXTURE IS__USED DURING .ASSEM8LY TO gNSURE THAT INSUL IS NOT 0AMAGED 
BY THE EXIT MQTfL WHEN THE COIL_.5YEE..IS. PRESSED ONTr THE CCIL. (B) 
2000 CYCLES (ON-OFF-FLOW) AND RANDOM'VIE AT ANTIC MISSION LEVELS ARE 
PERF OUfING CAL. ITEM IS USED DURING SYS EVAL TESTS AT WSTF %LLo IN&G 
EVAL UNDER SIMUL MESSION USAGE COMO. PROOF PRESS, LSAKAC-E, CPE: AND, 
INSUL TESTS ARE PERF DURING ATP. APPPOP LOCATED T=ST POINTS ALLOW 
POEIPOST FLIGHT LEAKAGE TESTS AND OPER TESTS ARE ALSO COiMO AT THIS TME.. 
(C), AND IDENTIF IS PERF 'NO THE UI1IT TAGGEO. C2NTAA CCNT PRCCESS, 
CCRROS., PROT' PROV, NDE EXAM- OF WELDS AND BRAZES,- INSP. FCP SURFACE A-t 
SUBSURFACE DEFECTS 4ND PROPER ELECT TERMINATICNS ARE VERIF BY INSPECT. 
THE POLL ITEMS ARE VERIF BY SHOP TRAELER INSP. PCINTS- RAW MAT'L (LOT 
CERTIF).' PARTS PPCT, MANUF., COATING, PLATING, NSTALL ANG ,6SSY OPER. 
- THE. ABOVE ITEMS AND THE FOLLOhING ITEMS WERE VERIFIED .BY AUDIT CONO 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CPSITER L02
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CCNTPOL FMEA NO 03-2 -2D2140-l REV:12/12/73
 
S-31-77. CONTAM CONT PRCC, CGRS. PROT OROV TURNARC,UNOD- FUNCT FLOW 
TESTS ARE MCNIT TO VERIFY THAT VALVES OPEN At: CLCSE PROPERLY UPON
 
COMMAND. (0) APOLLO FAILURES WERE MAIMLY ASSCC iITH REVEzSE POLARITY
 
ANO DEGUASSING OF MA-GNETS. THE SHUTTLE VALVE UTILIZES & CCNNECTOR
 
(RATHER THAN LEAD WIRES) .ND A BLOCKING DE'OE WHICH PREVENTS THIS TYPE
 
OF ERROR DURING Cdt.1. DEVEL TEST AND ANAL S.6WiC PPESS SUQGE FATIGUE
 
PROBLEM. THIS IS 9EING RESOLVED BY REDUCING THE LIFE OF ThE V.LVE TO 50
 
MISSIONS.
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.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-Ol03-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - gCS 	 FMEA IUMBER 03-2A-202150-1 
ITEM Propellant Fill & Bleed Disconnect FAILURE MODE Fails Open 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTUARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES [ NO 2 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION,THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO
 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FNEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO [ 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTARE TAKE ACTION to NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES D NO ID 
(EITHER BY COM!ANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES E] NO ] 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIEITING ALTER.'IATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	 AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE NODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES' NO W 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES No L 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 U *lE] 20 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A D]YESE]IO[-
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. 	CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES [@*N10 F 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES 5]*NO "5­
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
I.E] NO H/S ISSUES 3.[-] NO-SOFTWARE DETECTION 5., ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.= DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. ORECOMNENDED CHANGES BELOW 
In Flight Detectability 
FR4EA CHANGE RECOMNMEDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Gross leak detection will give first indication.
 
6. There isone success path remaining after the first faiTure.
 
8B. Same as primary,
 
2. Measurements V42P2313C, 2315C, 2313C and 3315C are not listed fn the MML.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CC'JTROL F'EA NC 03-24 -202150-1 ,EV:IL//172 
ASSEMBLY :PROPELLANT ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: I 
P/N RI :MCZ760 . - CRIT. HL: I 
P/N VEIlGQP.:T301000 C 76306000 MISSIONS: H= VF X FF IF S4 
QUANTITY 	 :1? PHASE(S): PL LO X CO X 00 X LS 
:VEHICLE 
:6LOD.
 
2-0F 1/2 IN. {REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/t s-N/A C-N/A
 
PREPARED BY: 4 9....... APPROVED APP: fO,.-

DoS t.,.1 /T74 

RELC M'AKERS RE-

DES C SCARLETT " 	 "/-t"L-K S,-/ 
6VED WITH CHANGES 
See Section 	13.0 
T Fl: DISCONNECT.FILL F BLEED 

PROPELLANT, SPRING LOADE, P'PPET ITH STRUCTURAL CAP(1/-" & 1/2").
 
FUNCT ICN '
 
TO PROVIDE FOP VENTING AND tELEDING PRPELLANT TI;IKS 0UATinG SERVICING IN 
VERTICA'L VEHICLE OSIEt;TATIOi. ONE INC " CCUPL'*,,;, (FUEL-LEFT POD AND 
DX-IGHT POD) SERVICES APCS AN) CMS. ITEM INCCICGRATFS SECCNONADY 
INTERNAL SEALS AtI HAS A PRESSURE CAP WHICH IS qEr0U.'D4T SEAL. CAP 
INSTALLED PRICIR TJ FLIGHT. 
,FAILURE MODE: F4ILS OPEN. 	 (S)
 
= 
rP LEAKS IN EXCESS C.a A4CC TAeL RATE, SFALS C-,vGE) R'rAIflI'G '"UT
 
LO"SE'iS NEGATING CAP SEAL -DU-'1OANCY.
 
CAUSE(S):
 
VIS0.TICN, PI CE PxPT STPUC-U~tAL =AILUE, ECrHt't:IC AL SHCK ' TAM,
 
EXCESS TORQUE, SEAL DAM4AGE, N LINE SPPCPT-ST'A:T 35. CORE :E-',;T, D~A EQ
 
,AAINT OF GSE HALF.
 
" 
EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYST=-M (3)INTERFZCES (CPAISSIG (Z)CRE',/'IEHfCLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF SU-SYSTEM PROPELLAN'. (B) DEGRADATION CF INTERFACE 
SUBSYSTEM (PROPELLANT E.FFECTS). (C) LAUNCH OELAY CR ABCRT fECISION. 
(0) POTENTIAL CREW LOSS DURING MISSION IF PPCP-LLANT CANNOT BE UTILIZEC 
OR DEPLETED.
 
,DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGN (B)TEST (C)ISPECTICN (D)FAILURE HISTORY:
 
(A) F.S. IS 2.*0 X WORKING PRESS. GROUND HALF COUPLINGS A.ND LINES ARE 
ADEQ SUPPORTED TO LIMIT ANY UNDUE STRESS ON THE COUPLING DURING -SERVICE 
AND PREV DAMAGE TO SEALS. A SAFETY FEATURE PRICR TO 
REMOVAL OF THE END CAP IS A PROV WEREBY ANY 'LEAKAGE PAST THE AIRBORNE 
POPPET SEAL CAN 8E VENTED OVERBOARD 5Y.ROTATING 4 BLEED SCREW. COMPLETE 
STRESS ANAL HAS BEEN CONDUCTED- UTIL OF STRUCT CAP 4INIMIZ-S LEAKAGE 
POTENTIAL AND PROVIDES A REDUNDANT SEAL EXCEPT FD STRUCT FAILURE. 
(B) THE COUPLING IS SU;JECT TO 600 OPER CYCLES (COUPLING AND UNCOUPLINGI 
DURING QUAL IN ADDITION TO PRESS SURGE CYCLING AND PROP EXPOSURE TESTS. 
RANDOM VIB TESTING IS ALSO CONDUCTED AT ANTIC VEA LEVELS FCR 34 MINUTES 
IN EACH AXIS. USAGE DURING SYS EVAL TESTS AT WSTF ALLOWS EVAL UNDER 
ACTUAL USAGE COND. PROOF PRESS TESTS ARE CONDUCTED DURING AT & LEAKAGE
 
TESTS ARE PERF BEFORE & AFTER OPER CYCLES. (C) AN IDENT IS PERF. RAW 
NAT'L NDE EXAM*. VISUAL INSP FOR SURFACE DEFECTS, & EQUIP CONFORMA,'.CE TO 
CONTRACT REQMTS ARE VERIF BY RECEIVING INSP. MEASUREMENT STANDARDS S 
TEST EQUIP. STANDARDS ARE IMPLEMENTED PER REQPTS CF MIL SPECS. THE 
FOLLOhING 	ITEMS ARE VERIF BY SHOP TRAVELER MANDATORY ENSP POINTS-PARTS
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999 SD75-- S-ooo3 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CRBITER .02
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION -ONTROL FME4 N40 03-2a -202150-j REV:tt/08/T -
PROT# MFG. PROCESSES, COATII;G, ASSY MWio INSTALLTION. THE &B:VE ITEMS 
& THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WEPE VERIFIED 6Y AUDIT CC IUCTED 5-23-71. COOROS 
PROT PROV, CONT0 CONT P"%CESSES, TEST HANOLI:NG, r STOAAGE ENVIR. 
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE VE'IFIEO BY AUOLT OF M4qCH 6, 197d. LNSPECTIZN
 
VERIFIES ASSE.4ELY 'PER INSPErTION PCIhTS IV MASTER RECRO. LOG OF CLEA: 
ROOM AND CALIBRATION OF TOOLS VERIFIED. ClITICAL OTMENSION -0O 
VERIFIED 5Y INSPECTION. PARTS CLEANLINESS AND '±SSIVLTICNl SY 
INSPECTION. .\OE INSPECTION PERFORMED AFrE? ASS=-.h3LY. 
TURNAROUNO-COUPLINGS ARE VISUALLY INSP FOR EVtD OF DAMAGE SEALS & LEAK 
TESTS ARE PERFORMED. (0) APOLLO FAILURE HISTORY WAS IN THE MAIN ASSOC 
WITH GROUND USAGE, IMPROPER HANDLING. 
91S9 D SDZ] SSH"0 0 03
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.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O1,03-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS 	 FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-211110-1 
ITEM Propellant Tank Assy, 	 FAILURE MODE External Leak 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY - YES 0 NO 5 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
Ii. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES M NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA.EVALUATION OF YES []*4Q 5 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES fl NO [ 
(EITHER BY COMANDIG" HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERN;ATE PROGRA.M, LOGIC)? 
3a. IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR ThE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES 5 NO [ 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEHIEUTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR- *YES 5 NO 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES ] NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF- THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 0 *15 20 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTIOI IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A E]YESINO[] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO'EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A., CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED-AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES E*.'O [1 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF' CREW/VEHICLE? YES 5*No I 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
T.02 NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.EQ NO SOFTWARE'DETECTION 5. 5 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. ME HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. - DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. ORECOIENDED CHANGES BELOW 
- FM5FNEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Gross leak detection qives first indicatinn.
 
6. Pod redundancy.
 
8B. Backup flight system same as primary.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CRBITER 10-

SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CLIT?.OL FMEA NIC 03-ZA -21LI13-1 IREV:11/03/7 
ASSEMBLY :PROPELL41NT FEED " ABCEPT: CRIT. FUNC: I 
P/N RI :MC292-O06I-3'00L,-00C2 CP IT. h.JW: I 
P/N VENDOR:355C3310000-O10O-J2O MISSIONS: H5 VF X FF iF SM 
QUANTITY 	 :4 PHASE(S): PL X L X 90 X DO X LS
 
:TkO PER
 
,MODULE
 
$REDUNDANCY SCREEN: 6-N/I s-N/A C-N/A LPREPARED BY: - APPROVED BY: 	 APPROVE p AS ): 
DES R BEMVIS OE S ~ - ssm -
REL C M SKERS REL tJtS j A. 

'.r -ROVED WITH CHANGES 
ee Section 13.0 
ITEM: TANK ASSY, PROPELLANT 

INCLUDING 	 ACQUISITIn'! DEVICE ND RETENT ICN SC. E'iS (1.5 Fa TCp CF 
"
 SA-FETY ) TK 23/204/303/304.
 
FUNCT ION: 
TO STGRE/SUPPLY PRFPELLANT FCR R-ACTI, C[fTrGL "HrS. TANK SHELL 
CONTAINS PROPELLANT AND ACQUISITION DEVICE RETAINS PROPELLANTS FOR ADEQUATE FEED 
DURING 1"G", O"G" AND HIGH "G" CONDITIONS. REGULATED HELIUM IS,SUPPLIED TO THE
 
ULLAGE TO FORCE PROPELLANT TO THE.THRUSTERS AS REQ'D. 245 PSIA (+ OR -15)
 
(17.95 CUBIC FEET). 
F.ILUPE :MOCE: STPUrTUPaL FAILURE U) 
EXTERNAL LEAK, TAIK WALL C'"CK OR SEIL FZILURE.
 
CAUSE(S):
 
* ECH SHCCK, F1TIGUE!VIQ, OVERPRESS, STPESR C2;CS, I"PRJP P P UUY-

OR TEST FLUt-, OVER TE%!P, PLUME. OR REE t ;TRY GASES, STRESS aESE?, >ELD 
OR MAT'L DEFECT, I'JC.RRECT C' DAMAGED SEAL. 
EFFECT(S): ON '{)SU9SYSTEM (S)ITERFACES (C)"ISSION (D)CREV/VEHICLE: 
(A) LOSS JR DEGRA- ATICN CF SUB-SYSTEM DEP"NDENT N EXTENT CF F 'ILURE. 
(B) LCSS OR CGRAGATION CF INTERFACE SUB-SYST-M-dFT RCZ, POD, TPS 0R
 
VEH DAMAGE. (C) ABORT DECISION. (0) PCSSIELE LCSS OF Cl'rF,/VEHICLE
 
(EXPLOSION, LACK OF PROPELLAN;T OR INABILITY TC :EPLETE OPPOSII=E
 
PROPELLANT). 
DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECr:DN (O)FAILUE HISTOPY: 
(A) THE F.S. (BURST) IS 1.5 X WORKING PRESSURE. COMPLETE STRESS
 
ANALYSIS FOR EACH TANK SEGMENT WAS PEPFORiED. TANK IS CLASSIFIED AS
 
FRACTURE CRITICAL FOP. HANDLING AND IS SUBJECT TO FPACTURE CON T OL
 
QEQMTS. ALL FITTINGS AND FLANGES USED ON THE TANK HAVE DUAL ELASTOMER
 
SPRING LOADED SEALS. (B) QUAL REQU'IRES 800 PRESSURE WITH (INCLUDING 
200 EXPULSION CYCLES AND A !O OAY CREEP AND PPPPELLANT EXn,SURE TEST. 
PROOF PRESSURE (1.3X WORKING PRESSURE) AND LE4KAG- TESTS A'E P!RFGRMED
 
DURING ATP- RADIOGRAPHIC AND DYE PENETRANT TESTS APE PERFOQMED TO
 
VERIFY NO PERMANENT DEFORMATION OR FLAW GROwTH. WELDS APE VISUALLY
 
INSPECTED FOR EVIDENCE OF STRESS RISER OR OTHER FLAWS. (C) AN 
IDENTIFICATION IS PERFORMED AND THE UNIT TAGGEn. RAW 'Ar'L An 
PURCHASED COMPONENT REOMTS ARE VERIFIED BY RECEIVING INSP. MEASUREMENT 
STANDARDS AND TEST EQUIP. STANDARDS ARE IMPLEMENTED PER REC.MTS OF MIL 
SPECS. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE VERIFIED ?Y SHOP TRAVELER YANDATORY 
INSPECTION POINTS- PARTS PFCTECTION, MFG. PROCESSES, FINISHES, ASSY A.'iD 
INSTALLATION. THE ABOVE ITEMS AND THE FOLLOUING ITEMS WERE VERIFI5D BY 
0 3
 94 SD75'SH-00
 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER L02
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2A -2111L0- REV:I1/C;3"-
AUDIT CONDUCTED 11-1-76. CORROSION PROTECTICN PROVISEINS, TEST 
HANDLING, AND STORAGE ENVIRCNMIENTS. TENSILE, HEAT TREAT AND WELD 
SAMPLES AR-E TESTED DURING IN-PROCESS FA2PICATICI: IN ADDITICN TO X-RAY 
AND DYE PENTRNT INSPECTION FOR SURFACE "NJ SUBSURFACE OEFECT3. BOTH 
CERTIFIED WELDERS AND CERTIFIED ENSPECTORS ARE USE=D FOR ALL WELDS. 
TURNAROUND- INSPECTION TO 'MONITOR FUNCTIO;AL TEST OtJRING PRESSURIZATION 
CYCLE FOR EVIDENCE OF LEAKI. LEAKAGE TESTS !RE PERFOAEO FT=R 
INSTALLATION INTO THE SYST MrAND PERIODICALLY AS PART -F CHECK-CUT 
PROCEDURE PRIOR TO FLISHT. ?RFSSURE CYCLES ACCUMULATED' APRE ALSO 
RECOROEDo (0) APOLLO FAILUqES WErE ASSOC. WITH INCORRECT TEST FLUID 
(METHYL ALCOHOL), IMPROPER PROPELLANT NO C,"NTENT, ,STRFSS PISEO OR TEST 
ERROR RESULTING IN CREATICN' CF VACUUM. CORRECTIVE ACTION 'AAS TAKEN FC. 
ALL OF ABOVE FAILURES AND ALSO I$PLEME$TTE CN SHUTTLE. 
95S99 Sf75--SH-OO3
 
*HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-0103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS FMEA NUMBER (O3-2A-21 1110-2 
ITEM Propellant Tank Assy FAILURE 1,OOE .Rihhlra in Prnnplnt 
I. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTIWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES fl NO [ 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION 1;1 RESPONSE)?. 
la. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES -*NO Q 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES [7- NO rn 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERi;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTI;IARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES 0 NO [] 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiIE;TING ALTERIATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES- [] NO [ 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
S. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *1 . 2D] 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A EYESNIRO] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES 0 *NO F 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES Q*NO Z]
 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY
 
1.C3 NO H/S ISSUES 	 3.0:] NO SOFTWARE DETECTION S. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.Ej HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. -I DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. - RECOMflENDED CHANGES BELOW 
EFMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
---- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ­ -- --- ---- --- - - ---- - - ---- - -- --- ------
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. "Failed off" thruster may illuminate if < 40 psi is sensed 3 times 80 milliseconds 
apart. 
5. Crossfeed.
 
8b. Same as primary.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 1OZ
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-24 -211110-2 REV:12/13/T7 
ASSEVIBLY :PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: CRIT. FUNC:. I 
PIN RI :mC232-0061-000v,-0002 CRIT., HDW: I 
P/N VEtIJOR:855C3310000-OO,-020 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF I OF SM 
QUANTITY :4 PHASE(S): PL LO X O X DO LS 
:ThO PER
 
-°MODULE
 REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/ 4 -N/A C-N/A 
PREPARED BY: APPROV D/ BY: , APPROVE BY NASA 
DES R BEMIS DES 7 SS... ...
AREL HNE 
See Section 13.0 
ITEM: TANK ASSY, PROPELLANT 
REL C M AKERS \UfPPROVEDWTWIITH C ANGES 
INCLUDING ACOUISITION OE'IICE £NO RETENTION SCREPIS (1.5 FACTOF OF 
SAFETY) TK Z33/204/303/304.
 
FUNCT ION:
 
TO STORE/SUPPLY PRCPELLANT' FR REACTIC, Cr%"'RCL TH;'JSTErS. ACQUISITION
 
uEVICE RETAIaS PROPELLANTS, FOR ADEQUATE FEED uuRING I"u", O"G"--ANU HIGH "G"
 
CONDITiONS. REGULATED HELIUM IS SUPPLIED TO THE ULLAGE TO FORCE PROPELLANT TO THE
 
THRUSTERS AS REQ'D. 245 PSIA (+ OR -15) (17.95 CUBIC FEET)..
 
FAThLU E ?OOE: ST'U.CTURAL FAILURE (6)
 
FAILS TO FEEO PAV3PELLANT DUE TO RETENTION DEVICE FAILURE,, GAS .U=9L.
 
IN PROPELLANT.
 
CAUSE(S):
 
FATIGUE, STRESS CCRRCS. CC....AM, VIB, HECH SHOCK, SCREEN CCLLAPSE, 
FROZEN PROP. PROP SLOSH LCA!S, FASTENING Hnwp.E FAILS 
EFFECT{S): ON (A)SUGSYSTEM (B;INrERFACES (C)MISSION (n)C'QE/VEHtCLE: 
(,B) SUBSYSTEM' AND INTERF&CE 'DEGRADATION -. GAS NUS3LES Ik' PSZP CAUSING 
REDUCED THRUST OR COMB INSTAB. (C) ABORT DECISION. (DJ POSSIBLE LCSS 
OF CREW VEHICLE - NASA STATES FAILURE OF ACQUISITION DEVICE SCREENS COULD CAUSE PREMATURE 
GAS INJECTION INTO THE THRUSTER MANIFOLDS DURING ENTRY MANEUVERING. 
DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A) DESIGN (B)TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY:
 
(A)SAFETY FACTORS OF 1.5 (MINIMUM) IN SCREEN WILL MINIMIZE FAILURE POTENTIAL. (B) QUAL
 
REQUIRES 200 EXPULSION CYCLES A 90 DAY PROPELLANT EXPOSURE TEST. DEVELOPMENT CERTIFICATION
 
TESTS DEMONSTRATE 100 MISSION FLOW TRANSIENTS (188,800 CYCLES) AND TWO YEAR PROPELLANT 
COMPATIBILITY. PROPELLANT ACQUISITION DEVICE AND WELD INTEGRITY VERIFIED VIA BUBBLE 
POINT TESTS AT THE COMPONENT, SUBASSEMBLY & TANK ASSY LEVEL. (C) AN IDENTIFICATION IS 
PERFORMED AND THE UNIT TAGGED. RAW MAT t L AND PURCHASED COMPONENT -REQMTS ARE VERIFIED BY 
RECEIVING INSP. MEASUREMENT STANDARDS & TEST.EQUIP STANDARDS ARE IMPLEMENTED PER REQMTS 
OF MIL SPECS. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE VERIFIED BY.SHOP TRAVELER MANDATORY INSPECTION
 
POINTS-PARTS PROTECTION, MFG. PROCESSES, FINISHES, ASSY' AND THE ABOVE ITEMS AND THE 
FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE VERIFIED BY AUDIT CONDUCTED 11-1-76. CORROSION PROTECTION PROVISIONS, 
TEST HANDLING, AND STORAGE ENVIRONMENTS. BOTH CERTIFIED WELDERS AND CERTIFIED INSPECTORS 
ARE USED FOR ALL WELDS. TURNAROUND - BUBBLE POINT TESTS ARE PERIODICALLY PERFORMED IN 
THE SYSTEM AS PART OF CHECKOUT PROCEDURE PRIOR TO FLIGHT. PRESSURE CYCLES.ACCUMULATED 
ARE ALSO RECORDED. .(D) NO IN-FLIGHT FAILURE EXPERIENCE FOR THIS DESIGN. 
98 
993 SD-75-SE-00S 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS 	 FMEA NUMBER - f3-2A-2111 n-i 
,.ITEM Gimbal Joint 	 FAILURE MODE Fyprnpl I ,akagn 
I. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFT'fARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES 0 NO Q) 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
Ia. IF NOT,,DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES Q no 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO GUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO [ 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE 'FAILURE YES j NO ] 
(EITHER BY COMhANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMEITING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY, EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES El NO fl 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWAREACTION OR IMPLEIIE;ITING ALTERIATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4., 	 AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES NO E 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MOE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES 0 NO, 
OTHER FUNCTIONS?
 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES- CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 F] *1Ix zC 
ACTION AND-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE-MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A E-YES0NOO-

TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
E]*NO
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES  
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES IJ*NO g] 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
I.0 NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. E NO SOFTWARE DETECTION, 5. 0l ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. r] HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4, r DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. E0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
In-flight detectability
 
W]FMEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED'
 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Gross leak detection gives first indication.
 
2. Fuel tank outlet pressure measurements V42P2310, 3310 were omitted from.the
 
FMEA and need to be added.
 
3A. Low pressure transducer signals could be used by software to isolate the system
 
automatically if desired.
 
6. There is one success path remaining after first faiTure. Cross-feed.
 
8B. Same as primary.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CPSETER 102 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA tic 03-ZA -211120-i REV:t/OIs/TE 
ASSEMBLY :PROPELLANT FEED A4CRT: CRIT. FUNC: 
,P/N RI :73P550015-tOZ1Q2 (MOAC) CRIT.- HO i
.P/N VENOOR:ICOS099-1:JIt~32 ($S!' MISSIC;;: hF VF X FF .-F S.
 
,QUANTITY 	:12 PHASECS): PL X L3 X CC X 'DO X LS X
 
:3 PER PROP TANK
 
i REOUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A ,-M/]A C-'4/A
 
PREPARED BY: 	 APPROVED By: APPROGVo BY NAS 1: 
REL C M AKERS REL __ 	 i__j, 
A!ROVED WITH CHANGES
 
ITEM.: CONNECTOR See Section 13.0
 
FLEXIBLE, GI BAL JOINT. 
FUNCT ION:
 
AN EXTERNALLY CONSTRAINED PELLO.S (UNIVERS L CCKET JrI"T ASS'Y IES
 
PROVDED FOR THE PROPELLANT TANK OU'LET LI;"ES T( ALL2.L hGVEMENT CUPI .lG
 
PRESSURE SURGES. CGNrECTIMG TUBES ARE WELjEO '0 'ChE BELLw,,S 24N'- TO T.4
 
PROP LINES.
 
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILUPF (s)
 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE.
 
CAUSE(S):

FATIGUE, SHOCK, HANOLING 1:'±O O WELD PENET., EtCCMP FUS trTh. POPCSITY,
 
CORROS RESULTING IN PEN HCLE LEAK- THRU CC'/VOLuTE, PRUP C S E-PqLP

' EXPOSURE oqESS SUrGe-. PL'rh [NOUCED Vte-POGC EPFEC , FLT VI.
 
EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUB1SYSTEM (P)ENTERFACES (CI.ISSIC' (DICREa/VEHECLE.
 
(A) SUBSYSTEM OEGRADATEON4 - LOSS OF 0RPPELLANT. (9 ) DEGF'O--ICN OF 
INTERFACE FUNCTION - PSS CORROS DAMAGE WITHIN POD AND ADVERSE EFFECT 
ON TPS (MOLECULAR VENTING). CC) LAUNCH DELAY CP AOF'r DECISION. - (0) 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREl/VEHICLE - IF BELLOMS JCINT.RUOTURES RESULTINlG IN 
INABILITY TO UTIL'IZE/OEPLETE PROP OR PROP REACTS WITH FUEL Oq OX 
CAUSING FIRE OR EXPLOSION. 
fOISPOSITION & RATIONkLE (A)OESIGN (BITEST (C)INSPECTLON (O)FAELURE HISTORY: 
(A) MULTIPLE BELLOWS ARE UTILIZED. FLOW INDUCED VIBRATION ANALYSIS
 
AND STRESS ANALYSIS ARE CONZUCTED TO VERIFY ACCEPTABLE DESIGN. THE
 
EXTERNAL CCNSTRAINT (UNIVERSAL SOCKET JOINT ASS'Yl 'AULD TEND TO
 
LIMIT ANY GROSS PROPELLANT LEAK IN EVENT OF BELLCWS FAILURE.
 
ITEM IS USED DURING SYSTEM EVALUATION TESTS AT WSTF ALLnING
 
EVALUATION UNDER SIMULATED 41SSION USAGE CONDITION. (C) A VISUAL
 
INSP AND IDENTIFICATION IS PERFoRMED AND THE UNIT TAGGED. CON-

TAMINATION CONTROL PROCESS, CORROS. PROTECTION PROVISIONS, NOE
 
EXAM OF WELDS. INSP FOR SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE -DEFECTS, RAW 
MAT'L (LOT) CERTIFICATION, PARTS PROTECTION, COATING AND PLATING
 
PROCESSES ARE VERIFIED BY I-ISPECTIQN. MANUF, INSTALLATICN, AfO 4SSY
 
OPERATIONS ARE VERIIED BY SHOP TRAVELER MANDATORY. INSP POINTS. THE
 
ABOVE ITEMS AND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE VERIFIED BY AUDIT CONDUCTED
 
8-29--T7. CONTAMINATION CONTROL PLAN,. PROPERLY MONITORED HANCLING AND 
STORAGE ENVIRONMENT, SPECIAL MEASUREMENT STANDARDS AND EQUIP AND MAT'L 
CONFORMANCE TO CONTRACT.REOMTS.. TURNAROUND - MONITOR LEAKAGE TESTS 
PERFORMED AFTER INSTALLATION INTO THE SYSTEM AND AS PART OF CHECKOUT." 
101 94D75-SH-ooo3 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - CRBITER .OZ-

SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION COCJTROL - FMEA NO 03-2A -211120-t REV:11/08/7E 
-PROCEDURE PRIOR TO FLIGHT. (0) NO FAILURE HISTORY AVILAELE ALThOUGH THE 
APOLLC POGRAM 010 SHOW SOME PROBLEMS ON FLEX HCS2 ASSY CUE TC PIN HOLE
 
CORROSION ASSOC. WITH RESIDUAL SDLVENTS Af]D PRCPELLANT. 
102 
M5 SD75-SH-ooo3 
-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS- CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT-RCS 	 FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-221308-1 
ITEM Bellows Assy. 	 FAILURE MODE External Leakage 
1. DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMTICALLY YES J] NO U 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION II RESPONSE)?. 
Ia. IF NOT. DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE IIFORMATION THAT THE, FLIGHT SOFTVARE COULD *YES n NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FNEA EVALUATION OF YES 5 *NO E] 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE TP-E EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES [] NO [
 (EITHER BY CON IANDIRG HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERN:ATE PROGRAIM LOGIC)?­
3a. IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR TEE SOFTWARE TO CONPE;NSATE FOR THIS *YES _ NO 5 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiIETING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	 AS' A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES 5, NO 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY-AFFECT *YES ] NO
 OTHER FUNCTIO3S?
 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDIARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [] *1[] 2X
 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FN.EA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTIONl IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A D YESmN'OGJ 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER I OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES 40 ]0 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES ]*NO 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.0 NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. 3 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
4. DETECTION 	 IRECOIK4ENDED CHANGES BELOW2.M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK W DURING CHECKOUT 6. 
In-flight detectability 
[DFMEA CHANGE RECOMMEIDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. Gross leak detection gives first indication. 
103
 
" 

* - 1 < -, iL- - .l *r-~I"J v L S - : 
t-. L L L 
I yI 
* - l :;,tL S/,(.Sj: i-L ,,I~ , I,'/ 
A Y 
;'' ' ..
A lY $_, c': r'- I1, -' ,. , ­
*IU- ';k ,i..... ?.......... - / ,,i . . s: ,
N ..  
* ­ vS i C-'-C
-' t.5V V'UVLT" :IC\ k' YC._:.: .. , " ID
* *. a:. Ir 
.7 K.~ t'Jt..7 
I '- I S c s 
L55' N- I-- L/ ' 
-it--
-­
*-' !, " '-l L 
 . . .
 
. 1L-'Ur o.Ly ;,-S- r Slu, L'
'"- C ,.. .. :. "v " L ,S A S P "S'-s ItL! C S I.{ I"U LL 
, LC-: 4 VAL' 'L, II P-Wj-LLL MI,- ]. {iZL,. 
' 
* r ' IE-i c u 
r 
r=i L -">. *: IAU .J'A rb LL W. --

.v:~~' L Li Y ,l 
- "
 
. u:"" 

>1..,,jt)--; 
 L
* -f !, I -L A-.L. 
- _N- it, . '\VL I tlNO . 
r'-' CIj1 }:OF Stt.S ,It:., (f JI >TflQM -(..(C.. . ..P OI'":. l: Ii i 1T' . . ,.
l CF L ' A_- "" . !"-L i S l ii * (,* ' 1>.! i J5Ii:, A l' C:\ - L :$5- C1" FH .JH-LLA%f. ( ;) -- ,}-, ilL.. 
* 11, ..r F t'. TlIl..l - i-'..S Cu 'l,-. A..."' ia i\ " '
 
(',LC '_L~',,f_11S L ). IL) LAU\2n ',,-LtY':.: 4,1..'T usA$.l .\• 
L- "' o_- 1..F ,I. S f, -P 1 Cll L7 G, 1 I- S'' A" IU',L, F l f 1 1;t 1-,*L" 

{ . . .. '',-Lv.-'-, L.-LeI.~t-'.,:Fr 'I1S''i\ ' Pw. ,'.L,, .,'I~ 
t T.. ... .. TcSt, AT ;"A,,5 fLE.LIRGA PAG isLI 
SI:N. -- L :-z HLLe,,r utn-i. H,.,Z:' ' .,I~ . fCXIC 10 "-LV "x. *-.... 
1<": f.(,JAS.ufLP-IIC ,-ILt., t: F. .N',Lt-.. Al,- LA C4,V',.L',tS F L=:I -- , 
°OP POOR QUALRTY 
104 
--
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - GRBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FlEA NO O3-2A -aZ1308- REV:1IOS/?5 
ASSEMBLY :THRUSTER/PROPELLANT FEED ABORT: CPIT. FUNC: I 
.P/N RI :NC621-0059 CRIT. HOW: I 
,P/N VENDOR:73P550Ot3-.OOITHRUI005 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM 
QUANTITY :56 PHASE(S): Pt X LO X CC X 00 X LS X 
%ONE FUEL aN ONE OXIDEZ. 
,PER THRUSTER(PRr F VERN) 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-fl/a B-N/A C-N/ 
PREPARED BY: - APPRrlV£D . '" APPROVEf BYh&ASAJ:IL 
.DES N GLAV(NICH DE S SS.-
REL G. M AKERS RELR 
" JAPPROVED WITH CHANGES 
ITEM: BELLOWS ASSEA., See Section 13.0 
ENG INE ALIGNMENT. 
FUNCT IONf 
% STAINLESS STEEL EXTERtlALLY (CYLINDER) CONSTRA,MF. 2ELLCS UITH RIGID 
TUSE END CONNECTIONS IS PRCVIDEO AS A :Ar4ANS CF GCNNECTENG ANC %LIZSN"4,t 
THE THRUSTER VALVES TO THE PROPELLANT SYSTEM. 
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE tS) 
EXTERNAL LEAKGE. 
CAUSE(S):
 
FATIGUE, SHOCK, HAtiDLING, I4A,)EQ ,ELO ?.NEt N.C&4P -UE'" POPOSITY, 
CORROS-PROP E B-PROP EXPOJSURS, PRESS SURGE-, FLO1 INDD!CED Vib-POGQ 
EFFECT* FLT VIB. 
,EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUSYSTEM {81IJTEFACES (C)MISSION (O)GCPF E/VEHItLE:(A) SUBSYSTEM OEGRA:JATION - COSS OF PROPELLANT. (3) DEGRAOA-IO;I OF 
INTERFACE FUNCTION - PUSS CORROS DAMAGE WITHIN POO AND ADVERSE EFFECT 
ON TPS (MOLECULAR VENTING). (C) LAUNCH 0'LAY OR &.30PT OECISIMN. ()
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CRE4/VEHICLE - FAILURE NOT CETECTA3LE SINCE PVT 
MEASUREMENTS HAVE SEEN DELETED FROM SOFTWA2E FOR ASCENT AND RTLS. 
(ISOLATION IS POSS'IdLE DUPING OTHER MISSION PH\SESK) 
.DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (BSTEST (C)INSPECTIJN (J)FAILURE HISTORY: 
(A) MULTIPLE BELLOWS ARE UTILIZED. FLJOW INDUCED VIBRATION ANALYSIS aND 
STRESS ANALYSIS 'ERE CONDUCTED TO VERIFY ACCEPTABLE: DESIGN. THE 
EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT WOULD TEND TO LIMIT ANY GROSS PROPELLANT LEAK IN 
EVENT OF BELLOWS F4ILURE. POOPELLANT LEAK F.OM LINE TO TH;USTER CCULD 
BE ISOLATED BY MANIFOLD VALVE. (S) ITE;4 ES USED DURING SYSTEM 
EVALUATION TESTS AT WSTF ALLOWING EVALUATION UNDER SIMULATED 'AISSION 
USAGE CONDITION. (C) A VISUAL INSP AND IDENTIFICATION IS PERFORMEO AND 
THE UNIT TAGGED. CONTAMINATION CONTROL PROCESS,- CCRROS. PROTECTION
 
PROVISIONS, NOE EXAM OF WELDS, INSP FOR SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE DEFECTS, 
RAW- MAT'L CLOT) CERTIFICATION,. PARTS PROTECTION, COATING AND PLATING 
PROCESSES ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. MANUF, INST.'LLATICN, AND ASSY
 
OPERATIONS ARE'VERIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELER MANOATCRY INS? PCINTS. THE
 
ABOVE ITEMS AND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE VERIFIED BY AUDIT CONDUCTED 
B-29-77.. CONrAMINATION CONTROL PLANr PROPERLY -MONITORED HANDLING ANO 
STORAGE ENVIRONMENT. SPECIAL MEASUREMENT STANDARDS AND EQUIP AND MAT'L 
CONFORMANCE TO CONTRACT REQ'4Ts. TURNAROUND - MONITOR LEAKAGE TESTS 
PERFORMED AFTER INSTALLATIOtN.INTO THE SYSTEM AND AS PART OF CHECKOUT 
-cEDUL._...R..TO FLIGHT.- (0) NO FAILURE HISTORY AVAILABLE ALTHOUGH--THE APOLLO PROGRAM DID SHOW-SOMEPROBLEMS ON-FLEX-HOSE ASSY OJrnl Pl 
HOLE CORROSION ASSOC. WITH RESIDUALSOLVENTS AND PROPELLANT. 
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-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-01 03-2
 
SUBSYSTEJ-1 AFT - RCS 	 FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-221310-4 
ITEM Engine Inlet Valve 	 FAILURE MODE Fails Closed 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFT;ARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e.. AUTOMATICALLY YES NO Q 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FIIEA EVALUATION OF YES *;0 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES [ NO _ 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEPIEUTING ALTER;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES [J NO fl 
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR ImPLEIEITING ALTERIATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	 AS A.RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES [ NO" [] 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
S. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES NO L 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 f *If] 2XE 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FmEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTIONl IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A E]YESrXiIoF-I 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES tonO Q 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES E]*NO *L 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1. - NO, H/S ISSUES 	 3.0 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.E HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. ORECOPI4ENOED CHANGES BELOW 
ZFMEA CHANGE RECOMVMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. 	 "Failed off" thruster C&W. 
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-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS FNEA NUMBER 03-2A-221311-1 
,,ITEM Injection Plate 	 FAILURE MODE Restricted Flow 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES j] NO [2 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION I| RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES Q*NO n 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES NO (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR I.PLEMENfTING ALTER,;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES Q NO fl 
FAILURE tODE (EITHER BY COPMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEI1E;;TI11G ALTERHATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES [ NO n] 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES [ N EO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 D *1E 2EJ 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A ]YESDOO 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
.A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES Ej*O -
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? 	 YES I]*NO ,E 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW)
 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.] NO H/S ISSUES 3.[3 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5.- QACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.0 DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
In-Flight Detectability 
nF' NEA CHANGE RECOMN1ENIDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. "Failed off" thruster C&W. 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST -GRBITER LOZ
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTIGO CCNTROL FMEA NO 03-2A -221311-1 PEV:tt/Czf7E
 
ASSEMBLY :THRUSTER. PRI;AARY ABurPT: CPIT. FUNC:
 
P/N RL_ :MC467-OO28 CRIT. HO~W : 

P/N VENOR:X30898 -MISSIONS: HF VP X FF CF SM
 
QUANTITY 	 :24 PHASE(S): PL . Lfl X CO X 00 X LS 
:ONE INJECTOR PROVE'DED FO 
:R EACH PRIMARY THRUSTER 
REUNOAIC SCREEN: A-P SS -FAlL C-2'­
,PREPARED BY: APPROVE%'BY Ag ADPRO 0 N 
DES 
REL 
ERY 
C M AKEPS 
DES 
REL - -- '/ 
SSM 
-
. . -- -
DELETE 
ITEM: INJECTOR. PLATE See Section 13.0 
FUNCTION:
 
,PROVIDES INJECTION ',APfV RtZATECN OF FUEL ANC OXIDIZER FPCl THRUSTE 
INLET VALVES AND P0cVIOES OCUSLET .4XEG AT 1.50 OX TC FUEL RATIO FOR " 
HYPERGOLIC REACTIONI ftHICH PT flUCES 825 P2UNDS 'F "H.UST aT 70.000 FEET. 
ALSO CONTROC CHAMBER WILL COOLING. THS INJECTOR IS CCNSTPUCTEZ P.F C-!.S3 
CCILUMBtUM 	 & WELDED TO THE CiB CHAAB8 ACCUSTIC C4VITISS- APE LC-CArED At 
THE OUTER 	 PERtPHERY CF THE INJ FACE TC P'2VEN7T IGH FQEO CO4B 
INSTAB. 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT O TOLERANCE' F) 
AT RESTRICTED FLOXW. 
CAUSE(S I : 
CONTAMINATION.. PRO3UCTS OF cCiEUSTICN' RL2.KING O.tFECdS, FpEEZENiC iF 
PROPELLANTS. 
EFFECT(S): ON CA)SUSSYST-; (,3)INTERFACBS (C)AISSICN (')CREI /VEH!CLE: 
(A) LOSS OF REOUNDANCY OR :UICTrCNAL "7EGR-S4TIC'N - REDUCED PPp 
FLOW-CHAM PRESS & THRUST, IIADE. CHAM/INJ FILM CO712LEG. (a) 
DEGRADATION OF INTERFACE FUCTION-INC0 GN&C & USE OF ALT TRUSTERS (C
" 
NO EFFECT. (D) NO EPFECT. (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFEC - 45077 
DECISION - OEGRADED PERFORMANCE OF RED-UNDaNT THRUSTERS WCULD' RECUIRE 
MISSION ABORT. 
DISPOSITION & RATIONALE &A)OESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTION (D)F-AELRE HISTC:v: 
74 MICRON NOMINAL FtLERS ARE PROVIDED rO CONTROL CONTAMIN4ATIfnl FRi STI" 
AND SUBSEQUENT HAZAR-. AUTCATIC SWITCH OVER (AND ISOLATION) ASY GNEC 
FAILURE DETECTION SYS. COMPLETE THEFMiL AND STqESS ANALYSIS HAVE BEEN 
COMPLETED. (8) RCS SYS EVAL TEST'AT-WSTF. THRUSTER CUAL FOR 53,000 
CYCLES. SPRAY PATTERN CHECKED DURING ATP. CC) A.VISUAL INS? AND 
IDENTIFICATION IS PERFORMED AND THE UNIT TAGGED. CONTAMINATION CONTPCL 
PROCESS, CORROS. PROTECTION PROVISIONS-r NOE EXA 3F WELDS, RAt MATqL 
(LOT) CERTtFICATION. PARTS PROTECTION, COATING ANO OLATING PROCESSES :: 
VERIFIED BY -INSPECTION. M.-INUF, INSTA'LLATICN, 4MO ASSY OPE,'M'CNS A6RE 
VERIFIED BY SHOP' TRAVELER 4ANDATCRY INSP POINTS.. THE ABOVE ITEM S AND 
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE VERIFIED BY AUDIT CCNOUCTED 9-2-T6. 
CONTAMINATION CONTROL PLAN, PROPERLY MONITORED HANCLLNG AND STORAGE 
ENVIRONMENT, SPECIAL MEASUREMENT STANDROS AND EQUIP AND MAT'L AND EcU:? 
CONFORMANCE TO CONTRACT REQ,4TS. TURNAROUND INS'ECTION TO INCLUDE USE 
OPTICS WHERE ACCESSIBLE TO OETER4MINE EVIQE"CE OF PLUGGED ORIFICE. FL-: 
SAMPLING TO BE PERFORMED TO DETECT CONTAMINATEION. (0 N DIRECT FAILUIE= 
HISTORY AVAILABLE. 
TTI 
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-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-0103-2 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-221312-1 
ITEM Thrust Chamber FAILURE MODE Burn-Thru 
1. 	 DOES THE FLIGHT SOFT'WARE DETECT THIS FAILURE NODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES - NO [] 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)?.
 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE' INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO J 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE?
 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA.EVALUATION OF YES []'*NO [ 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES [ NO
 (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERN:ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IFNOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO CO'PENSATE FOR THIS *YES RI NO El 
FAILURE -ODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIIEITING ALTERNIATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES 2 NO [ 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES El NO EJ 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 El *1 ] 2v]
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTViARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A Q-YES[ ;Of 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES l O ] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES El*No El 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEt BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.0 NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. f NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 2 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. 0 HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.[f3 DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. 02 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
FCFMEA CHANGE RECOM NENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
1. 	"Failed off" thruster C&W.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM 	:AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2& -221312-1 REV:11/O8/78
 
ASSEMBLY 	:THRUSTER, PRIMARY ABORT: CPIT. FUNC: I
 
'P/N RI :MC467-002, CRIT. HOW: I
 
P/N VEN3OR:X30958 MISSIONS: HF VF X FF CF S­
,QUANTITY 	:24 PHASECS): PL LO X CC X DO X LS
 
:ONE PER THRUSTER
 
REDUNDANrY SCREEN: A-14/A B-'NlA Chl/A 
PREPARED BY: , APPROV B APPROV ,SY 'SA
 
DES i SEARCY 1DES E Ss. .,
 
RE C M AKERS REL a Y'
 
KtPPOVED WITH CHANGES 
See Section 	 13.0 ITEM: THRUST CHAMBER 

FROM INJECTOR TO NOZZLE EXTIENSIfN LCCATEO CCLU"8t f-A.
 
FUNCT IONi:
 
TO COaTAIII HYPERGOLIC REACTION OF PROPELL4'tTS *40 CIRtECT CflMPUSTIfN
 
PRODUCTS THROUGH NOZZLE & EXTENSION TOl PRCVIDE IM'PULSE TC VEHICLE. THE
 
CHAMS IS CONSTRUCTED CF C-013 CCLUMBIUI. hITH ?-512 A CXICA'1(N
 
RESISTANT COATING 4NO UTILIZES FILM COJLI'!G. THE CHAM8e PRESS 13 152
 
PSI & IS DESIGNED TO PRO-UCE A THRUST CF P70 *LBS VACUUA AT A 'C4 INAL
 
STEADY STATE SPECIFIC IMPULSE OF 280 SECO."DS.
 
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL F&ELU~- (5)
 
RURN THRU CRRUPTU'RE Ii CHAMBER.
 
CAUSE(S):
 
THERMAL CYCLING/STIESS FATIGUE, VIB, CnmB INSTA , SHCCK. 'LOCKED IJ
 
ORIFICES, HIGH TEMO/LCCALIZED HOT SPOTS/INAOEO CCDLING NOZZLE
 
RESTRICTION.
 
EFFECT(S]: ON (A)SUBSYSTE4 (3INTERFACES (C)'ISSICN (-D)C7!D%/VEHICLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF REDUNOANCY-POSS LOSS OF 3 THRUSTERS Ic N'FLGLD ISL,VALVE 
MUST BE CLOSED. (B) OEGRADATION OF ITTEDFACE FUNCrION-INCR GNLC L USE 
'OF ALT THRUSTERS (C) ISSICN MODIFICArION/AEOP.T DECISION IF FAILUPE
 
CAUSES DAMAGE PROPAGATION. (0) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BURN-

THRU MAY CAUSE HIGH TEMP OAMAGE TO SURR STRUCT & AOJ THRUSTERS
 
RESULTING IN POSS ENTRY HAZ IF TPS IS DAMAGEC.
 
DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C3INSPECTION (DIFAILUPE HIS T ORY:
 
(A) STRUCTURAL MARGINS (2.0 TO 4.01 MINIMIZE FAILURE EFFECT(S). ENG
 
DESIGNED TO INGEST UP TO 45 CU. IN. OF GAS. (B) RCS SYS EVAL TEST AT
 
WSTF. THRUSTER QUAL FOR 50,000 CYCLES. (C) A VISUAL INSP. AND
 
IDENTIFICATION IS PERFORPED AND THE UNIT TAGGED. CONTAMINATION CONTROL
 
PROCESS, CORROS. PROTECTION PROVISIONS, NOE EXAMWOF WELDS, RAW MATIL
 
(LOT) CERTIFICATION, PARTS PROTECTION, COATING AND PLATING PROCESSES 4AE
 
VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. MANUF, INSTALLATION, !.NO ASSY OPERA ICNS ARE
 
VERIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELER MANDATORY INSP POINTS. THE ABOVE ITEMS AND
 
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE VERIFIED BY AUDIT CONDUCTED 9-2-76.
 
CONTAMINATION CONTROL PLAN, PROPERLY MONITORED HANDLING AND STORAGE
 
ENV-IRONMENT, SPECIAL MEASUREMENT STANDARDS AND EQUIP AND MATL AND EQUIP
 
CONFORMANCE TO CONTRACT REOMTS. TURNAROUNn INSPECTION TO INCLUDE USE OF
 
OPTICS WHERE ACCESSIBLE TO DETERMINE EVIDENCE OF PLUGGED ORIFICE. FLUID
 
SAMPLING TO BE PERFORMED TO DETECT CONTAMINATION. (D) NO DIREcT FAIURE
 
HISTORY AVAILABLE.
 
S 	 17Sf 5-SE-0003 
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-HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O 03-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS 	 FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-221313-1 
•ITEM Nozzle Extension 	 FAILURE MODE urn-Thru 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWIARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES 2) NO f 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION Il RESPONSE)? 
li. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES El NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	 ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES ] *NO 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY?
 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES ] NO []
 
(EITHER BY CONIMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWIARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES [ NO [

FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COPMANDING HARDWARE ACTIOI OR INPLE[IETINIG ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES E3 No 11 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	 CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES 5 NO 
FUNCTIONS?OTHER 
6. 	 HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 5 *15 2f-r 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A 5IYESf ]IO5] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. 	CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? YES 5]*'o [] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES 5*NO 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
1.0 NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. 0 NO SOFTWARE DETECTION S. E ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2. HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.E" DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. E- RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
-]FMEA CHANGE RECOMME'DED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER tO2 
SU6SYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTRCL FMEA NO ,03-2A--221313-L REV:-L/3OS/7 
ASSEMBLY :THRUSTE0 , PRE'4ARY ABORT: CRIT. FUNG: I 
,P/N RI C46T-0028 I CRIT. How: I 
,P/N VENOOR:X30872 MISSICNS: HF VF X FF 2F SM 
QUANTI'TY 	 :24 PHASELS): PL LO X. CC X DGX LS
 
:ONE PER THRUSTER
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-"IJA 
,PREPARED BY': a&PRVE 	 APPROVEb /AS : 
.DES W'SEARCYk DES 	 SSM.
 
REL 	 C M AKERS REL LC 2 R EKL 
APP&/ED WITH CHANGES 
See Section 13.0ITEM: NOZZLE EXTENSION, 

uCATED COLUMBIUM- (WITH INSULATION BLANKET].
 
FUNICT ION:
 
TO PROVIOE ISENTRUPHIC EXP4':SICN OF COMEUSTICN GASES FCO AX EFF IN
 
VACUUM. NOZ EXT IS CONJSTRUCTED OF C-103 CCLU"EIUM WITH R-51.24 OXIDATIOi 
RESISTANT COATING.- THE NOZZLE EXPANSION R-ATIC ES 2Z TO 1. -'HE 1,Z EXT 
IS INTEGR-AL WITH THE COMB CH-NS AND -ENCLOSED IN A CYO.I FLEX I,,5UL 
SHROUD SO THAT THE EXT TEMP IS MAINTAINED PER THE PROCUREMENT 
SPECIFICATION REQM'T. 
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTIHPL F tLRE, (S) 
BURN-THRU. 
CAUSE(S): 
HIGH TEMPERATURE IN LOCAL SPOT CCNTAMI.,4&TEO INJ.CT'rlP C'n.NT HOLES -LD 
CR MAT'L DEFECT'., 
EFFECT(S):ON -C()SUBSYSTEM (3 |INTERF4CES (C*IESSECN (0)CP.E./VEHICLE:
 
(.A) LOSS OF REDUNOANCY-POSS LOSS OF 3 ThOUSTERZ IF Y'FrrL ISOL VALVE
 
MUST BE CLOSED., (.8) 'EGRACATION OF iNTE FACE FUNCTION-INCR, GNSC Z USE
 
OF ALT THRUSTERS- SURN-THPU MAY CAUSE HIGH TEMP DAM TO SURP STAUCT,
 
TPS. & AOJ THRUSTERS (C) MISSION-M OOIFCTICIN/ 8CRT DECISION IF
 
FAILURE CAUSES DAMAGE PROPAGATICN. (0) LOSS CF CPEW/VEHICLE-URN,
 
TNRU MAY CAUSE HIGH TEMP DAMAGE TO SURR STRUC T & ADJ STRUCTURES
 
RESULTING IN POSS ENTRY HAZ IF TPS IS DAMAGC
 
DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN .(B)TES7r (C)INSPECTION (O)FAILURE HISTORY:
 
(4) H'IGH THERMAL mARGINS IN NOZZLE EXTENSION AND HIGH COOLING ARGIN
 
WILL MINIMIZE FAILURE EFFECT. ENG DESIGNED 
TO INGEST 45 CU. IN. OF GAS..THRUSTER CAN BE ISOLATED AT INLET 
OR MANIFOLD VALVE. (B)' RCS SYS.EVAL TEST AT hSTF. THRUSTER- QUAL FOR 
50,,000 CYCLES. (C A VISUAL INSP AND IDENTIFICATION I'S PERFORMED AN!O 
THE UNIT TAGGED. CONTA.4INATION CONTROL PROCESS, CORROS. PROTECTION 
PROVISIONS. NOE EXAM OF WELDSC.RAW- MT'L (LOT) CERTIFICATION, P&RTS 
PROTECTION. COATING AND PLATING PROCESSES ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECT.I'N. 
MANUF. INSTALLATIONv AND ASSY OPERATIONS-4E VERIFIED BY SHOP TRAVELER 
MANDATORY INSP POINTS.. THE ABOVE ITEMS AND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE 
VERIFIED BY AUDIT CONDUCTED 9--Z-76-. CONTMINATION CONTROL PLAN,
 
PROPERLY MONITORED HANOLING AND STORAGE ENVIRONMENT, SPECIAL -EASUREMENT
 
STANDARDS AND EQUIP AND MATT L AND EQUIP CONFORMANCE TO CONTRACT REQMTS.
 
TURNAROUND INSPECTION TO INCLUDE USE OF OPTICS WHERE ACCESSIBLE TO
 
DETERMINE EVIDENCE OF BURN-THRU.. (0) NO DIRECT FAILURE HISTORY
 
AVAILABLE-

Is 	 SD75-.SF-O 003 T19. 
.HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-0103-2 -
SUBSYSTEM AFT - RCS -F.EA NUMBER 03-2A-231310-1
 
ITEM Vernier Thruster FAILURE MODE Loss of Output
 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES JX NO [ 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION Il RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES [ NO 2 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSW RS TO OUESTIONS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FMEA EVALUATION OF YES 'l*NO[ 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES NO £3 
(EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO COMPENSATE FOR THIS *YES 40 EjMO 

FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COPtNDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEiE;TING ALTERNATE
 
PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES [] NO [
 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE?
 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES 0 NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 ] *I1 2£3
 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FNEA CRITICALITY.
 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A FDjYES-RO[
 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTIOn AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTIO?
 
8. 	IF THE ANS.WER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES ElJ *NO F] 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES (*NO "­
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEZ BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY
 
1. NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. C NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.M HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. - DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. [ RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW
 
3F-flEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED
 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS:
 
3. Down modes to free drift.
 
6., No redundancy in the verniers.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - C"8ITEq 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO0D03-ZA -23I31U-1 ,EV:Li/08/73

ASSEMBLY :VERNIER THRUSTER ABORT: CRIT. FUNC: a
 
PIN RI £MC467-OOZ9 CRIT. HOW: 2 
P/N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VP X FF .iF SM 
QUANTITY :4 PHASE(S): PL LO Cc X O0 LS 
:2 PER- POD 
:.. PITCH, I YAW 
REDUNOAN SCREEN: -PASS n-PASS C-FAIL 
PREPARED BY: PP-CVE .PPPR'1 0 4: 
DRERTAGGARTt' DES i ess 
EC AKERS EL 
-
ARVED WITH CHANGES
 
ITF.M: THRUSTER, ASSY, VERNIER See Section 13.0
 
25 POUIND THRUST LEVEL. V1 357/358/257/258.
 
FUNCT ION: 
CNE PITCH (2 AXIS-UP FIRING) AtO ONE YAW (PLUS/MIIUS Y AXIS) VE.RNIER 
THRUSTER ARE PRCVIZ"ED IN EAC' ARCS MODULE TC PrCVIOE PE'.CISE LO0, LEVEL 
PULSING AND ATTITUDE H'2LC R--'O OP PAYLOA0 DCINTIN;G. rilY 492 - " 
CONCEPTUALLY SIMILA' TO THE PRIMAPY TH'RUSTER 3AUT LINIT PLUngE 
ImPINGENENT "ND PRCP RESIDUE CCNTAM TO rHE PAYLA'). 
PAILURE MODE: LOSS !F CUT 0 UT(THO.UST) (F) 
INLET VALVES CLOSE' 9R EIJ O.TIFICE PLUGGED. 
CAUSE(S) : 
OPEN SCL CUIL AUTOU SHI,-uu'i, INLET VLV LEAK/STRUCT FAIL, t:IJ 
CONTAM/RESIOUE OR FROZEN PROP SLOCKING ORIPFCE!, COm CHA'/%Oz STRUCT.
 
FAIL.
 
EFFECT(S): ON (A)SUBSYST). ().NTERFICES tCP tIsrr {cE,./vmrcLE:

(A)- LOSS-OF FUNCTION ('VERNIER THRUSTERS)-CUR.ENTLY L'SS .VF SI'IGLE
 
VERNIER THRUSTER CAUSES LOSS (SHUTDOhN) OF VERNIER C'NTRCL. (BI NO
 
EFFECT. (C) MISSION MOOIFICATICN OR ABOT rECESICN (COTENTIAL
 
INABILITY T RETRIEVE PAYLCAO). - IT IS PrSSILc CAYLOAD COULD BE 
RETRIEV ED WHILE I, FREE DRIFT MODE AND IN SOvE IN!STANCES PAYLOAD MAY 
HAVE ATTITUDE & TRANSLATION CONTROL. IT MAY BE PrCSSIBLE TC USE: Ftd)j Z %;:T 
PCS EX AXIS) ENGINES FOR PITCH (DO.NWARD) MOTION. (0) NC EFFECT.
 
DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)OESIGN ({)TEST(C) INSPECTION (D)FAILURE H-STZRY:
 
(A) P03SS REDUND MODES IN X AXIS PRIMARY TlirUSTE, PAYLOAD ATTITUDE 
CONTROL & FREE DRIFT MODES. 100 MICRON FILTPATIDN a HEATERS PROVIDED TO 
LIMIT CONTAM & PREVENT PROP FREEZIG.. (8) THRUS-ER CUAL FOR 500,000 
CYCLES. 125,000 SEC BURN TIME, INLET VALVE TESTED FOR 5OO,0 WET CYCLES
 
& 5000 DRY. (C) A VISUAL INSP ANO IDENTIFICATION IS PERFORMED AND THE.
 
UNIT TAGGED. CONTAMINATION CONTROL PPOCESSr COROS. PROTECTICN
 
PROVISIONS, NOE EXAM OF wELDS, RAW -MAT'L (LOT) CERTIFICATION, PARTS
 
PROTECTION, COATING AND PLATING PROCESSES ARE VERIFIED BY 
INSPECTION.
 
MANUF, INSTALLATION. AND ASSY OPERATIONS ARE'VERIFIED SY SHOP TRAVELER 
MANDATORY INSP POINTS. THE ABOVE ITEMS AND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE 
VERIFIED BY AUDIT CONDUCTED 9-2-76.-- CONTMAINATICN CONTROL PLAN,
PROPERLY MONITORED HANDLING AND STORAGE ENVIRONMENT, SPECIAL IEASUREHE'IT 
STANDARDS ANO EQUIP AND MAT'L AND EQUIP CONFORMANCE TO CON'TRACT-REQ.TS. 
ThRNAROUNO - VISUAL INSP USING OPTICAL INSTRUMENTATION. SYSTEM FLUIDS 
ARE ANALYSED FOR EVIDENCE.OF CONTxMINATION. PROPER INLET VALVE FUNCTION 
-ANId LECTRICAL LOGIC POWER 1.5 VERIFIED( O-IRECT FAILURE HISTORY
 
AVAILABLE.
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HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2
 
SUBSYSTEM AFT- _RCS FMEA NUMBER 03-2A-231310-2
 
ITEM Vernier Thru!;___r FAILURE MODE Fails to Stop Firina
 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES J] NO E 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION Il RESPONSE)? 
la. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIONS I AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE FNEA-EVALUATIOZ OF YES *N 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTW4ARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES NO E 
(EITHER BY COMRIANDIHG HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTER;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO CONPENSATE FOR THIS - *YES L NO [
FAILURE MODE (EITHER BY,COPMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR INPLEIIENTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES M NO [ 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES E] 1O 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 [fl *IC] 2f-1 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? NOTE CHANGE TO FNEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	 IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A f]YES RO[f] 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION? 
8. 	IFTHE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES: 
A. CAN THE SFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES l*NO 
B. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES IXZI*NO 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW) 
CHANGE/RETENTION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
i.D- NO H/S ISSUES 	 3. C NO SOFTWARE DETECTION 5. 0] ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2.Mx HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4. M DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT 6. E0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
[GFMEA CHANGE RECOMIMENDED
 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS:
 
1. "Failed on" thruster C&W.
 
6. 	 No redundancy in the verniers.
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SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORSITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NC 03-2A -231310-2 REV:L1/037F.
 
ASSEMBLY :VERNIER THRUSTER ABORT: CP IT. FUNC: 2 
P/N RI :MC467-0029 CPIT. HOW: 2 
P/N VENDOPR: MISSIONS: HF VF X FF 3F SIl 
QUANTITY :4. PHASE(S): 0 L L0 C X Do LS 
:a PER POD 
:1 PITCH, I YAW 
REDUND&NCY SCREEN: 4A-PtSS B-PASS C-FMIL 
DES J SSMATI:APS 
REL C M AKERS REL 
DELETE
 
See Section 13.0ITEM: THRUSTER, ASSY, VERNIER 
25 PUND THRUST LEVEL. EN 357/358/257/258. 
FUNCT ION: 
-NE 
 PITCH (2 4XIS-UP FIRING) A"1D ONE YAW {PLuS/MI1U3 Y AXIS) vE.'[ER 
THRUSTER ARE Pc[UVIOED IN EACH ARCS MODULE TO *jROvTOE FEC13E Lt'i LEVEL 
PULSING AND ATTITUDE HOLD REQ'O FOp PAYLOAS PG)INIGS THEY AtE 
CONCEPTUALLY SIMILAR TO THE OcIMARY THUSTER SU LI'IT PLUME 
IMPI'GEMENT AND PROP RESIDUE CONTAA T.) THE PAYLIAZ. 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO STOP (F) 
F-ILS GPEN, F-ILS TO CLCSE (THRUSTER CCNTI:'JES 10 'J3).:
 
CAUSE(S)

CONrAMINATION, STRUCTUKAL FAILRE,. DUAL ;HCR' IN DRIER CIRCUIT "toOUAL 
'IO FIpE CCM.m4tNO. 113, SHCCK SEAL SEAT ,, P'R.C0 aES'JE , FLUSH SALT2, 
CORROS, WEAR.
 
EFFECT(S):. ON (A)SUBSYSTE? (B)INTERFACES (C)"ISSECN (t-C.E-/VEH(CLE:
 
(A) LOSS OF FUNCTIOG (VEP.NIER THRUSTERS) - CURE,5N'TLY 'LIjSS CF SINGLE 
VERNIER THRUSTER CAUSES LOSS (SHUTDOWN) .3F E NIER CONTROL. (3) 
DEGRADATION OF INTERFACE SUE-SYSTEM - PRIP LOSS DUE 72 EXCESS 3Uj1J-TIME 
UNTIL MANIFOLD CAN 3E ISGLATED-POSS DMAAGE TC PVYLOAD 37 P-YL3AO BAY 
ARMS. (C) MISSION MODIFICATION OR ABORT DECISION. (D) NO q.FECT. 
DISPOSITION & RATLON.&LE (A)DESIGN (B)TEST (C)INSPECTrIOlI (D)CILUPE HISTORY:
 
(A) ISOLATION CAPABILITY IS AN AUTOMATIC FUNCTION *HLCH WiLL 4E,[I.AIZE
 
FAILURE EFFECT. POSS REOUND MODES OF OPERATICON. (PRImARY THRUST-RS,

FREE DRIFT O'DE & PAYLOAD ATTITUDE CONTROL YAY PROVIDE AZOITIOIIAL
 
CONTROL POTENTIAL). 1O0 MICRON FILTRATI.-N PROVIDED. INADVERTENT FIRE 
SIGNAL IS IMPROBABLE DUE TO GPC/MDM DESIGN. (81 THRUSTER QUAL FDR 
500,000 CYCLES, 125,000 SEC BURN TIME, INLET VALVE TESTED FOR 500,00) 
WET CYCLES & 5000 DRY. (CI A VISUAL INS: AND IDENTIFICATION IS 
PERFORMED AND THE UNIT TAGGEO. CONTAMINATION CONTROL O4CCESS, CORPOS. 
PROTECTION PROVISIONS, NOE EXAM OF WELDS, Pt. MAT'L (LUT} CERTIFICATI'4, 
PARTS PROTECTION, COATING AND OLATING PROCESSES ARE VEMFIEO BY 
INSPECTION. 1ANUF, INSTALLATION, AND ASSY OPERATIONS ARE VERIFIED BY 
SHOP TRAVELER MANDATCRY INSP POINTS. THE A3OCVE ITEMS AND THE FCLLCWINm 
ITEMS WERE VERIFIED BY AUDIT CONDUCTED 9-2-75. CONTAMI14ATIGN CONTROL 
PLAN. PROPERLY MONITORED HANDLING AND STORAGE ENVIRCNMENT, SPECIAL 
MEASUREMENT STANDARDS AND EQUIP AND MAT'L ANr ECUI:P CONFCRMAANCE TO 
CONTRACT REOMTS. TURNAROUND - SYSTEM FLUIDS APE 4NALYSED F O EVIDENCE 
OF CONTAMINATION. PROPER INLET VALVE FUNCTION AND ELECTPICAL LOGIC
 
P(hER IS VERIFIED; (D) NO DIRECT FAILURZE HISTORY XVALLABLE. 
127 R'7SE 
-000a 
HARDWARE/SOFTWARE ANALYSIS CHECKLIST SD72-SH-O103-2 
RCS 03-2A-231310-3SUBSYSTEM AFT FMEA NUMBER 

,ITEM Vernier Thruster FAILURE MODE Burn Thru
 
1. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE DETECT THIS FAILURE MODE (i.e., AUTOMATICALLY YES 12 NO - 5 
ANNUNCIATE OR TAKE ACTION IN RESPONSE)? 
ia. IF NOT, DOES THE HARDWARE PROVIDE INFORMATION THAT THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE COULD *YES 0 NO 
USE TO DETECT THE FAILURE? 
2. 	ARE THE ANSWERS TO OUESTIOMS 1 AND la CONSISTENT WITH THE,FMEA EVALUATION OF YES *NO FT 1 
IN-FLIGHT DETECTABILITY? 
3. 	DOES THE FLIGHT SOFTWARE TAKE ACTION TO NEGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE FAILURE YES R]'NO C]
 
(EITHER BY, COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEMENTING ALTERS;ATE PROGRAM LOGIC)?
 
3a. 	 IF NOT, DOES THE CAPABILITY EXIST FOR THE SOFTWARE TO CONPEtiSATE FOR THIS *YES Fl NO El 
FAILURE NODE (EITHER BY COMMANDING HARDWARE ACTION OR IMPLEIENTING ALTERNATE 
PROGRAM LOGIC)? 
4. 	AS A RESULT OF THIS FAILURE MODE, CAN THE SOFTWARE OVERSTRESS THE HARDWARE OR *YES E] NO El 
INDUCE ANOTHER FAILURE? 
5. 	CAN THIS FAILURE MODE, IN COMBINATION WITH-SOFTWARE LOGIC, ADVERSELY AFFECT *YES El NO 
OTHER FUNCTIONS? 
6. 	HOW MANY OF THESE HARDWARE FAILURES CAN THE SHUTTLE TOLERATE (CONSIDER CREW *0 M *15-25 
ACTION AND HARDWARE/SOFTWARE OPERATION)? -NOTE CHANGE TO FMEA CRITICALITY. 
7. 	IF CREW ACTION IS REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THIS FAILURE MODE, ARE CUES PROVIDED N/A- 53YES5NO[]
 
TO SIGNAL THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION AND THE REQUIRED CORRECTIVE ACTION?
 
8. 	IF THE ANSWER TO EITHER 1 OR 3 IS YES:
 
A. CAN THE BFS BE ENGAGED AFTER OCCURRENCE? 	 YES, IZ*NO 5 
B.. WILL BFS TOLERATE FAILURE WITHOUT LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE? YES @]*NO 5]
 
*EXPLANATION REQUIRED (SEE BELOW).
 
CHANGE/RETENTIION RATIONALE SUMMARY 
i.il NO H/S ISSUES 3.- NO SOFTWARE DETECTION S. 0 ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE BELOW 
2..MJ HARDWARE ACCEPTS RISK 4.fl DETECTION DURING CHECKOUT' 6. 0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES BELOW 
5IFNEA CHANGE RECOMMENDED 
EXPLANATION/COMMENTS: 
I. 	 "Failed off" thruster C&W. 
3. 	Down modes to free drift.
 
6. 	No redundancy in the verniers.
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SHUTTLE FAILURE MUDE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS - URBIIER 102
 
SuSSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NO 03-2A -231310-3 REV:I1/Cb/7t 
ASSU LY :VEc.NIER THRUSTER ABORT: CR] F. FUNC: 1 
P/N Pt :I0C467-0C29 CRIT. hWD: 1 
P/N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VF X FF OF SM 
QUANTITY :4 PHASE(S): PL LO X 00 X DO X LS 
:2 PER POD NUMBER OF SUCCESS PATHS ,EMAINING
 
:1 PITCH, I YAW AFTER FIRST FAILURE: 2
 
REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-N/A B-N/A C-N/A
 
FAILURE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT?. YES TIME TO EFFECT:
 
ChAMBER PRESSURE ON EACH ENGINE, V42P32521 THRU SECONDS
 
V42P-2534 AND V42P-3521 THRU V42P-3534 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:
 
MC 621-C59
 
GPQUND TURNAROUND? ............. YES MJO7O-OOO1-C15
 
VISUAL INSPECITON ED72-SH-O03-?
 
VS70-,210II
 
PREPARED BY: APPROVED BY:
 
DES J TAGGART DES
 
REL C M AKERS REL
 
ITEM: ThRUST-R, ASSY, VERNIER
 
25 POUND THRUST LEVEL. EN 357/358/257/25E.
 
FUNCTION:
 
312E PITCH (2 AXIS-UP FIRING) ANU CT YAW [PLUS/MINUS Y AXIS) VEiKNIER
 
THRUSTER ARE PROVIOED IN EACH ARCS MODULE TO PROVIDE PRECISE Lvjw LLVEL
 
PULSING AND ATTITUDE x-OLD REQ'U FOR PAYLOAU POINTING. THLY ARE
 
CO.NCtPTUALLY SIMILAR TO THE PRIMARY THRUSTER SUT LIMIT PLUME
 
I'PINGEMENT AND PROP RESILUE CONTAM TO THE PAYLOAD.
 
F&ILUk' MOCE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE is)
 
BURN TnRU OR RUPTORE IN CHAMBER.
 
CAusi? (S):
 
THkRAAL CYCLING/SIRESS FATIGUE, VI, CO.M? INSTAR, SHOCK. eLOCKEO INJ)
 
ORIFICES! HIGH IEMP/LGCALIZED HOT SPOTS/INAOEqf COOLING NOZZLE
 
RESTRICTION.
 
PFEST(S): ONJ (A)SUSSYSIEM (B)INTERFACES 'C}MISSION (C)CREW/VEHICLe: 
(A) LOSS OF FUNCTION-CURRENTLY LOSS OF SINGLE VERNIER THRUSTER CAUSES
 
LOSS (SHUTDOWN) OF VENIER CONTROL. (8) DEGRADATION OF INTERFACE
 
F-NCTION-INCR GN&C C USE OF ALT "HRUSTERS (C) MISSION
 
MODIFICAIION/ABURT DECISION IF FAILURE CAUSES DAMGE PROPAGAIION. D)
 
PDSSILLE LOSS OF CaEw/VEH1CLE-5URN-ThRU MAY CAUSE HIGH TEMP DAMAGu TO 
SUR STRUCT E ADJ THRUSTERS RESULTING IN POSS ENTRY hAZ IF TPS IS 
DAMAGED. 
C RCECTxNG ACTION:
 
I S ITE PPOPELLANIS FROM THRUTFR (AT MAiIFOLJ LEVtL) AND ASSEs FOR
 
LEAAAGE AND DAMAGE TO SURROUNDING STRUCTURE.
 
I,:M.ARKS/HAZARS:
 
T1lhEp IS NO AUTO THRUSTER ISOL AFTLR BURN INITIATION (OURING IRI,'b).
 
PuT IXPINC'IT O. HLT GASES C. t.L- SlVUoT E AjJ ThUST-RS. aUxQ4-l-;KU
 
'AY CAUSE m1Gm TLMP CAN TU SL'iRK W51ULI L AUJ TrtUSTERS RESULTINS IN Ph.S
 
t-xISY HAZ IF-TPS IS DAHAGED.
 
SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER 102
 
SUBSYSTEM :AFT - REACTION CONTROL FMEA NC 03-2A -Z3131O-3 PEV:1I/O8/73 
ASSEMBLY :VERNIER THRUSTER ABaOPT: CPIT. FUNC: I 
.P/N RI "MC467-0029 . CRIT. HaCv I
 
P/N VENDOR: MISSIONS: HF VF X FF CF SM
 
*QUANTITY 	:4 PHASE(S): PL L-3 X CO X DOC X"LS 
:2 PER POD 
:1 PITCH, I'YAh 
REDUNDANCY SCIESN: A-N/IA B-N/4 C-N/a 
PREPARED BY:, 4 APPROVE Y,I APPR-VE9Y/A,: 
DES TAGGARTt DES 7tS2A7at 
,REL 
-J 
C M AKERS REL c4 L..a '­
,,PROVED WITH CHANGES
 
See Section 	 13.0ITEM: THRUSTER, ASSY, VERNIER 

. 25 POUND THRUST LEVEL. EN 357/358/257/258.
yFUNCTiON: 

ONE PITCH (2 AXIS-UP FIRING) At40 ONE YAw (3LUS-/MINUS Y AXIS) VERNIER
 
THRUSTER ARE PRGVIOEO IN EACH ARCS MCDULE TC ?0 OV[OE PCECISE LC s LEVEL
 
PULSING ANO ATTITUDE HOLC REO'D FOR PAYLCAC PrINTING. THEY ARE
 
CONCEPTUALLY SIMILAR TO THE P'IMARY THRUSTEs PUT LIMIT PLUME
 
IMPINGEMENT AND PROP RESIDUE CONTAM Tr, THE PAYLOAD.
 
FAILURE NODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (S)
 
SUR;4 THRU C-R RUPTURE IN CH&MBER"
 
CAU ES IS:
 
THERMAL CYCLING/STRESS FATISUE, VIB,, CGCfr INSTAB,. S:CK. ALCCKE0 I'IJ
 
nRIFICFS, HIGH TEMP/LOCALIZED HCTSPDTS/INAOEO CCOLI"IG NCZZLE
 
RESTRICTION.
 
EFFECT(S): ON (A]SUBSYSTEM (SIINTERFACES IC)MISSION (P)flE'/VEHIr.LEZ
 
(A) LOSS OF FUNCTIZN-CURRENTLY LOSS OF SINGLE VER:zIP' THRUSTal CIUSES 
LOSS (SHUTDOWN) OF VERNIER CCNTROL. (B) DEGRACATICN fF INTERFACE 
FUNCTION-INCR GN&C C USE OF ALT THRUSTERS (C) MISSION 
MODIFICATICN/ABORT DECISION IF FAILURE CAUSES CAPSE PRDPAG4TI-N. (D) 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE-BURN-THRU MAY CAUSE HIGH TERP DAMAGE TO 
SURR STRUCT & ADJ THRUSTERS RESULTING IN POSS ENTRY HAZ IF TPS IS 
DAMAGED.
 
DISPOSITION & RATIONALE (A)DESIGN (BITEST (C)INSPFCTIO'! (OLZAILURE HISTORY: 
- (A) STRUCTURAL MARGINS (2.0 TO 4.01 MINIMIZE FAILURE EFFECT(S). POSS 
.,REDUND MODES IN X AXIS PRIM4ARY THRUSTER, PAYLOAD ATTITUDE CONTROL F FREE 
DRIFT MODES. 100 MICRON FILTRATION & HEATERS PRCVID-ED TO LIMIT CONTAM & 
PREVENT PROP FREEZING. (B) THRUSTER QUAL FOR 500,000 CYCLES, 125*'000 
SEC BURN TIME, INLET VALVE TETED FOR 500,000 WET CYCLES S 5000 DRY. ('C) 
A VISUAL INSP AND IDENTIFICATION IS PERFORMED AND THE UNIT TAGGED. 
CONTAMINATION CONTROL PROCESS, CORROS. PROTECTICN PROVISIONS, NOE EXAM 
OF WELDS, RAW MAT'L (LOT) CERTIFICATION, PARTS PROTECTION, COATING AND 
PLATING PROCESSES ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION. MANU , INSTALLATION, 4ND 
ASSY OPERATIONS ARE VERIFIED ?Y SHOP TRAVELER, MANDATORY INSP POINTS. 
THE A8OVE ITEMS AND THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE VERIFIED BY AUDIT CONDUCTED 
9-2-76. CONTAMINATION CONTROL' PLAN, PROPERLY MCNITORED HANDLING AND 
STORAGE ENVIRONMENT, SPECIAL MEASUREMENT STANOAPCS AND ECUIP AND MAT'L 
AND EOUIP.CONFORMANCE TO CONTRACT REQNTS. TURNARGUND - VISUAL INSP 
USING OPTICAL INSTRUMENTATION. SYSTEM FLUIDS ARE ANALYSED FOP EVIDENCE 
OF CONTAMINATLON.* PROPER INLET VALVE FUNCTION-ANDE-- LECTRICAL'LC-C 
POWER IS VERIFIED. (D) NO DIRECT FAILURE HISTOQY AVAILABLE. 
"s Sfl5' -S H-GO03 
MEETING MINUTES
 
Review of JSC 14651, Hardware/Software Interaction Analysis Volume VIII,
 
AFT Reaction Control System Part 2 of 2.
 
1. Telecon held 	between Boeing-Houston/Rockwell, Downey 11/5/79 12:30 PM
 
to 2:00 PM. 
2. Attendees Organization Phone 
Lonnie Jenkins NASA/JSC X 3851' 
Dave Latham Boeing/Reliability 527-0323 (FTS) 
Don Cagle Boeing Reliability 527-0323 (FTS) 
Herb Saxton Rdckwell Propulsion/RCS X 4503 
Larry Gladu Rockwell Systems Engineering X 1189 
3. The following changes were discussed and will be incorporated in the final
 
release of AFT Reaction Control System Hardware/Software Interaction Analysis
 
and will be reflected in the next update of AFT RCS FMEA.
 
03-2A-201010-I: 	 Change SM to RM GAX, change 400 psi to 500. Add gross leak 
detection. Add crossfeed. 
03-2A-201013-1: No. 1 same as 201010-1. Add crossfeed. Add gross leak detection. 
03-2A0201020-I: Change question 1 to ullage transducer will give C&W alert 
< 200 psi. Change no to yes. 
03-2A-201030-2: Question 1 same as 201020-I 
03-2A-201035-1: Question 1 same as 201020-1. Add gross leak detection. 
03-2A-201060-4: Change question 1 no to yes and "No Software-Detection" to 
"Hardware Accepts Risk". Add gross leak detection. 
03-2A-201070-1: Change question 1 and 2 to gross leak detection. Add POD 
Redundancy to question 6. 
03-2A-201080-1: Change question 1 to gross leak detection. Change question 
6 from 2 to 0 and add "Need minimum of 2 yaw thrusters. 
Crossfeed isavailable. Pods are redundant. 
03-2A-201090-i: Change question I to gross leak detection. Add question 6 -
Pod redundancy. 
03-2A-201095-2: Change question 6 from 1 to 2 and delete comments. 
03-2A-202108-1: Change-question I to gross leak detection. Delete question 7. 
03-2A-202109-1: Delete questions 1, 3a and 6. 
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03-2A-202110-1: 	 Change question 1 to - First indication "failed off" thruster 
C&W for 1/2 leg, redundant paths on 3,4,5 leg. 
03-2A-202111-2: 	 Question 1 change no to yes. Add "failed off" thruster gives
 
first indication.
 
03-2A-202120-3: 	 Change question 1 from yes to no and delete comments. Change
 
question 3 from no to yes and add "RCS RM automatically detects
 
and prevents thrusting".
 
03-2A-202150-1: 	 Change question 1 to gross leak detection. Change question 6
 
from 0 to 1 and add "There isone success path remaining after
 
first failure.
 
03-2A-21111-0-1: 	 Change question 1 to gross leak detection. Change question 6­
to POD Redundancy
 
03-2A-211110-2: 	 Delete la/3a add question 1 "failed off" thruster may illuminate
 
if < 40 psi is sensed 3 times, 80 milTiseconds apart. Change
 
no to yes. Question 2 change yes to no. Change question 3a
 
from yes to no. Change question 6 from 0 to I. Add crossfeed.
 
03-2A-211120-1: 	 Change question 1 to-gross leak detection. Change question 6
 
from 0 to 1. Add crossfeed.
 
03-2A-221308-1: 	Change question 1 to gross leak detection. Delete comments
 
question 2. Delete comments question 3 and change yes to no.
 
03-2A-221310Z4: 	 Delete la/3a, add question 1 "failed off" thruster C&W. Change 
no to yes. Question 3 change no to yes. 
03-2A-221311-1: 	 Same as 221310-4.
 
03-2A-221312-1: 	 Same as 221310-4.
 
03-2A-221313-1: 	 Question la change yes to no. Questtonr 3a change yes to no. 
03-2A-231310-1: 	 Change no to yes, question 1 change no to yes, question 3 and
 
add "down modes to free drift". Change yes to no, question
 
3a. Question 6 change 2 to 0 and add "No redundancy in the
 
verniers".
 
03-2A-231310-2: 	 Question 1 change no to yes, add "failed on" thruster C&W.
 
Question 3a change yes to no. Questian- 6 change 2 to 0 and
 
add "down modes to free drift."
 
03-2A-231310-3i 	 Question 1 change no to yes. Change comments to "failed off"
 
thruster C&W. Question 2, delete comments. Question 3, change
 
no to yes and add "down modes to free drift"_ Question 6 change
 
2 to 0 and add "No redundancy inthe vernfers."
 
130
 
Approved by:
 
Larry Gladu, RIJenkin 
System Engineering JSC Propulsi
 
Dave Latham D~n Cagle
 
JSC Reliability (Boeing) JSC Reliability (Boeing)
 
NASA-JSC 
131
 
Document Number: JSC 14651 
Title: HARDWARE/SOFTWARE INTERACTION ANALYSIS 
Volume VIII, AFT Reaction Control System, Part 2 of 2 
Prepared by: NB - Reliability Division 
Distributed by: NB - SR&QA Data Center 
Authorized Distribution 
NASA/USC
 
EH/J. F. Hanaway () 
MG/A. D. Aldrich
 
NA/M. L. Raines/L. T. Spence
 
SR&QA Data Center (Boeing, HS-O1)
 
NB/J. H. Levine/H. L. Williams
 
W. L. Bunce (Boeing, HS-02)
 
ND/T. J. Adams
 
S. Costello (Boeing, HS-03)
 
NE3/E. Vonusa
 
NS/J. B. Hannmack
 
Rockwell-Downey
 
041-AD45/C. 0; Baker, Jr./V. P. Ostrander
 
041-FA46/G. A. Phelps
 
041-FA46/L. W. Gladu
 
041-FA46/W. A. Harris
 
041-FB75/W. B. Fouts
 
